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Abstract
This thesis considers two interrelated themes: the emergence of aggregate volatil-
ity from idiosyncratic shocks and optimisation under incomplete information when,
for reasons of strategic complementarity, agents are interested in both simple and
weighted averages of their competitors’ actions.
I first develop a model of Bayesian social learning over a network. Unlike earlier
literature that abandons one of the assumptions that agents (a) act repeatedly; (b)
are rational; and (c) face strategic complementarities, I obtain tractability for arbit-
rarily large networks by also assuming that agents do not know the full structure of
the network, but do know its link distribution. An AR(1) process for the underlying
state induces an ARMA(1,1) process for the hierarchy of expectations, with current
and lagged weighted averages of agents’ idiosyncratic shocks entering at an aggregate
level. For sufficiently irregular networks, these shocks do not wash out, thus causing
persistent aggregate effects.
I next apply this to firms’ price-setting problem, demonstrating that even when
firms possess complete price flexibility, network learning induces considerable per-
sistence in aggregate variables following monetary and real shocks and that network
shocks plausibly represent a source of aggregate economic volatility.
Finally, I explore price setting under monopolistic competition when facing Trans-
Log preferences. I solve explicitly for a firm’s best-response pricing rule under full
information and show that in partial equilibrium under incomplete information, lar-
ger firms will focus on their marginal costs while smaller firms will place more weight
on changes in consumer preferences and competitors’ prices. In general equilibrium,
I estimate the effect of two distinct sources of real rigidity that emerge from Trans-
Log preferences: the well-known curvature in demand and the dramatic increase
in complexity of firms’ signal-extraction problems. With non-uniform preferences,
the model represents another channel through which idiosyncratic shocks can cause
aggregate volatility.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and common definitions
1.1 Introduction
This thesis is interested in two fundamental questions of macroeconomics. First,
what are the underlying causes of observed volatility in aggregate variables? From
where do the shocks arise and of what are they comprised? Second, what explains the
magnitude and persistence of the effects of aggregate shocks on the macroeconomy?
Is it possible for those effects to persist beyond the shock itself, or beyond the time
when agents in the economy successfully identify it?
These are by no means new questions – macroeconomists have been grappling
with them for decades – but they remain open questions of active research and recent
work has brought each of them (and previous attempts at answering them) into a
new light.
The first question may to some extent strike readers as odd, as it is natural
to suppose that aggregate volatility must be caused by aggregate shocks, at least
when considering a linear model. However, recent work by Acemoglu, Carvalho,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Saleh (2012) and Gabaix (2011) has raised the possibility of
idiosyncratic shocks having aggregate effects when their economic relevance emerges
through distributions that are fat tailed (i.e. when certain agents’ shocks or actions
play a disproportionately important role in aggregation, while the majority of agents
receive a disproportionately low weight). A central contribution of this thesis is to
add to this burgeoning literature by outlining and characterising two new settings
in which this result applies. In both cases, the result relies on the presence of a
distribution that is asymptotically non-uniform, in that it remains sufficiently far
from uniform even as the number of agents over which it applies grows arbitrarily
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large. Section 1.3 below offers a formal definition of such a distribution, demonstrates
why it allows for idiosyncratic shocks to have aggregate effects and discusses the class
of distributions that meet such a characteristic.
The second question is of particular importance to a policy maker seeking to
dampen aggregate volatility in an economy. Statistical analyses, relying only minim-
ally, if at all, on economic theory, have suggested that the effects on real GDP and
aggregate prices from identified aggregate shocks, both real and nominal, are signi-
ficant and quite persistent. Understanding why this is so, particularly for nominal
shocks, is therefore of critical importance.
The most obvious way to model rigidity in aggregate prices is naturally to suppose
that individual prices are themselves in some way “sticky.” This approach was
supported by early quantitative evidence, which suggested that prices, once set,
generally remained fixed for 12 months (Taylor, 1999). With this in mind, the
canonical New Keynesian model was developed by assuming that firms follow simple
time-based pricing rules. That is, that firms choose only the magnitude of any price
changes, while the timing of those changes is determined exogenously. Standard
approaches here are the staggered pricing rule of Taylor (1980), in which firms’
prices remain fixed for n periods and a fraction 1/n of firms update their prices each
period, and the model of Calvo (1983), in which a random fraction of firms are able
to update in each period. Since simple models of state-based pricing, such as those
proposed by Rotemberg (1982), imply similar Phillips curves under linearisation, it
was generally held that the analytically simple time-based rules were sufficient.
However, a variety of challenges to simple time-based pricing rules have arisen
in recent years. From a theoretical perspective, models that exogenously impose
the timing of price changes would appear to fail the Lucas Critique by assuming,
rather than deriving, policy invariance in agents’ actions (e.g. Plosser, 2012). In-
deed, modern models of state-based pricing (i.e. that look both at the magnitude of
price changes and whether and when to change) have consistently shown that selec-
tion effects work against any persistence of aggregate effects on real variables, with
the firms that elect to adjust their prices following a monetary policy shock being
precisely those that make the largest adjustment (e.g. Gertler and Leahy, 2008).
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Empirically, a variety of modern studies of microeconomic price changes have
demonstrated that a great many prices are remarkably short lived. The seminal work
of Bils and Klenow (2004), for example, found that the median duration of prices
in CPI data in the United States was 4.3 months, an update frequency almost three
times higher than previously thought. More recent work by Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008) found a median duration of only 3.7 months and highlighted that a significant
fraction of goods’ prices are changed on a weekly basis.
With prices apparently quite flexible and selection effects ensuring minimal real
effects via what individual price stickiness remains, it is therefore conceptually ne-
cessary to develop models of real rigidity – a “contract multiplier,” in the words of
Taylor (1980) – to explain the sluggish responses observed in aggregate price indicies
following monetary shocks.
One key approach to achieving real rigidities in firms’ pricing is to suppose that
they have imperfect access to information, an idea that dates to Lucas (1972) and
Phelps (1984). Modern models in this field fall broadly into three categories:
1. Sticky Information. First, as argued by Mankiw and Reis (2002), firms may
have access to information only infrequently, so that in aggregate, they only
respond to a policy change gradually. Reis (2006) provides a microfoundation
for this idea, arguing that information processing costs (as distinct from classic
menu costs) make it optimal for firms to delay their updates.
2. Rational Inattention. Second, as suggested by Sims (2003), firms may be
subject to an information processing constraint, whereby there is a limit to the
amount of information they can accommodate, irrespective of the cost of doing
so. In such a case, it is rational for firms to access information in every period,
but to select which signals to observe.
3. Incomplete Information. Finally, as proposed by Woodford (2003), even
if firms are free to update their information sets every period and face no
constraints in doing so, they may be subject to structural imperfections in
their signals. When noisy signals of hidden aggregate states are combined with
strategic complementarity, this gives rise to what Woodford termed “Imperfect
14
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Common Knowledge,” with firms needing to consider the higher-order beliefs
of their competitors.
The work of this thesis fits squarely in the latter of these categories, extending the
problem to scenarios where firms must consider not just the simple average of other
firms’ expectations, but weighted averages as well. The sizes of firms’ state vectors
become much larger in these settings and their signal extraction problems become
correspondingly more difficult, thus leading to more sluggish responses in prices
following aggregate shocks, even when firms are free to update their information sets
and their prices every period.
Section 1.2 below offers some necessary definitions relating to higher-order expect-
ations when there are multiple expectations of interest and illustrates the explosion
in the size of the state vector that they can imply.
15
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1.2 Higher-order expectations
The near-ubiquitous treatment of higher-order expectations in the macroeconomic
literature to date1 has been to consider only the hierarchy of simple average ex-
pectations. That is, to consider settings in which agents are interested only in the
sequence of objects
{
xt, Et [xt] , Et
[
Et [xt]
]
, · · ·} where Et [·] ≡ ∫ 10 Et (i) [·] di.
It is important to realise that this is a modelling choice only, made for analytical
convenience. It is easy to envisage scenarios where other, more complex hierarchies of
beliefs are relevant and this thesis occupies itself with two such examples. The first,
dealt with in chapters 2 and 3, involves rational learning over a network, in which
economic agents must (in principle, at least) form opinions regarding the beliefs of
every other agent in the network and know that they will each, in turn, do the
same. The second, addressed in chapter 4, examines firms’ price-setting problem
when household preferences are non-uniform, so that every firm must consider two
separate aggregations of belief, one of which is firm-specific.
To model these fully, we therefore first provide a generalised definition of a hier-
archy of expectations.
Definition 1. A compound expectation is a weighted sum of all agents’ expect-
ations. Let xt be an (m× 1) vector of random variables, E [xt|It (i)] be the ex-
pectation of xt conditioned on the period t information set of agent i and Et [xt] ≡[
E [xt|It (1)] · · · E [xt|It (N)]
]
be the (m×N) matrix containing all agents’ ex-
pectations of the same. Let w be an (N × 1) vector of weights across all agents such
that wi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑N
i=1wi = 1. The compound expectation, Ew,t [xt], is given by:
Ew,t [xt] ≡ Et [xt]w (1.1)
Note that this nests both simple, or unweighted, average expectations (e.g. wA =[
1
N
· · · 1
N
]′
) and individual expectations (e.g. wB =
[
0′ 1 0′
]′
).
Definition 2. Let W ≡
[
wA wB · · ·
]
be the (N × p) matrix formed of all weights
of interest in a given problem and p be the number of those weights (i.e. the number
1Modern macroeconomic literature on higher-order expectations dates to Townsend (1983),
although the general idea has been known since, at least, the famous “beauty contest” argument
of Keynes (1936).
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of columns in W ). We then define higher-order expectations as follows, using a
blackboard-bold E(k) to denote the vector containing all expectations of the k-th order:
E(0)t [xt] ≡ xt
E(k)t [xt] ≡

EwA,t
[
E(k−1)t [xt]
]
EwB ,t
[
E(k−1)t [xt]
]
...
 = vec(Et [E(k−1)t [xt]]W) ∀k ≥ 1 (1.2)
Note that if we are interested in p different compound expectations, there are pk
different permutations of k-th order expectations. For example, if xt is scalar and
p = 2, then the vector describing the set of second-order expectations will be of size
(4× 1) and arranged in the following way:
E(2)t [xt] =
EwA,t [E(1)t [xt]]
EwB ,t
[
E(1)t [xt]
] =

EwA,t
[
EwA,t [xt]
EwB ,t [xt]
]
EwB ,t
[
EwA,t [xt]
EwB ,t [xt]
]

Definition 3. A hierarchy of expectations, from order 0 to k, is defined recurs-
ively as:
E(0:k)t [xt] =

xt
EwA,t
[
E(0:k−1)t [xt]
]
EwB ,t
[
E(0:k−1)t [xt]
]
...
 (1.3)
Note that this is not simply the stacking of each order of expectations on top of
each other. For example, if xt is scalar and p = 2, the hierarchies (0 : 1) and (0 : 2)
are given by:
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E(0:1)t [xt] =
 xtEwA,t [xt]
EwB ,t [xt]
 E(0:2)t [xt] =

xt
EwA,t
 xtEwA,t [xt]
EwB ,t [xt]

EwB ,t
 xtEwA,t [xt]
EwB ,t [xt]


The benefit of depicting hierarchies in this recursive manner is that it becomes simple
to extract sub-hierarchies comprised of a single compound expectation. For example,
if wA =
[
1
N
· · · 1
N
]′
so that EwA,t [xt] = Et [xt] is the average expectation, the sub-
hierarchy of x
(0:k)
t ≡
[
x′t, Et [x
′
t] , Et
[
Et [x
′
t]
]
, · · · ]′ may be extracted as:
x
(0:k)
t =
[
I 0
]
E(0:k)t [xt]
In all of the models in this thesis, the expectation hierarchy E(0:∞)t [xt] will represent
the unknown state vector about which agents attempt to learn.
1.2.1 Size of the expectation hierarchy
Although not of particular importance in theory, the size of the state vector of in-
terest is of crucial importance if any model is to be simulated. It is clear that if xt
contains m elements, then E(k)t [xt] – the set of k-th order expectations – will contain
mpk distinct elements. However, it is worth emphasising that it does not in gen-
eral follow that the hierarchy E(0:k
∗)
t [xt] will contain m
(∑k∗
k=0 p
k
)
unique elements.
This is because if one of the compound expectations, say EwB [·], is formed from a
single information set – i.e. a single agent’s expectation – then the law of iterated
expectations implies that EwB ,t [EwB ,t [xt]] = EwB ,t [xt].
In general, when q (≤ p) is the number of individual expectations in W , the
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number of unique elements in the hierarchy E(0:k
∗)
t [xt] will be given by:
2
N (m, p, q, k∗) = m
(
pk
∗
+
k∗−1∑
k=0
(
pk − q
k∑
s=0
ps
))
(1.4)
with N (m, p, 0, k∗) = m
(∑k∗
k=0 p
k
)
. Nevertheless, even when q = p, it should be
readily apparent that size of an expectation hierarchy explodes in both p (the number
of compound expectations) and k∗ (the highest order in expectations). Figure 1.1
illustrates this point, plotting the size of the hierarchy when q = 0 and m = 1.
A state vector of infinite dimension need not be a problem, per se, provided
that the researcher is able to make a reasonable approximation of agents’ actions
by restricting attention to a finite subset of the state. In most models – including
those of this thesis – imposing a finite upper limit, k∗, on the number of orders
of expectation will be acceptable as in order to ensure stability in agent actions,
decreasing weight is placed on higher order expectations.
On the other hand, allowing the number of relevant compound expectations to
increase can be more problematic as there is rarely, if ever, an obvious reason for
weighting them differently. Existing work in the macroeconomic literature has gen-
erally avoided this difficulty by limiting attention to problems that implicitly assume
that p = 1 (in particular, that all agents care only about the simple average expect-
ation of their competitors).
This avenue is not available when considering learning via networks, however,
where it is typically the case that p is given by the number of agents in the network,
or in the case of asymmetric preferences examined in the final chapter, where p is
given by the number of firms in the joint demand system.
2
m
 [1]︸︷︷︸
0-th order
+ [p]︸︷︷︸
1-st order
+
[
p2 − q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
2-nd order
+
[
p ∗ (p2 − q)− q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
3-rd order
+
[
p ∗ (p ∗ (p2 − q)− q)− q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
4-th order
+ · · ·

= m
((
k∗∑
k=0
pk
)
− q
(
k∗−1∑
k=0
k∑
s=0
ps
))
, which rearranges to the equation in the text
19
1.2. Higher-order expectations
0
2 4
2
0
p
6 108
64
k*
8
0
10
500N
1000
(a) Linear scale
0
2 4
4 8
8
0
10
106
p
6
k*20
10ln(N)
20
(b) Log scale
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
10
100
1000
10000
k*
p = 1
p = 2
p = 3
p = 4p = 5
(c) Cross-section by p (log scale)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
10
100
1000
10000
p
k* = 1
k* = 2
k* = 3
k* = 4
k* = 5
(d) Cross-section by k∗ (log scale)
Figure 1.1: The number of elements in an expectation hierarchy (q = 0, m = 1)
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1.3 Asymptotically non-uniform distributions
The second key theme of this thesis is an illustration of how idiosyncratic shocks
need not “wash out” and may, instead, induce aggregate volatility in an economic
context. Fundamentally, this implies an exploration of settings in which the standard
law of large numbers does not apply which, in turn, implies that the models must
consider weighted sums of agents’ idiosyncratic shocks.
Identifying laws of large numbers for weighted sums of i.i.d. random variables
(i.e. the limiting behaviour of
∑N
i=1 aN,iXi when E [X] = 0) remains an area of active
research.3 However, we do not require an exact characterisation of the necessary
conditions for a weighted sum to converge to zero, as there is a broad range of
functions for the weights under which a weighted sum will not converge to zero. In
particular, it is sufficient to suppose that the weights are asymptotically non-uniform:
Definition 4. Let ΦN be a discrete distribution with corresponding p.d.f.
4 φN (i).
Let ζ (N) ≡ ∑Ni=1 φN (i)2 be the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the same. The
distribution ΦN is asymptotically non-uniform if:
• limN→∞ φN (i) = 0 ∀i; and
• limN→∞ ζ (N) = ζ∗ where ζ∗ ∈ (0, 1).
To appreciate how such a distribution is sufficient to ensure that idiosyncratic
shocks do not wash out, suppose that each agent receives an independent, mean zero
shock drawn from a common Gaussian distribution (i.e. one fully characterised by
its first and second moments):
v (i) ∼ N (0,Σvv) ∀i
3See, for example, Wu (1999), Sung (2001) or Cai (2006).
4Strictly, for a discrete distribution, it is a probability mass function. But since we will concern
ourselves only with the limiting case of N → ∞ and assume that they are indexed uniformly
from zero to one so that the distribution becomes continuous, we stick with the conventional
nomenclature.
21
1.3. Asymptotically non-uniform distributions
and consider the setting where it is not the simple average of agents’ shocks that
matters, but a weighted average:
v˜N ≡
N∑
i=1
v (i)φN (i) where φN (i) ∈ (0, 1) and
N∑
i=1
φN (i) = 1
Since v˜N is a linear combination of mean-zero Gaussian variables, it must itself have
a Normal distribution with a mean of zero. Its variance will then be given by:
V ar [v˜N ] = V ar
[
N∑
i=1
v (i)φN (i) di
]
=
N∑
i=1
V ar [v (i)φN (i)] di
=
N∑
i=1
ΣvvφN (i)
2 di
= ζ (N) Σvv
where in moving to the second line we use the independence of each vector to ignore
the covariance terms. The limiting variance as N →∞ is therefore ζ∗Σvv and, hence,
so long as ζ∗ 6= 0, the law of large numbers does not apply.
The set of asymptotically non-uniform distributions is quite broad, but in par-
ticular it includes the discrete power law distribution (the Zipf distribution)
φN (i) = cN i
−γ; where cN =
(
N∑
i=1
i−γ
)−1
and γ > 1
and its equivalent for infinite N, the Zeta distribution. The shape parameter, γ > 1,
governs the scaling of the distribution’s tail, with larger values of γ corresponding
to greater non-uniformity. Figure 1.2 plots the values of ζ∗ for a range of values of
γ for the Zeta distribution.5
This thesis explores two separate settings in which power law distributions are
of economic importance. The first, studied in chapters 2 and 3 relates to social
5Strictly, these are calculated for Zipf distributions with N = 108.
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Figure 1.2: A plot of ζ∗ for power law distributions with shape parameter γ
networks. A great many observed networks, from links between pages on Wikipe-
dia to established relationships in social networks, have been shown to have degree
distributions6 well approximated by power law distributions (i.e. the networks are
scale free). See, for example, the work of Albert and Baraba´si (2002), Jackson and
Rogers (2007) or Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009). The second setting, studied
in chapter 4, relates to the distribution of firm sizes, which has also been shown to
follow a power law. See Axtell (2001) or Gabaix (2011).
It is important to appreciate, though, that the models in this thesis do not gen-
erally assume any particular distribution, only that it remains non-uniform (in the
sense of definition 4) as the support of that distribution grows arbitrarily large.
6In network theory, the degree of a node is the number of connections it has to other nodes, so
the degree distribution is the distribution of these degrees over the entire network.
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Chapter 2
Social learning over an opaque
network
Abstract
I present a flexible and readily implemented linear model of rational (i.e.
Bayesian) social learning over a network where agents do not know the full
structure of the network, but do know the link distribution. I assume that
there are several dynamic state variables to be estimated; agents act repeatedly
and simultaneously; and agents’ payoffs depend both on the accuracy of their
beliefs regarding the state and the proximity of their actions to those of their
competitors (i.e. there is strategic interaction). When the network is suffi-
ciently irregular, transitory idiosyncratic shocks will not wash out in aggrega-
tion but will instead have persistent aggregate effects, and an AR(1) process for
the underlying state will induce an ARMA(1,1) law of motion for the hierarchy
of aggregate expectations.
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Context
An ideal model of network learning must contain a number of key features. Naturally,
there must exist a hidden state of the world and agents be arranged in some sort
of observation network, whereby they are informed of the actions, if not the actual
beliefs, of a subset of their compatriots. Beyond this, there are arguably three
desirable attributes of a “true” model of network learning:
1. agents act repeatedly;
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2. agents update their beliefs in a Bayesian (i.e. rational) manner; and
3. agents act strategically, with their payoffs a function of other players’ actions.
The complexities involved in solving such a model, let alone simulating it or
nesting it within a broader model of the economy, have typically been thought to
be sufficiently great as to preclude comprehensive analysis in anything other than
trivially small networks. As such, the literature to date has proceeded by avoiding
one or more of the above assumptions.1
Early work in observational learning, for example, focussed on sequential learning,
with each agent making a single, irrevocable decision in an exogenously defined
order, typically after observing the actions of all, or a well-defined subset, of their
predecessors. In such a setting, it is well known that agents can rationally (in the
Bayesian sense) exhibit “herding”, or “information cascades”, whereby their private
signals regarding the unknown state are swamped by the weight of past actions (see,
for example, Banerjee, 1992; Lee, 1993; and Smith and Sørensen, 2000).
More recently, work in sequential learning has examined situations where the
observation neighbourhood of each agent is determined stochastically. Banerjee
and Fudenberg (2004), for example, demonstrate that convergence will occur if the
sampling of earlier players’ beliefs is “unbiased” in the sense that it is representative
of the population as a whole and at least two earlier players are sampled. More gen-
erally, Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) characterise the (Bayesian)
equilibrium of a sequential learning model for a general stochastic sampling pro-
cess. They demonstrate that so long as no group of agents is excessively influential,
there will be asymptotic learning of the truth when private beliefs are unbounded2
and characterise some settings under which asymptotic learning still emerges when
private beliefs are bounded.
Although this more recent work carries the flavour of network learning in that
agents observe the actions of only a subset of their competitors,3 they do not meet the
1Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) provide a recent review.
2That is, where agents may receive arbitrarily strong signals so that the support of their pos-
terior belief that the state is equal to a given possibility is [0, 1].
3Indeed, Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) refer to their model as one of learning
over a social network.
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popular conception of network learning in which agents undertake repeated, simul-
taneous actions in an environment of strategic interaction. Tackling such a problem,
however, is notoriously difficult. The presence of strategic interaction introduces the
need to consider the infinite hierarchy of higher-order (average) beliefs. When agents
exist in an observation network, it is also necessary for each of them to consider the
specific belief held by their observation target and, in turn, the belief of their target’s
target and so forth. As the number of agents in the network expands, this causes
an explosion in the size of the state vector quite apart from the presence of higher-
order expectations (see section 1.2 in the previous chapter for more detail), thereby
subjecting the problem to the famous curse of dimensionality.
In order to analyse learning in a repeated, simultaneous action environment,
the literature has therefore most commonly chosen to abandon the assumption of
Bayesian updating. Non-Bayesian learning over a network is typically modelled in
the style of DeGroot (1974), with agents applying a constant weight to their observa-
tions of competitors’ actions. For example, DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003)
explore situations where agents assume that signals they receive from observing each
other contain entirely new information. In a setting where a finite number of agents
wish to estimate an unknown, but fixed state θ ∈ RL, they suppose that agents
each receive a single, conditionally independent and unbiased signal of the state
and then communicate their beliefs over multiple rounds. Imposing the assumption
that agents update their beliefs via a simple and constant weighted sum greatly
simplifies analysis, but introduces what the authors label “persuasion bias” from
the agents’ failure to properly discount the repetition of information they receive.
Calvo´-Armengol and de Mart´ı (2007) extend this setting to provide an assessment
of the welfare losses from “unbalanced,” or irregular4 networks.
Golub and Jackson (2010) likewise study learning in a setting where agents
“na¨ıvely” update their beliefs regarding a fixed state of the world by taking weighted
averages of their neighbour’s opinions. In contrast to earlier work, they are able
demonstrate that with such heuristic learning, individual beliefs converge to the
truth for a broad variety of networks (provided they are sufficiently large) and provide
4A regular network is one in which all nodes have the same number of inbound and outbound
links.
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upper and lower bounds on the rate of convergence.
In the area of what might be called “true” Bayesian network learning (repeated
simultaneous actions with agents engaged in Bayesian updating), there has been
remarkably little work to date. Gale and Kariv (2003) examine Bayesian network
learning in a setting with connected networks5 and in which agents’ payoffs depend
only on the proximity of their expectation to the state (i.e. without any strategic
interaction). They note that the “computational difficulty of solving the model is
massive even in the case of three persons.” Mueller-Frank (2013) details a formal
structure for Bayesian learning over an undirected social network (i.e. with pairwise
sharing), allowing for a choice correspondence from information to actions (and gen-
eral strategies for the selection between indifferent options) as opposed to outright
decision rules, but notes the extreme practical difficulties of actually implementing
such a rule, both for the agents in principle and the researcher more generally.
Furthermore, both Gale and Kariv (2003) and Mueller-Frank (2013) step away
from consideration of strategic interaction in agents’ decision-making, so that when
observing any competitor, every agent knows that their action is driven entirely by
their belief regarding the underlying state.
2.1.2 This paper
In contrast to earlier work, the present paper is able to embrace all three of the
assumptions listed above by combining them with a fourth: network opacity. By
denying agents knowledge of the exact topology of the network (the network is
opaque) and instead supposing that they know only the (i.i.d.) distribution from
which observation targets are drawn and do not learn about the structure of the
network over time, agents’ state vector of interest includes an infinite sequence of
weighted average expectations instead of individual agents’ expectations. Because
of the recursive nature of agents’ learning, this sequence will be of decreasing im-
portance to the hierarchy of simple-average expectations, so an arbitrarily accurate
approximation of the full solution may then be found by selecting a sufficiently high
5In this context, a connected network is one in which information is able to flow from any agent
to any other agent.
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cut-off for the number of weighted-average expectations to include, together with the
standard cut-off for the number of higher-orders of expectation.
The imposition of an opaque network is both intuitive and appealing. It is not
plausible, for example, to suppose that every business knows to whom every other
business speaks, just as nobody knows the identity of all of their friends’ friends.
From the researcher’s perspective, this ignorance of topology makes it particularly
challenging when attempting to consider the aggregate effects of network learning.
But by recognising that not only the researcher but also the economic agents them-
selves are ignorant of the network structure, we are able to identify laws of motion
for the agents’ aggregate beliefs, even if we can never pin down the path of any
individual’s expectation.
The second requirement mentioned above – that agents not learn about the struc-
ture of the network over time – may be thought of in two ways. First, one might
consider a setting in which the network is dynamic, changing every period. In ex-
tremis, this would involve the network being destroyed and redrawn each period and
in such a scenario, agents are not able to learn about the network as it does not
persist over time. The decisions followed by agents will then be fully rational in that
they are entirely model-consistent, but the extent to which it might realistically be
considered a “network” is called into question.6 Second, one might suppose that
the network was drawn once, at time zero, but agents are boundedly rational in
that they do not attempt to learn about it beyond the common knowledge of the
distribution from which it was drawn. In this setting, agents’ decisions are perhaps
best described as conditionally rational, in that conditional on the structure of the
network, they are rational in their processing of the information they gain from it.
With unobserved aggregate variables following an AR(1) process, we demonstrate
that the full hierarchy of agents’ aggregate expectations will follow an ARMA(1,1)
process, with current and lagged weighted sums of agents’ idiosyncratic shocks en-
tering at an aggregate level. For sufficiently irregular networks – i.e. where some
agents’ actions are disproportionately observable – these weighted sums are shown to
6Such a setup, which is indeed deployed in this chapter, might arguably be better thought of
as a search model.
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not converge to zero, thereby adding aggregate volatility to the system. Despite idio-
syncratic shocks being purely transitory, the aggregate volatility they induce through
the network is also shown to exhibit (endogenous) persistence.
Because we examine a setting with a dynamic underlying state and demonstrate
a specific law of motion for the hierarchy of average expectations, the researcher is
able to simulate the aggregate effects of network learning7 without a need to simulate
individual agents’ decisions. This makes the model particularly amenable to nesting
within broad general equilibrium models of the economy.
Methodologically, this chapter expands on the work of Nimark (2008, 2011a,b),
who in turn extended that of Woodford (2003). The latter of these reintroduced the
ideas of Lucas (1972) and Phelps (1984) – that imperfect information could give rise
to nominal shocks having real effects – and demonstrated that with incomplete in-
formation and strategic interaction, firms become interested in higher-order beliefs.
In particular, with firms observing independent, unbiased signals of nominal GDP,
Woodford demonstrated aggregate rigidity broadly equivalent to that produced by
Calvo (1983) pricing. In contrast, Nimark (2008) supposed that firms’ uncertainty
surrounded the supply side of the economy (the average marginal cost) and, in addi-
tion to their private signals, granted firms visibility of the previous period’s aggreg-
ate price level. Because aggregate variables are functions of the entire hierarchy of
average expectations, this addition required the development of a new solution meth-
odology that the present chapter adapts and extends to the idea of agents observing
the previous-period actions of specific competitors.
Although the present chapter borrows from these papers and the next chapter
applies the current model to a setting of firms’ price-setting behaviour, the model
developed here is context free and may be applied to any general setting with strategic
competition and network learning. The conclusion considers a number of examples
of such applications.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
model, together with a characterisation of the solution and a methodology for finding
7The model is calibrated by two additional parameters: one specifying the number of other
agents each player observes, and one describing the degree of irregularity in the network.
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it. Section 2.3 provides an illustrative example of the model in action, applying it
to a common scenario in the social learning literature. Section 2.4 considers some
other applications of the model, including the need to consider dynamic actions (i.e.
where agents’ decision making includes consideration of competitors’ future actions).
Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 The Model
We here develop a generalised model of Bayesian learning across opaque, stochastic
networks with agents’ optimal decision rule depending on both their expectation
of the underlying state and their expectation of the agents’ average action. The
underlying state is assumed to be subject to persistent AR(1) shocks, while agents’
observations include errors that are entirely transitory Gaussian white noise. It is
demonstrated that for an irregular observation network, the hierarchy of aggregated
expectations regarding the underlying state follows an ARMA(1,1) process, with
weighted sums of agents’ idiosyncratic shocks entering at the aggregate level (i.e.
idiosyncratic shocks do not wash out).
A simple roadmap of how this section will proceed may be of some assistance.
First, in subsection 2.2.1, we will describe the agents’ problem, the information avail-
able to them and how they make their decisions. Subsection 2.2.3 will characterise
agents’ average action and briefly describe the informational assumptions used in
previous research and how they differ to the current paper. Subsection 2.2.4 then
explores the process of observing the actions of individual competitors before sub-
section 2.2.5 presents the main result of this paper.
2.2.1 The general setting
There is a countably infinite number of agents,8 indexed in a continuum between
zero and unity.9 The underlying state follows a vector autoregressive process:
xt = Axt−1 + Put (2.1)
where ut is a vector of shocks with mean zero, while A and P are appropriately
dimensioned matrices of fixed and publicly known parameters. Agents do not observe
the value of xt and must instead form beliefs about it. We define Xt to be the
hierarchy of expectations regarding xt, in the sense of definition 3, and refer to it as
8An infinite number of agents is assumed to allow an appeal to relevant laws of large numbers
when considering simple averages of zero-mean shocks.
9The assumption of indexing agents from zero to one is innocuous and made only to simplify
the calculation of averages (e.g. gt =
∫ 1
0
gt (i) di).
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the state vector of interest.
Xt ≡ E(0:∞)t [xt] (2.2)
At a minimum, Xt contains xt and the hierarchy of at least one compound expecta-
tion. For illustrative purposes, we will assume that agents’ primary concern is with
the the hierarchy of simple-average expectations, so that
x
(0:∞)
t|t ∈ Xt where x(0:∞)t|t ≡
[
x′t Et [xt]
′ Et
[
Et [xt]
]′ · · ·]′
but it will be shown below that Xt must include a variety of other compound ex-
pectations as well.
Agents’ decision rule
Agents determine their individual actions simultaneously and according to a common
linear decision rule:10
gt (i) = λ
′
1Et (i) [Xt] + λ
′
2xt + λ
′
3vt (i) (2.3)
where Et (i) [·] ≡ E [·|It (i)] is agent i’s (first-order) expectation of the element within
the square brackets conditional on all information available to her in period t (defined
below); and vt (i) is a transitory, mean zero shock specific to agent i in period t
(defined below).
Non-zero elements in λ1 against higher-order average expectations capture stra-
tegic considerations in agents’ actions. Note that the terms in xt and vt (i) are
included here to make the model as general as possible. They allow for the possib-
ility that components of i’s signal vector may have direct economic significance in
addition to their informational role. Note, too, that although xt may be included in
agents’ decision rule, it is not directly observed.11
10The derivation of the decision rule will invariably be context-specific. For example, in the
context of price-setting to be explored in the next chapter, the underlying state will include aggreg-
ate shocks to marginal cost and demand, while agents’ actions will be the price they choose and
the signal they receive will include their private marginal cost and the previous-period price of a
competitor.
11For example, a firm may privately observe their productivity, which includes both aggregate
and idiosyncratic components, but not their separate values. If their decision rule relies directly
on their productivity, it will include a term in the aggregate productivity even though firms do not
observe it directly.
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Equation (2.3) is a reduced form expression for agents’ actions that nests a wide
array of commonly studied settings. An illustrative example with a univariate state
is considered in depth in section 2.3 below, while other applications and their implied
decision rules are discussed in section 2.4.
Agents’ information
Agents possess common knowledge of joint rationality, in the sense of Nimark (2008),
so that they are aware of the structure and the coefficients of the system. Their
information sets then evolve as:
I0 (i) = {Ω,Φ} It (i) = {It−1 (i) , st (i)} (2.4)
where Ω is the set of all system coefficients, st (i) is the signal vector received each
period and Φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is the (cumulative) distribution from which agents’
observation targets in the network are drawn, assumed to be identical and independ-
ent, both across agents and across time. Φ (i) is absolutely continuous over the range
[0, 1] and has p.d.f. φ (i).
Each agent’s signal vector is made up of two, distinct components – a pub-
lic/private signal based on the underlying state and a social signal derived from
observing competitors’ actions with a one-period lag:
st (i) =
[
spt (i)
sst (i)
]
(2.5)
spt (i) = D1xt +D2Xt−1 +R1vt (i) +R2et +R3zt−1
sst (i) = gt−1 (δt−1 (i))
Public/Private signals may include both current and lagged information12 and
are noisy, including three sources of uncertainty:
• vt (i) is a vector of transitory shocks specific to agent i in period t, drawn
from independent and identical Gaussian distributions with mean zero and
variance Σvv. These may simply be noise in agents’ private signals or may
carry economic significance, depending on the context.
12That is, they allow for some signals to only be observable with a one-period lag.
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• zt is a vector of network shocks (see equation 2.12 below), comprised of weighted
sums of all agents’ idiosyncratic shocks.
• et is a vector of transitory “noise” shocks to public signals, drawn from an
independent Gaussian distribution with mean zero and variance Σee.
Note that although agents may observe signals based on the current underlying
state (xt), they do not observe signals based on the current hierarchy of expectations
about the state (Xt). This is because to do so would involve agents observing a signal
based on their beliefs before they have even formed them! However, we include
terms in Xt−1 and zt−1 (instead of just xt−1) to allow agents to observe, with a lag,
aggregate variables and thus the past effect(s) of their network learning.
Social signals are observations of the previous-period actions of specific agents,
with the function δt mapping each agent onto their observation targets:
δt : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]q (2.6)
where q is the number of agents observed. In other words, δt (i) is the result of i’s q
separate draws from Φ for period t. For presentational simplicity, we will typically
assume that q = 1 (i.e. that all agents observe a single other agent) and simply
write j = δt (i) to mean that agent j’s period-t action will be observed by agent i
(in period t + 1). To speak of the observee of an observee, we write δs (δt (i)): the
identity of the agent whose period-s action is observed by the agent whose period-t
action is observed by agent i.
With agent i observing the previous-period action of a single competitor, their
social signal is therefore given by
sst (i) = gt−1 (δt−1 (i))
= λ′1Et−1 (δt−1 (i)) [Xt−1] + λ
′
2xt−1 + λ
′
3vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) (2.7)
2.2.2 The observation network
Because agent i’s social signal is based on her observee’s expectation, Bayesian up-
dating then requires that i include Et (δt (i)) [Xt] in her own state vector of interest.
However, knowing that agent δt (i) is himself observing δt (δt (i)) then requires that
34
2.2. The Model
i also maintain an estimate of Et (δt (δt (i))) [Xt], and so forth. This is the explosion
of the state vector in p (the number of compound expectations) described in section
1.2 of the previous chapter. In order to make the problem tractable, we make two
key assumptions:
Assumption 1. The network is stochastic and opaque, in that:
• all agents observe the same number of other agents;
• observees are drawn from identical, fully independent distributions with p.d.f.
φ (i);
• agents know the identities of the other agents they observe;
• agents do not know who they are observed by; and
• agents do not learn about the network topology over time.
To obtain this last point, we suppose that agents make a fresh draw of whom
to observe every period, in which case nothing could be learned about the network
topology (since it changes every period).
Assumption 2. The network is asymptotically irregular, in that its degree distribu-
tion is asymptotically non-uniform (see definition 4).
As shown in the previous chapter and expanded on below, assumption 2 is suf-
ficient to ensure that idiosyncratic shocks do not “wash out” in aggregation and
will, in this context, enter into agents’ aggregate beliefs. Social networks are widely
regarded as having degree distributions well approximated by power law distribu-
tions,13 which satisfy this assumption. It is important to appreciate, though, that
the model here does not require any particular distribution of links in the agents’
network, only that the network remain irregular as it grows arbitrarily large.
13See Albert and Baraba´si (2002), Jackson and Rogers (2007) or Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman
(2009).
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2.2.3 Agents’ learning and imperfect common knowledge
It will be shown below that the hierarchy of agents’ expectations obeys the following
ARMA(1,1) law of motion:
Xt ≡ E(0:∞)t [xt] = FXt−1 +G1ut +G2zt +G3et +G4zt−1 (2.8)
where zt is a vector of transitory network shocks, derived as weighted sums of agents’
idiosyncratic shocks. The exact statistical properties of zt are derived below in
proposition 2.
In the macroeconomic literature, this environment – a state space system paired
with strategic complementarity – is typically referred to as a setting of incomplete
common knowledge, a phrase coined by Woodford (2003) in his demonstration of the
potential importance of incomplete information in explaining inflation dynamics.
The system described here is not in the form of a classic state space problem,
however, both because of the presence of the lagged state in agents’ signals (2.5)
and because of the moving average component of the law of motion (2.8). The usual
response to these quirks would be to stack the state vector with both its own lag and
the lag of the shock with the moving average component, thus creating a combined
state that follows an AR(1) process: Xtzt
Xt−1
 =
F G4 00 0 0
I 0 0

Xt−1zt−1
Xt−2
+
G1 G2 G30 I 0
0 0 0

utzt
et

and then to express agents’ signals in terms of this combined state and estimate the
system as a classic filtering problem. This approach more than doubles the size of the
state vector, though, which may present problems when simulating the system with
finite computing resources (and particularly so in the present setting with multiple
compound expectations).
Fortunately, the following lemma grants us that it is not necessary here to include
zt in the state vector of interest.
Lemma 1. Agents’ contemporaneous expectations of the network shocks are zero
Et (i) [zt] = 0 ∀i, t (2.9)
36
2.2. The Model
Proof. Since all shocks are distributed Normally, the ability of an agent to create an
expectation about a variable depends on the covariance between that variable and
the agent’s signal vector. But, by construction, agent i does not observe any signal
that is based on zt. Since zt is transitory and fully independent across time and from
the underlying state, it must be the case that Cov (zt, st (i)) = 0. The only possible
exception to this is to note that zt is comprised of weighted sums of idiosyncratic
shocks and agent i’s signals do include vt (i). However, we have that:
Cov
({1}v˜t,vt (i)) = E [ lim
N→∞
N∑
j=1
φN (j)vt (j)vt (i)
]
= lim
N→∞
φN (i) Σvv
= 0
where the second equality relies on the independence of agents’ idiosyncratic shocks
and the third on assumption 2 (which grants us that limN→∞ φN (i) = 0 ∀i). An
equivalent argument applies to all higher-weighted averages: Cov
({q}v˜t,vt (j)).
Since all agents’ expectations of the network shock are zero, it must be the case
that all average expectations (simple or weighted) of the network shock are also
zero and since agents are jointly rational, this must be common knowledge. There
is therefore no need to include any expectation of zt within the state vector to be
estimated.
Because of the linearity of the system, the best linear estimator in the sense of
minimising the mean squared error14 will be a Kalman filter:15
Et (i) [Xt] = Et−1 (i) [Xt] +K {st (i)− Et−1 (i) [st (i)]} (2.10)
where K is a time-invariant projection matrix (the Kalman gain). As in other models
of imperfect common knowledge, since Xt includes x
(0:∞)
t|t , we have that (a) the state
vector to be estimated is of infinite dimension; and (b) the Kalman filter serves a
dual role, both as estimator and as part of the law of motion for the state vector.
14With all shocks drawn from Gaussian distributions, it will be the best such estimator, linear
or otherwise.
15A derivation of the standard Kalman filter may be found in most texts on dynamic macroeco-
nomics (e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004)) or time series analysis (e.g. Hamilton (1994)).
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Woodford (2003) supposed that agents (firms) each receive only a private signal
regarding the underlying state (aggregate expenditure) and no social signal from
other agents. In such a setting, where Xt = x
(0:∞)
t|t , Woodford showed that F will
be lower-triangular: each order of average expectations will be a linear combination
of current period shocks and lower order expectations. Consequently, F may be
constructed sequentially, first finding an expression for Et (i) [xt], then averaging it
and repeating the process to find Et (i)
[
Et [xt]
]
and so forth.
By contrast, Nimark (2008) allowed agents to observe an aggregate signal (the
average price) from the previous period in addition to their private signals.16 This
meant that each agent’s signal vector includes a linear combination of the entire
hierarchy of previous-period expectations (since individual actions are based on (ex-
pectations of) the entire hierarchy). As a result, the solution must be found for all
higher-order expectations simultaneously and the state vector of interest expands to
include x
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1 so that Xt =
[
x
(0:∞)′
t|t x
(0:∞)′
t−1|t−1
]′
.
An alternative to including x
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1 in the state vector of interest is to retain the
current signal vector and instead to modify the Kalman filter:
Et (i)
[
x
(0:∞)
t|t
]
= Kst (i) + (F −K (D1F +D2))Et−1 (i)
[
x
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1
]
This approach was first developed by Nimark (2011b) and is also used in the current
paper to avoid the need to stack the state vectors of interest.
It is perhaps worth emphasising that the signal structures assumed by Woodford
(2003) and Nimark (2008) both result in agents only being concerned with the simple
average expectation of their peers (or higher-order versions of the same). In the
language of chapter 1, they have chosen signal structures that explicitly set p = 1,
thereby having the infinite dimensionality of the state vector arising only from the
presence of higher-order expectations.
16The hidden aggregate state in Woodford (2003) was on the demand side of the economy, while
that in Nimark (2008) was on the supply side. Woodford also limited attention to static pricing by
firms, while Nimark made use of Calvo-style dynamic pricing.
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2.2.4 Observing individual competitors’ actions
In implementing the Kalman filter (2.10), agent i needs to create a prior expectation
of the signal they will receive in the next period. From equation (2.7), we see that
it is therefore necessary for agent i to construct Et (i) [gt (δt (i))] as part of her prior
for period t+ 1, which includes Et (i) [Et (δt (i)) [Xt]]:
Et (i)
[
sst+1 (i)
]
= Et (i) [gt (δt (i))]
= Et (i) [λ
′
1Et (δt (i)) [Xt] + λ
′
2xt + λ
′
3vt (δt (i))]
Constructing Et (i) [Et (δt (i)) [Xt]] requires, in turn, that agent i take a view regard-
ing who δt (i) is observing: that is, the action of δt−1 (δt (i)).
Proposition 1. Given assumption 1 and common knowledge of rationality, agents’
use of a linear estimator implies that all agents treat all other agents as though they
observe a common, weighted average of previous-period actions, with the weights
given by the distribution φ.
Proof. The proof may be found in appendix 2.A.
We see from equation (2.3) that the weighted-average action, g˜t, is given by:
g˜t = λ
′
1E˜t [Xt] + λ
′
2xt + λ
′
3v˜t (2.11)
where E˜t [·] ≡
∫ 1
0
Et (j) [·]φ (j) dj is the (first-order) weighted-average expectation,
which we will more fully denote {1}E˜t [·] (see proposition 2 below).
We cannot, in general, make use of some law of large numbers to disregard the
effect of idiosyncratic shocks in the weighted-average action – that is, we cannot
assume that v˜t ≡
∫ 1
0
vt (j)φ (j) dj will be equal to zero – because the weights applied
to each agent may not be sufficiently close to equal. As an extreme example, if all
agents were to observe agent 1 and nobody else (i.e. φ (1) = 1 and φ (i) = 0 ∀i 6= 1),
we would then have that v˜t = vt (1) which in any given period will be non-zero,
almost surely.
In this regard, assumptions 1 and 2 are sufficient to allow us to assert the following
proposition regarding the limiting properties of aggregate (random) variables derived
from agents’ idiosyncratic shocks:
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Proposition 2. Suppose that vt (i) ∼ i.i.d. N (0,Σvv) ∀i, t. For a finite number of
agents (N), define the aggregate statistics
{1}v˜N,t ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
vt (δt (i))
{1}v¨N,t ≡
N∑
i=1
vt (i)φN (i)
{2}v˜N,t ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
vt (δt (δt (i)))
{2}v¨N,t ≡
N∑
i=1
vt (δt (i))φN (i)
{3}v˜N,t ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
vt (δt (δt (δt (i))))
{3}v¨N,t ≡
N∑
i=1
vt (δt (δt (i)))φN (i)
...
...
Given assumptions 1 and 2, we have the following results in the limit (as N →∞):
1. {q}v˜N,t
d−→ {q}v˜t ∀q where v˜t ∼ N
(
0,Σ
{q}
v˜v˜
)
Σ
{q}
v˜v˜ = (1− (1− ζ∗)q) Σvv
2. {q}v¨N,t
L2−→ {q}v˜t ∀q
3. Cov
({p}v˜t, {q}v˜t) = Σ{p}v˜v˜ ∀p < q
Proof. The proof may be found in appendix 2.B.
Given proposition 2, we refer to {q}v˜t as the q-th weighted average of agents’
idiosyncratic shocks and define the vector of network shocks, zt, as that containing
the full sequence of these weighted sums:
zt ≡

{1}v˜t
{2}v˜t
{3}v˜t
{4}v˜t
...

∼ N (0,Σzz) Σzz =

Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ · · ·
Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ Σ
{2}
v˜v˜ Σ
{2}
v˜v˜ Σ
{2}
v˜v˜ · · ·
Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ Σ
{2}
v˜v˜ Σ
{3}
v˜v˜ Σ
{3}
v˜v˜ · · ·
Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ Σ
{2}
v˜v˜ Σ
{3}
v˜v˜ Σ
{4}
v˜v˜ · · ·
...
...
...
...
. . .

(2.12)
Including these higher weighted averages is necessary because of the recursive
nature of agents’ learning through the Kalman filter. It will be shown below that
the aggregate expectation {1}E˜t [Xt] will be a function of {1}v˜t and {2}E˜t−1 [Xt−1], the
latter of which will be a function of {2}v˜t−1 and {3}E˜t−2 [Xt−2], etc.
Note that the following two corollaries immediately follow from proposition 2:
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Corollary 1. Σvv ≥ · · · ≥ Σ{3}v˜v˜ ≥ Σ{2}v˜v˜ ≥ Σ{1}v˜v˜ where ≥ is in the sense that the
difference between the two is a positive-definite matrix.
Proof. Trivial, since ζ∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Corollary 2. E
[{q}v˜t | {1}v˜t = a] = a ∀q ≥ 2
Proof. Follows immediately from item 3 in the proposition.
The first of these is a necessary component of approximating the full solution
with a finite state vector (see section 2.2.6 below), while the latter is used when
simulating the aggregate effects of network learning.
2.2.5 Social learning over an opaque, irregular network
We are now in a position to present the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 1. Given the broad setting described above and assumptions 1 and 2, the
hierarchy of agents’ aggregate expectations will obey the following ARMA(1,1) law of
motion:
Xt ≡

xt
Et [Xt]
{1}E˜t [Xt]
{2}E˜t [Xt]
...

= FXt−1 +G1ut +G2zt +G3et +G4zt−1
where
Et [·] =
∫ 1
0
Et (i) [·] di
{1}E˜t [·] =
∫ 1
0
Et (δt (i)) [·] di
{2}E˜t [·] =
∫ 1
0
Et (δt (δt (i))) [·] di
...
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Proof. The proof may be found in appendix 2.C
Although the complete derivation is provided in the appendix, an outline of the
agents’ learning process may be of interest. To begin, we define the matrices Sx, Ts
and Twq as the matrices that select xt, Et [Xt] and
{q}E˜t [Xt] respectively from Xt
(e.g., Tw2Xt =
{2}E˜t [Xt]). We also define the general notation that θt|q (i) represents
the error in agent i’s period-q expectation regarding θt. In particular, we will use
the following:
st|t−1 (i) ≡ st (i)− Et−1 (i) [st (i)] : signal innovation
Xt|t−1 (i) ≡ Xt − Et−1 (i) [Xt] : prior expectation error
Xt|t (i) ≡ Xt − Et (i) [Xt] : contemporaneous expectation error
The filter
As with a standard Kalman filter, the Kalman gain (equation 2.30) is calculated as:
Kt = Cov(Xt, st|t−1 (i))
[
V ar
(
st|t−1 (i)
)]−1
where st|t−1 (i) is the agent’s signal innovation (the portion of their signal that was
not forecastable). With agents observing the previous-period actions of specific com-
petitors, the signal innovation is then able to be expressed (equation 2.36) as:
st|t−1 (i) = M1Xt−1|t−1 (i) +M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i)) +M3Xt−1
+N1ut +N2vt (i) +N3et +N4vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) +N5zt−1
Note that innovation in i’s signal includes not only a term in their own previous
period expectation error but also a term in their observee’s error. As such, both the
covariance and variance terms in the Kalman gain will therefore include terms in both
the variance of i’s expectation error, Vt−1|t−1 ≡ E
[
Xt−1|t−1 (i)Xt−1|t−1 (i)
′], and the
covariance between any two agents’ errors, Wt−1|t−1 ≡ E
[
Xt−1|t−1 (i)Xt−1|t−1 (j)
′].
The variance in agents’ expectation errors then updates in the usual way via
an interim prior variance, but a corresponding expression must also be found for
updating the covariance between agents’ errors.
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Defining M ≡
[
M1 M2 M3
]
, the full set of equations for updating the filter for
one period is given by:
E
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (i)
′] = M
 Vt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1
Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1
M ′
+ (M1 +M2 +M3)G2ΣzzN
′
5
+N5ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
−M2Kt−1N2ΣvvN ′4
−N4ΣvvN ′2K ′t−1M ′2
+N1ΣuuN
′
1 +N2ΣvvN
′
2 +N4ΣvvN
′
4 (2.13a)
E
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (j)
′] = M
Wt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1Wt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1
Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1
M ′
+ (M1 +M2 +M3)G2ΣzzN
′
5
+N5ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+N1ΣuuN
′
1 (2.13b)
E
[
Xtst|t−1 (i)
′] = F [Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1]M ′
+G1ΣuuN
′
1
+ FG2ΣzzN
′
5
+G4ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+G4ΣzzN
′
5 (2.13c)
E
[
Xt|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (j)
′] = F [Vt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1]M ′
+G1ΣuuN
′
1
+ FG2ΣzzN
′
5
+G4ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+G4ΣzzN
′
5 (2.13d)
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Kt = E
[
Xtst|t−1 (i)
′] (E [st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (i)′])−1 (2.13e)
Ut = FUt−1F ′
+G1ΣuuG
′
1 +G2ΣzzG
′
2 +G4ΣzzG
′
4 + FG2ΣzzG
′
4 +G4ΣzzG
′
2F
′ (2.13f)
Vt|t−1 = FVt−1|t−1F ′
+G1ΣuuG
′
1 +G2ΣzzG
′
2 +G4ΣzzG
′
4 + FG2ΣzzG
′
4 +G4ΣzzG
′
2F
′ (2.13g)
Wt|t−1 = FWt−1|t−1F ′
+G1ΣuuG
′
1 +G2ΣzzG
′
2 +G4ΣzzG
′
4 + FG2ΣzzG
′
4 +G4ΣzzG
′
2F
′ (2.13h)
Vt|t = Vt|t−1 −KtE
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (i)
′]K ′t (2.13i)
Wt|t = Wt|t−1 +KtE
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (j)
′]K ′t
− E [Xt|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (j)′]K ′t
−KtE
[
st|t−1 (i)Xt|t−1 (j)
′] (2.13j)
Provided that all eigenvalues of F are within the unit circle, there will exist a
steady state (i.e. time-invariant) filter, found by iterating these equations forward
until convergence is achieved.
The law of motion
Starting from the basic form of the Kalman filter:
Et (i) [Xt] = FEt−1 (i) [Xt−1] +Ktst|t−1 (i)
we substitute in the above expression for st|t−1 (i) and take a simple average to
obtain Et [Xt]. Since the signal innovation includes a term in Et−1 (δt−1 (i)) [Xt−1]
(from the observee’s expectation error), taking the simple average over i turns this
into a term in {1}E˜t−1 [Xt−1], thereby introducing the need to also determine the
(first) weighted-average expectation.
44
2.2. The Model
Taking the weighted average of the filter to obtain {1}E˜t [Xt] then produces a
term in {2}E˜t−1 [Xt−1], thus requiring that we include the second weighted average
expectation. The second weighted average expectation subsequently produces a term
in the third weighted average expectation, and so forth.
The coefficients for the full-state law of motion are given by:
F =

[
A 0m×∞
]
K (M1 +M2 +M3) + (F −KM1)Ts −KM2Tw1
K (M1 +M2 +M3) + (F −KM1)Tw1 −KM2Tw2
K (M1 +M2 +M3) + (F −KM1)Tw2 −KM2Tw3
...

(2.14a)
G1 =

P
KN1
KN1
KN1
...

G2 =

0m×∞
0∞×∞
K
[
N2 01×r 01×r 01×∞
]
K
[
01×r N2 01×r 01×∞
]
...

(2.14b)
G3 =

0m×n
KN3
KN3
KN3
...

G4 =

0m×∞
K
([
N4 01×r 01×r 01×∞
]
+N5
)
K
([
01×r N4 01×r 01×∞
]
+N5
)
K
([
01×r 01×r N4 01×∞
]
+N5
)
...

(2.14c)
where m is the number of elements in the underlying state (xt); n is the number of
elements in the vector of public signal noise (et); and r is the number of elements in
each agents’ vector of idiosyncratic shocks (vt (i)).
Since these matrices are defined recursively, finding the solution involves finding
the fixed point of the system for a given Kalman gain (K).
2.2.6 Working with a finite approximation
The full state vector of interest and, hence, the transition matrices in the law of
motion and the filter variances in the Kalman filter are all of infinite dimension, so
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the full solution cannot be found in practice.
For standard problems with imperfect common knowledge, where only the hier-
archy of simple-average expectations is needed,17 an arbitrarily accurate approxim-
ation of the full solution can be achieved by selecting a cut-off, k∗, and including all
orders of expectation from zero to that cut-off, provided that
1. the importance attached by agents to higher-order average expectations is de-
creasing in the order of expectation; and
2. the unconditional variance of higher-order average expectations are bounded
from above.
The first of these is imposed by assumption. In the context of the model presented
here, this amounts to a restriction on the coefficients in λ1.
18 The second is assured
by the fact that agents are rational (Bayesian) and this is common knowledge. A
proof of this is provided by Nimark (2011a), although it requires one minor extension
here. Since we can write Xt = Et (j) [Xt] +Xt|t (j) and the variance of the two sides
must be equal, we have
V ar (Xt) = V ar (Et (j) [Xt]) + V ar
(
Xt|t (j)
)
where we can ignore the covariance term on the right hand side because j’s rationality
implies that her expectation must be orthogonal to her expectation error. This
demonstrates that
V ar (Et (j) [Xt]) ≤ V ar (Xt)
The Kalman filter ensures that j’s expectation must have a Moving Average repres-
entation incorporating linear combinations of the complete history of all shocks that
enter her signals. For a simple average of this (lemma 2 in the Nimark paper), any
idiosyncratic shocks will necessarily sum to zero, ensuring that the simple-average
expectation must have lower variance than that of any individual agent. For weighted
averages of this, the idiosyncratic shocks will not sum to zero, but the variance of
17That is, where there is only one compound expectation of interest (p = 1).
18See section 2.3 for a typical example.
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the weighted-average of those shocks will be less the variance of an individual shock
as shown above in corollary 1 to proposition 2. We therefore have that
V ar
(
Et [Xt]
) ≤ {1}E˜t [Xt] ≤ {2}E˜t [Xt] ≤ · · · ≤ V ar (Et (j) [Xt]) ≤ V ar (Xt)
The recursive structure of Xt then establishes the result.
With network learning over an opaque network, however, it is also necessary to
define a cut-off in the number of compound expectations to include (p∗). Analogously
to the cut-off in higher orders of average expectation, the researcher’s ability to
deliver an arbitrarily accurate approximation requires that
1. the importance attached by agents to higher-weighted average expectations is
decreasing in the weighting; and
2. the unconditional variance of higher-weighted average expectations are bounded
from above.
The first of these is implied by the fact that each (next) higher weighted average
expectation enters with a (further) lag and the underlying autoregressive process
ensures that agents assign decreasing importance to older signals when considering
their current expectation. The second was described above and is implied directly
by corollary 1 to proposition 2.
2.2.7 Finding the solution
The solution is defined implicitly in two respects (the filter and the law of motion),
both of which require iterating through a series of update rules while taking the other
as given.
Note that the size of the state vector can still be very large even when operating
with few state variables (m) and quite low choices of k∗ and p∗. Table 2.1 lists the
sizes that emerge for a variety of parameters.
Given the size of the matrices involved, problems of numerical instability must be
considered. Numerical instability arises as a consequence of the round-off errors that
necessarily occur with floating-point operations on computers. When iterating a large
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m k∗ No network (standard ICK) With network learning (p∗ = 3)
1 4 5× 5 : 200 Bytes 121× 121 : 114.4 KB
1 6 7× 7 : 392 Bytes 1093× 1093 : 9.1 MB
4 4 16× 16 : 2.0 KB 484× 484 : 1.8 MB
4 6 28× 28 : 6.1 KB 4372× 4372 : 145.8 MB
Table 2.1: Size (each) of F , U , V and W , assuming use of double-precision.
system over many steps, these errors can accumulate and magnify to the extent that
the system does not converge.19 Such a problem is, regrettably, relatively common
in the implementation of larger Kalman filters and typically first appears as a failure
of symmetry or positive definiteness in the variance matrices of the Ricatti equation.
A variety of approaches can be undertaken to combat numerical instability. We
list the major ones here, together with a description of how (if possible) each has
been incorporated into the attached Matlab code.
Minimise the size of the state vector
The primary approach to avoiding numerical stability issues is, where possible, to
reduce the size of the system being estimated. It is for this reason that the solution
developed here makes use of Nimark (2011b) in avoiding the need to double the state
vector (which would multiply the number of operations in a matrix multiplication
by eight) when including lagged signals.
Factor the variance and covariance matrices
Arguably the most robust (to roundoff error) implementations of Kalman filters
are those that factor the relevant variance-covariance matrices. In particular, since
the variance matrices are by definition symmetric and positive (semi) definite, a
Cholesky decomposition of them (i.e. the decomposition of V into LL′ with L lower
triangular) can be deployed. By operating on the L matrices directly, the implied
variance matrices remain well defined.
19The number of arithmetic operations involved in matrix multiplication or inversion typically
increases with the cube of the matrix’s dimension, with roundoff errors able to enter in every
operation
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In practice, a modified Cholesky decomposition, sometimes referred to as a “UD
decomposition”, that breaks V into UDU ′ with U unit upper triangular (i.e. with
ones on the leading diagonal) and D diagonal is typically used,20 as this avoids the
need to find any square roots. Using this technique for a regular Kalman filter, the
algorithm for implementing the temporal update of the filter (from Vt−1|t−1 to Vt|t−1)
was developed by Thornton (1976) and that for the observational update (from Vt|t−1
to Vt|t) by Bierman (1977).
Unfortunately, although the model developed here is amenable to use of the
Thornton temporal update, the Bierman observational update algorithm is not ap-
plicable. This is because the inclusion of social signals introduces the need to consider
the covariance of agents’ expectation errors so that, when calculating the Kalman
gain, the covariance between the state (Xt) and the signal innovation (st|t−1 (i)) can
no longer be expressed in the form
Cov
(
Xt, st|t−1 (i)
)
= Vt|t−1H
which is required for Bierman’s factorisation. A successful UD implementation of
the current model would therefore require the derivation of a new algorithm in the
style of Bierman which accounted for the more complex structure of the Kalman
gain found here. Such an investigation is left for future research.
Avoid unnecessary iteration
As mentioned above, the network learning problem involves finding convergent solu-
tions to the filter and the law of motion, each taking the other as given. In principle,
the fixed point may therefore be found by finding the convergent result of one within
each iteration of the other (e.g., we might nest the finding of a time-invariant fil-
ter within each iteration of updating the law of motion), but such an algorithm is
needlessly complex and in practice is more likely to suffer from numerical stability
issues.
Instead, for a given set of signals, we find the fixed point by updating the filter
and the law of motion incrementally within the same loop:
20Of course, an equivalent expression of L∗DL∗′ may be found, with L∗ unit lower triangular.
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repeat
Update the filter by one step using equation (2.13)
Update the law of motion by one step using equation (2.14)
until both the filter and the law of motion converge
Avoid temporary creation of unnecessarily large matrices
The solution as presented in the text (see equations 2.13a and 2.13b) involves the
temporary creation (and multiplication) of matrices that are (2 + q) × N square,
where N is the size of Xt and q is the number of other agents observed.
The implementation presented in the attached Matlab code keeps the public/private
signals and the social signals separate (i.e. it breaks the M∗ and N∗ matrices into
their constituent components) to avoid this and to exploit the fact that each social
signal will be treated identically.
Pay close attention to operation order
Because matrix addition and subtraction are of order O (n2) while matrix multiplic-
ation and inversion are of order O (n3), the order in which expressions are calculated
can affect the number of operations required.
For example, although mathematically equivalent, the computational complexity
of calculating (A+B)×C is less than that of (A× C)+(B × C) because the former
involves only a single multiplication.
Optimise the selection of initial conditions
Choosing initial values for F , U , V and W that are in some sense close to their final
values has three benefits:
1. By lowering the number of iterations required, it reduces the time taken to
converge to the final result;
2. Lowering the number of iterations (quite dramatically) lowers the number of
calculations required, thereby reducing the opportunity for roundoff errors to
affect the result; and
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3. Starting closer to the final result reduces the chance of the agents’ error variance
needing to “pass through infinity” en route to the solution.
The latter point derives from the fact that sufficiently low initial variance will
cause the system to diverge, while arbitrarily large initial variance will, in principle,
converge asymptotically to the final result (see section 4.8.4.4 of Grewel and Andrews,
2008). Given this, a common practice is to impose exceptionally high initial variances
in the hope of avoiding divergence. However, such a practice is also fraught in that
too large an initial variance can be a particular source of numerical roundoff if it is
sufficiently large relative to Cov
(
Xt, st|t−1 (i)
)
.
Instead, we make use of our assumption that agents’ problems place decreasing
weight against higher-order expectations to note that the natural set of initial con-
ditions to choose when considering a problem with k∗ orders of expectation is the
solution to the problem with (k∗ − 1) orders.
We therefore use the following process to find the solution:
1. Starting at time t = 0 with k∗ = 2,21 suppose that agents observe no signals
at all. This implies that the variance (Vt|t) and covariance (Wt|t) of agents’
expectation errors will be equal to the unconditional variance of the full state
(Ut).
2. Starting at the convergent result from step one, suppose that agents now ob-
serve their public and private signals. The no-network solution (for k∗ = 2) is
found via the algorithm listed above by imposing that q = 0.
3. Starting at the convergent result from step two, suppose that agents now ob-
serve all of their signals. The network learning solution for k∗ = 2 is found via
the algorithm listed above.
4. Starting at the convergent result from the previous step, increase k∗ and solve
the problem with agents observing both public/private and social signals.
21Note that solving the network learning model requires that k∗ ≥ 2, as the law of motion gives
us that each of the compound expectations of order k relies on expectations of order k − 2.
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The final step is repeated for higher and higher values of k∗ until the researcher
is satisfied that the results are a sufficiently accurate approximation of the k∗ →∞
solution.
2.2.8 A special case
Recall that agents’ decision rule is assumed to be given by
gt (i) = λ
′
1Et (i) [Xt] + λ
′
2xt + λ
′
3vt (i)
and their signal vector by
st (i) =
[
spt (i)
sst (i)
]
spt (i) = D1xt +D2Xt−1 +R1vt (i) +R2et +R3zt−1
sst (i) = gt−1 (δt−1 (i))
A special case emerges when agents’ actions only depend on their beliefs regard-
ing the hierarchy of simple-average expectations (so coefficients in λ1 against other
compound expectations are all zero) and agents’ signals from the previous period
are based only on the hierarchy of simple-average expectations (so coefficients in
D2 against other compound expectations are all zero). In this case, we posit the
following conjecture:
Conjecture 1. When agents observe each others’ individual actions in an opaque
network and therefore attempt to estimate higher weighted average expectations, but
this is done solely as part of estimating x
(0:∞)
t|t (i.e. individual agents’ estimates of
{q}E˜t [Xt] are of no direct economic significance to them) and agents observe lagged
signals that are based only on x
(0:∞)
t−1|t−1, then the impulse responses of x
(0:∞)
t|t following
any aggregate or network shock are the same for any p∗ ≥ 2.
In other words, for the purposes of simulating the effects of network learning,
it is only necessary to include the primary compound expectation (here the simple
average) and the first weighted average expectation from the network. We have
not yet been able to prove this conjecture, but have confirmed that it holds for
p∗ ∈ {2, 3, 4} with k∗ = 6 and m = 1. Its proof clearly calls for future work.
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2.3 An illustrative example
We here present a simplified example to illustrate some of the results that emerge
from adding network learning to a setting of strategic complementarity. A more
extensive model in the context of firms’ price-setting decisions is presented in the
next chapter.
2.3.1 The simplified model
There exists only a single hidden state that follows an AR(1) process
xt = ρxt−1 + ut ut ∼ N
(
0, σ2u
)
(2.15)
Agents each receive a single, unbiased private signal about the state
spt (i) = xt + vt (i) vt (i) ∼ N
(
0, σ2v
)
(2.16)
with ut and vt (i) being fully independent for all i and t.
Agents face quadratic losses from mismatch between their action, a single hidden
state and the average action of others:22
ui (gt, xt) = − (1− β)
[
(gt (i)− xt)2
]− β [(gt (i)− gt)2] β ∈ (0, 1)
With agents maximising their expected payoff without explicitly knowing the state
or the average action that other agents will take, their optimal action is given by
gt (i) = (1− β)Et (i) [xt] + βEt (i) [gt]
Taking the average of this expression and repeated substituting it back in then
eventually yields
gt (i) = (1− β)
[
1 β β2 · · ·
]
Et (i)
[
x
(0:∞)
t
]
(2.17)
22This utility function is quite common in the network literature. See, for example, Calvo´-
Armengol and de Mart´ı (2007). An alternative utility function described by Morris and Shin
(2002) presents the strategic complementarity as being a zero-sum game, but produces the same
optimal decision rule for individual agents (although not for a social planner).
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In the framework presented above, this would be captured by
λ0 = λ2 = λ3 = 0
λ1 = (1− β)
[
1 β β2 · · ·
]
(Sx + Ts)
Note that equations (2.16) and (2.17) satisfy the conditions for the special case laid
out above in section 2.2.8. As a baseline, we suppose the following parameters:
Parameter Value Description
β 0.5 The relative importance of strategic complementarity
ρ 0.6 The persistence of shocks to the hidden state
σ2v/σ
2
u 5.0 The relative innovation variance
ζ∗ 0.1 The degree of irregularity in the network
Table 2.2: Baseline parameterisation
2.3.2 Aggregate beliefs following a shock to the underlying
state
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Figure 2.1: The hierarchy of simple-average expectations (x
(0:k∗)
t|t ) following a one
standard deviation shock to the underlying state with no network (q = 0)
Figure 2.1 plots a standard scenario in the incomplete common knowledge liter-
ature, showing impulse responses for the resultant hierarchy of simple-average ex-
pectations23 following a one standard deviation shock to the hidden state when there
23So k = 0 denotes the time path of xt, k = 1 the time path of Et [xt], k = 2 the time path of
Et
[
Et [xt]
]
and so on.
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is no network learning, so agents only have access to their private signals. Although
all agents’ signals are unbiased, the presence of noise ensures that they attribute
some of their signal to idiosyncratic factors, so the average expectation responds by
less than the truth. Since each agent knows this (common knowledge of rational-
ity), each successive order of expectation responds by less than its predecessor. Note
that all orders of expectation remain below the the underlying state, so the average
expectation error (xt − Et [xt]) remains strictly positive. The hierarchy of beliefs
subsequently decays back to zero with the underlying shock.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Period
 
 
k = 0
k = 1
k = 2
k = 3
k = 4
Figure 2.2: The hierarchy of simple-average expectations (x
(0:k∗)
t|t ) following a one
standard deviation shock to the underlying state with agents each observing one
competitor (q = 1).
Figure 2.2 next plots the same hierarchy when, in addition to observing their
private signals, each agent observes the previous-period action of one competitor.
On impact, there is very little difference because social signals are received with a
lag (the observation of competitors’ actions having been zero in the pre-impact period
lowers the beliefs fractionally). In the near term, agents’ average expectations are
improved relative to the no-network case, with observations of their peers’ actions
reinforcing their own private signals that an aggregate shock has occurred.
In the longer term, however, as the underlying state decays back to zero, the
presence of network learning introduces a degree of persistence in agents’ aggregate
beliefs beyond that embodied in the underlying state so that agents’ average expect-
ations are above the truth (the average expectation error (xt −Et [xt]) becomes and
remains strictly negative).
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This is herding in the broad sense of Banerjee (1992), but with an amplification
from Morris and Shin (2002)-style strategic complementarity. First and most simply,
by observing that their competitors’ actions were high yesterday, agents infer that
the state may be high today. As a result, they partially attribute their low private
signals to idiosyncratic noise, consequently choosing a high action themselves. How-
ever, although there is no public signal available, by effectively assuming that their
competitors all observe the same weighted average action, agents’ social observations
act as private signals about a public signal that they themselves cannot observe but
which they assume is seen by everybody else.24 For any given agent, their social
observation therefore acts as a coordination device for addressing their strategic
complementarity concerns. When the underlying state is falling, this therefore acts
as a kind of upward bias in social signals for signal extraction purposes.
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(a) Simple-average expectations
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(b) Average expectation errors
Figure 2.3: Varying the number of other agents observed (q)
Figure 2.3 illustrates the responses for different numbers of other agents observed.
Although the addition of social signals lessens the average expectation error in the
near term, in the longer term expectations overshoot so that, on average, errors
become negative. The absolute value of the long-term average error is increasing in
the number of competitors observed.
24Strictly speaking, agents do not assume that their competitors observe a public signal. Rather,
their Bayes-rational signal extraction problem is mathematically equivalent to making the assump-
tion.
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(a) Simple-average expectations
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(b) Average expectation errors
Figure 2.4: Varying underlying persistence (ρ)
Figure 2.4 shows the impulse responses of first-order simple-average expectations
and the corresponding average expectation errors for different values of ρ. Larger
values of ρ cause not only larger movements in average expectations, but renders
the errors in those expectations larger for longer. In other words, the presence of
network learning introduces a persistence multiplier effect so that the persistence of
average beliefs increases by more than that of the state.
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(a) Simple-average expectations
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(b) Average expectation errors
Figure 2.5: Varying the relative innovation variance (σ2v/σ
2
u)
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Figure 2.5 then presents equivalent plots for a variety of values for σ2v/σ
2
u. Lower-
ing the signal-to-noise ratio of agents private signals,25 worsens the value of agents’
private signals, causing them to rely more heavily on the social signals and so causing
marginally worse performance in the longer term.
2.3.3 Aggregate beliefs following a network shock
In addition to shocks to the underlying state, the irregularity of the observation net-
work gives rise to the possibility of aggregate network shocks : a suite of idiosyncratic
shocks in a period for which more prominent agents happen to draw innovations
in one direction (say, positive) while more obscure agents draw innovations in the
opposite direction. Overall, with a continuum of agents, the law of large numbers
ensures that the simple average innovation is zero, but an average weighted by the
agents’ probability of being observed will be non-zero.
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Figure 2.6: The hierarchy of simple-average expectations (x
(0:k∗)
t|t ) following a one
standard deviation network shock (a one standard deviation shock to v˜t and the
corresponding conditional expected value for higher-weighted averages) with agents
each observing one competitor (q = 1).
Figure 2.6 plots the hierarchy of simple-average expectations regarding the hid-
den state following a one standard deviation network shock – strictly, a one standard
deviation shock to v˜t plus the corresponding (conditionally) expected value for higher
weighted averages – when agents each observe one competitor (q = 1). Note that the
25That is, raising the relative variance of idiosyncratic shocks.
58
2.3. An illustrative example
underlying state remains at zero throughout. Unlike with a shock to the state, there
is no movement in aggregate beliefs on impact because the law of large numbers
does apply: all agents receive the same social signal from the pre-impact period and
movements in the expectations of prominent and obscure agents balance out. In the
second period, the average expectation rises as people observe the positive movement
in prominent agents’ actions from period one and largely ignore the opposite move-
ments by obscure agents. Consequently in period two, despite the average private
signal being zero, not just prominent agents but all agents, on average, choose pos-
itive actions. Aggregate beliefs then gradually decay back to zero as agents continue
to receive average private signals of zero but continue to place weight on the previous
actions of others.
Overall, the scale of movements in average beliefs is roughly one order of mag-
nitude smaller than those following a true shock to the underlying state. This scale is
controlled by the relative variance of the network shocks. Recall that for a univariate
private signal, V ar (v˜t) = ζ
∗σ2v , where ζ
∗ ∈ (0, 1) indicates the degree of irregularity
in the network. Increasing the irregularity of the network (i.e. making the distribu-
tion of inbound observation links less uniform) therefore increases the scale of typical
network shocks.
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(b) Average expectation errors
Figure 2.7: Varying the degree of network irregularity (ζ∗)
Figure 2.7 illustrates this, plotting the first-order simple-average expectations
and average expectation errors for a variety of values for ζ∗ following a one standard
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deviation network shock when agents each observe a single competitor.
At one extreme, the network is regular (ζ∗ → 0), so the distribution of links
is uniform and the law of large numbers therefore applies, meaning that network
shocks have no effect. At the other extreme, as the probability of being observed
approaches unity for a single agent and zero for everybody else (ζ∗ → 1), that sole
agent’s idiosyncratic shocks come to play a significant role in shaping average beliefs.
For the baseline scenario listed above, a one standard deviation network shock when
ζ∗ = 1 produces a peak average expectation of 0.13, compared to the 0.31 obtained
from a one standard deviation shock to the underlying state.
Note, too, that although varying ζ∗ changes the magnitude of the movement in
agents’ average expectations, the persistence of that movement is unchanged across
different values of ζ∗.
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Figure 2.8: Varying the relative innovation variance (σ2v/σ
2
u)
Figure 2.8 next shows the effect on network shocks from varying the relative
variance of agents’ idiosyncratic shocks. As with increasing ζ∗, an increase in σ2v/σ
2
u
increases the magnitude of the average expectation’s response, but in addition, as
seen for shocks to the underlying state above, the increased uncertainty also increases
the persistence of the shock’s effects.
Finally, figure 2.9 shows that both the magnitude and the persistence of deviations
in average expectations following a network shock increase with the persistence of
60
2.3. An illustrative example
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
−0.01
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
Period
 
 
k = 0
k = 1, ρ = 0.5
k = 1, ρ = 0.6
k = 1, ρ = 0.7
(a) Simple-average expectations
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Period
 
 
xt − Et[xt], ρ = 0.5
xt − Et[xt], ρ = 0.6
xt − Et[xt], ρ = 0.7
(b) Average expectation errors
Figure 2.9: Varying underlying persistence (ρ)
underlying system.
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2.4 Other examples
The model developed here is arguably applicable to a number of areas of ongoing
macroeconomic research. Possible applications may include
1. In a setting of monopolistic competition with firms’ facing demand curves that
are functions of their relative prices, price-setting firms may inform their de-
cisions by observing the prices of individual competitors. Coordination con-
cerns and network learning will then induce notably different dynamics for
aggregate inflation. This setting is explored in detail in chapter 3 of this thesis.
2. When posting vacancies in a labour search model in the style of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), firms’ probability of finding a successful match is dependent
on the number of vacancies that other firms post. When firms’ productivity
includes both aggregate and idiosyncratic components, observing the number
of vacancies posted by their competitors allows firms to predict both the com-
ponent of their productivity that is common to all and their expected gain
from posting an additional vacancy themselves.
3. In the asset pricing model of Singleton (1987), traders’ individual demand
for a risky asset is dependent on their expectation of the next-period price,
itself a function of all traders’ actions and (unobserved in advance) shocks to
the supply of the asset. Observing the actions of (some of) their competitors
would allow traders to learn about the (higher-order) expectations of other
traders and adjust their responses accordingly.
Three features arguably common to all of these possible applications are that (a)
agents’ actions are affected directly by their private signals in addition to indirectly
through their expectations; (b) agents may need to consider the actions of other
agents not just in the current period but also into the future; and (c) agents may
receive public signals about aggregate statistics.
The broad model of this chapter readily nests all of these features. For example,
suppose that agents’ private signals are given by:
spt (i) = Bxt +Qvt (i)
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and that the linearised first-order conditions of agents’ optimisation problems are
given by:
gt (i) = α
′spt (i) + η
′
xEt (i) [Xt] + ηyEt (i) [gt] + ηzEt (i)
[
gt+1
]
We show in appendix 2.D that this may be expressed as
gt (i) = (η
′
x + ηya
′ + ηza′F )︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ′1
Et (i) [Xt] +α
′B︸︷︷︸
λ′2
xt + α
′Q︸︷︷︸
λ′3
vt (i)
where
a′ ≡ (α′BS + η′xTs) (I − ηyTs)−1
(
I − ηzFTs (I − ηyTs)−1
)−1
which is clearly in the form of equation (2.3).
This is by no means the only dynamic setting that may be modelled here. The
dynamic price-setting model explored in chapter 3, for example, considers an en-
vironment with an infinite sum of forward-looking variables in the individual firm’s
decision rule and the addition of a lagged public signal (the previous period’s ag-
gregate price).
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced and solved a model of social learning with a continuum
of agents that satisfies the three requirements that (a) agents observe individual com-
petitors’ actions through an observation network; (b) agents act simultaneously and
repeatedly over many periods; and (c) agents’ optimal decisions include consideration
of strategic complementarity. To avoid the curse of dimensionality that ordinarily
prevents analysis of large networks, we introduce the idea of network opacity – that
agents know who they observe, but not who anybody else observes. Instead, we sup-
pose that agents know only the (common) distribution from which those observees
are drawn.
This assumption grants an arbitrarily accurate simulation and may therefore be
performed by selecting a cut-off, k∗, on the number of higher-order expectations and
a cut-off, p∗, on the number of compound expectations to consider. The first of these
arises from the standard assumption that agents place decreasing weight on higher-
order expectations. The second emerges from the opacity of the network (so that
agents are interested in a sequence of weighted average expectations), the recursive
nature of the Kalman filter (so that each weighted-average expectation depends on
the next-higher weighted average from the previous period) and the AR process of
the underlying state (so that older shocks are of decreasing importance to the current
state).
Theorem 1 demonstrates that when the underlying state follows an AR(1) pro-
cess, the full hierarchy of relevant aggregate expectations will follow an ARMA(1,1)
process with network shocks – weighted sums of agents’ idiosyncratic shocks – enter-
ing both contemporaneously and with a lag.
A number of broad consequences of the model emerge directly from theorem 1.
First, it is possible to simulate the effects of network learning without having to
simulate the network explicitly: the network shocks together represent a sufficient
statistic for the effect of the network on agents’ aggregate beliefs. This makes the
model particularly amenable to nesting within broad General Equilibrium models of
the economy.
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Second, impulse responses of average expectations following shocks to the un-
derlying state will exhibit greater persistence than the state itself, increasing in the
number of agents observed. This is a form of rational herding behaviour that com-
bines the herding exhibited in both Banerjee (1992), where agents observe others’
actions, but have no strategic motive; and Morris and Shin (2002), where agents
have a strategic motive, but do not observe others’ actions.
Third, when the network is asymptotically irregular (i.e. has a distribution of
links that is sufficiently far from uniform), mean zero idiosyncratic shocks do not
wash out in aggregation, thereby leading to a network-based source of aggregate
volatility, independent of “true” aggregate shocks to the hidden state. The scale of
this additional volatility depends on the degree of irregularity in the network, which
is captured simply in a single parameter: ζ∗.
Finally, because of the herding behaviour of agents’ actions, the aggregate effects
of idiosyncratic shocks are persistent, even though the shocks themselves are entirely
transitory.
The model would appear to be applicable to a variety of problems in macroeco-
nomic research, including firms’ price-setting decisions, labour search-and-matching
models and asset pricing problems. A particular application to firms’ price-setting
decisions in a classic dynamic pricing environment is examined in depth in the next
chapter.
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Appendix 2.A Proof of proposition 1.
The Kalman filter (2.10) requires that each agent construct a prior expectation of
the signal she will receive and then update her beliefs on the basis of the extent
to which the signal she actually receives is a surprise. Using the equation for each
agent’s decision rule (2.3), we have that when preparing for period t+ 1, agent i will
construct her prior expectation of her social signal as follows:
Et (i) [gt (δt (i))] = Et (i) [λ
′
1Et (δt (i)) [Xt] + λ
′
2xt + λ
′
3vt (δt (i))]
Common knowledge of rationality then allows agent i to substitute in the Kalman
filter for agent δt (i)’s expectation:
Et (i) [Et (δt (i)) [Xt]] = Et (i)

Et−1 (δt (i)) [Xt]
+Kp {spt (δt (i))− Et−1 (δt (i)) [spt (δt (i))]}
+Ks
{
gt−1 (δt−1 (δt (i)))
−Et−1 (δt (i)) [gt−1 (δt−1 (δt (i)))]
}

The final term shows if agent i is going to observe the period-t action of agent
δt (i), then in order to form her prior, she must also consider whomever agent δt (i)
observed from period-(t− 1). This recursion of expectations (and expectations of
expectations) across agents and backwards through time leads to an explosion in the
dimensionality (this is the explosion of p) and typically prevents closed-form analysis
in anything other than trivially small networks.
However, by denying agents knowledge of the full network and, instead, granting
them knowledge of the distribution from which observation links are drawn (Φ) and
using the assumption that this distribution is independent of other shocks, we can
note that:
Et (i) [gt−1 (δt−1 (δt (i)))] =
∫ 1
0
Et (i) [gt−1 (j)]φ (j) dj
= Et (i)
[∫ 1
0
gt−1 (j)φ (j) dj
]
= Et (i) [g˜t−1]
where the second equality exploits the linearity of the expectation operator. The
object g˜t ≡
∫ 1
0
gt (j)φ (j) dj is a weighted average of all agents’ actions in period t
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using the observation p.d.f. as the weights. Note, too, that by identical logic we also
have that when considering their observee’s observee, agent i will expect that:
Et (i) [Et−1 (δt (i)) [gt−1 (δt−1 (δt (i)))]] = Et (i) [Et−1 (δt (i)) [g˜t−2]]
That is, common knowledge of rationality and the symmetry of agents’ problems
leads agent i to expect that agent δt (i) makes the same assumption about their own
observee. The ongoing recursion backwards through time should be clear. Substi-
tuting this all back in above gives:
Et (i) [Et (δt (i)) [Xt]] = Et (i)
 Et−1 (δt (i)) [Xt]+Kp {spt (δt (i))− Et−1 (δt (i)) [spt (δt (i))]}
+Ks {g˜t−1 − Et−1 (δt (i)) [g˜t−1]}

In effect, this is agent i treating agent δt (i) as though (a) they receive a weighted
average of everybody’s period-(t− 1) action and (b) they act in the same manner
towards their own observee(s).
So long as the weights used (the observation p.d.f.) are common across agents and
constant over time – that is, so long as agents do not learn about the topology of the
network – then we have that agent i’s problem may be summarised as follows: observe
the action of agent δt (i), but treat them as though they, and and all information
obtained through them, come from a setting in which all agents observe the weighted
average action.
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Appendix 2.B Proof of proposition 2.
Denoting ζ (N) ≡ ∑Ni=1 φN (i)2 and assuming that limN→∞ ζ (N) = ζ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
(assumption 2), we here demonstrate the following results regarding agents’ idiosyn-
cratic shocks:
1. {q}v˜N,t
d−→ {q}v˜t ∀q where v˜t ∼ N
(
0,Σ
{q}
v˜v˜
)
Σ
{q}
v˜v˜ = (1− (1− ζ∗)q) Σvv
2. {q}v¨N,t
L2−→ {q}v˜t ∀q
3. Cov
({p}v˜t, {q}v˜t) = Σ{p}v˜v˜ ∀p < q
where the weighted sums are defined as:
{1}v˜N,t ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
vt (δt (i))
{1}v¨N,t ≡
N∑
i=1
vt (i)φN (i)
{2}v˜N,t ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
vt (δt (δt (i)))
{2}v¨N,t ≡
N∑
i=1
vt (δt (i))φN (i)
{3}v˜N,t ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
vt (δt (δt (δt (i))))
{3}v¨N,t ≡
N∑
i=1
vt (δt (δt (i)))φN (i)
...
...
First, note that since the vector vt (i) is drawn from independent and identical Gaus-
sian distributions with mean zero for each i and t, all of the weighted sums must
also be distributed Normally with mean zero. We now consider each of the results
in turn.
1. {q}v˜N,t
d−→ {q}v˜t ∀q v˜t ∼ N
(
0,Σ
{q}
v˜v˜
)
Σ
{q}
v˜v˜ = (1− (1− ζ∗)q) Σvv
Since it is clear that {q}v˜N,t must converge to a Normal distribution with mean zero,
all that remains is to determine its variance-covariance matrix (note that the law of
large numbers will apply here when the variance-covariance matrix is zero).
We will begin by considering each weighted-sum in turn.
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• {1}v˜N,t d−→ {1}v˜t
The variance of {1}v˜N,t is given by:
V ar
[{1}v˜N,t] = 1
N2
V ar [vt (δt (1)) + vt (δt (2)) + · · ·+ vt (δt (N))]
=
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E [vt (δt (i))vt (δt (j))]
=
1
N2
(
NΣvv +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
E [vt (δt (i))vt (δt (j))]
)
However, when i 6= j, given the full independence of the distributions of agents’
observees, it must be that
E [vt (δt (i))vt (δt (j))] =
N∑
k=1
φN (k)E [vt (k)vt (δt (j))]
=
N∑
k=1
φN (k)
(
N∑
l=1
φN (l)E [vt (k)vt (l)]
)
=
N∑
k=1
φN (k)
2E [vt (k)vt (k)]
= ζ (N) Σvv (2.18)
where in moving from the second line to the third we have made use of the inde-
pendence of agents’ idiosyncratic shocks. We therefore have that
V ar
[{1}v˜N,t] = 1
N2
(
NΣvv +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
ζ (N) Σvv
)
=
1
N2
(
NΣvv +
(
N2 −N) ζ (N) Σvv)
=
1
N
Σvv +
(
N − 1
N
)
ζ (N) Σvv
and thus, in the limit, it must be that
Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ ≡ limN→∞V ar
[{1}v˜N,t] = ζ∗Σvv (2.19)
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• {2}v˜N,t d−→ {2}v˜t
The variance of {2}v˜N,t is given by:
V ar
[{2}v˜N,t] = 1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E [vt (δt (δt (i)))vt (δt (δt (j)))]
=
1
N2
(
NΣvv +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
E [vt (δt (δt (i)))vt (δt (δt (j)))]
)
Focussing on the latter term, we have that when i 6= j, it must be that
E [vt (δt (δt (i)))vt (δt (δt (j)))] =
N∑
k=1
φN (k)E [vt (δt (k))vt (δt (δt (j)))]
=
N∑
k=1
φN (k)
(
N∑
l=1
φN (l)E [vt (δt (k))vt (δt (l))]
)
=
N∑
k=1
φN (k)
2 Σvv
+
N∑
k=1
N∑
l 6=k
φN (k)φN (l)E [vt (δt (k))vt (δt (l))]
It was shown above in equation (2.18) that
E [vt (δt (k))vt (δt (l))] = ζ (N) Σvv ∀k 6= l
so it follows that
E [vt (δt (δt (i)))vt (δt (δt (j)))] = ζ (N) Σvv + ζ (N) Σvv
N∑
k=1
N∑
l 6=k
φN (k)φN (l)
Next, consider that since φN (k) and φN (l) are p.d.fs, it must be that
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
φN (i)φN (j) =
N∑
k=1
φN (k)
(
N∑
l=1
φN (l)
)
=
N∑
k=1
φN (k)
= 1
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We must therefore have that
N∑
k=1
N∑
l 6=k
φN (k)φN (l) = 1−
N∑
k=1
φN (k)
2 = 1− ζ (N) (2.20)
Thus, when i 6= j, we have
E [vt (δt (δt (i)))vt (δt (δt (j)))] = ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N)) ζ (N) Σvv (2.21)
Substituting this back in, we arrive at
V ar
[{2}v˜N,t] = 1
N
Σvv +
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
(ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N)) ζ (N) Σvv)
=
1
N
Σvv +
N (N − 1)
N2
(ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N)) ζ (N) Σvv)
and thus, in the limit, it must be that
Σ
{2}
v˜v˜ ≡ limN→∞V ar
[{2}v˜N,t] = ζ∗Σvv + (1− ζ∗) ζ∗Σvv (2.22)
• {3}v˜N,t d−→ {3}v˜t
The variance of {3}v˜N,t is given by:
V ar
[{3}v˜N,t] = 1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E [vt (δt (δt (δt (i))))vt (δt (δt (δt (j))))]
=
1
N2
(
NΣvv +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
E [vt (δt (δt (δt (i))))vt (δt (δt (δt (j))))]
)
Focussing on the latter term, we have that when i 6= j, it must be that
E [vt (δt (δt (δt (i))))vt (δt (δt (δt (j))))]
=
N∑
k=1
φN (k)
(
N∑
l=1
φN (l)E [vt (δt (δt (k)))vt (δt (δt (l)))]
)
=
N∑
k=1
φN (k)
2 Σvv +
N∑
k=1
N∑
l 6=k
φN (k)φN (l)E [vt (δt (δt (k)))vt (δt (δt (l)))]
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It was shown above in equation (2.21) that
E [vt (δt (δt (k)))vt (δt (δt (l)))] = ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N)) ζ (N) Σvv
Combined with equation (2.20), this then implies that when i 6= j,
E [vt (δt (δt (δt (i))))vt (δt (δt (δt (j))))]
= ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N)) (ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N)) ζ (N) Σvv) (2.23)
Substituting this back in, we arrive at
V ar
[{3}v˜N,t] = 1
N
Σvv
+
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
(ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N)) (ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N)) ζ (N) Σvv))
=
1
N
Σvv
+
N (N − 1)
N2
(ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N)) (ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N)) ζ (N) Σvv))
and thus, in the limit, it must be that
Σ
{3}
v˜v˜ ≡ limN→∞V ar
[{3}v˜N,t] = ζ∗Σvv + (1− ζ∗) (ζ∗Σvv + (1− ζ∗) ζ∗Σvv) (2.24)
• The general case
By this stage, it should be clear that the variance-covariance matricies of higher
weighted averages of agents’ idiosyncratic shocks are able to be expressed in a re-
cursive form:
Σ
{q}
v˜v˜ = ζ
∗Σvv + (1− ζ∗) Σ{q−1}v˜v˜
This may be simplified by first expanding it as
Σ
{q}
v˜v˜ =
(
q−1∑
p=0
(1− ζ∗)p
)
ζ∗Σvv
=
(
1− (1− ζ∗)q
1− (1− ζ∗)
)
ζ∗Σvv
= (1− (1− ζ∗)q) Σvv (2.25)
which completes the proof of the first result.
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2. {q}v¨N,t
L2−→ {q}v˜t ∀q
We next demonstrate that {q}v¨N,t converges to {q}v˜t in mean square error.26 That
is, we show that limN→∞E
[({q}v¨N,t − {q}v˜t)2] = 0. First, see that:
E
[({q}v¨N,t − {2}v˜t)2] = E [({q}v¨N,t)2 − 2{q}v¨N,tv˜t + ({2}v˜t)2]
= V ar
[{q}v¨N,t]− 2Cov [{q}v¨N,t, {q}v˜t]+ V ar [{q}v˜t]
The third term is just Σ
{q}
v˜v˜ from the first result above. We now consider the first
and second terms in turn. The variance of {q}v¨N,t is given by:
V ar
[{q}v¨N,t] = V ar
 N∑
i=1
φN (i)vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(i)))

= E
 N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φN (i)φN (j)vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(i)))
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(j)))

=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φN (i)φN (j)E
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(i)))
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(j)))

=
N∑
i=1
φN (i)
2 Σvv
+
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
φN (i)φN (j)E
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(i)))
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(j)))

But we know from the first result above that when i 6= j,
E
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(i)))
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(j)))

= ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N))E
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−2
(i)))
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−2
(j)))

26Recall that convergence in mean square error is a stronger form of convergence than conver-
gence in probability.
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Noting the recursive structure and making use of equation (2.20) then gives us
V ar
[{q}v¨N,t] = ζ (N) Σvv + (1− ζ (N))V ar [{q−1}v¨N,t]
which, in the limit, becomes
lim
N→∞
V ar
[{q}v¨N,t] = ζ∗Σvv + (1− ζ∗) lim
N→∞
V ar
[{q−1}v¨N,t]
which is the same rule for V ar
[{q}v˜N,t], which implies that
lim
N→∞
V ar
[{q}v¨N,t] = lim
N→∞
V ar
[{3}v˜N,t] = Σ{q}v˜v˜
Turning next to the covariance between {q}v¨N,t and {q}v˜t, we note that
Cov
[{q}v¨N,t, {q}v˜N,t] = E

∑N
i=1 φN (i)vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(i)))

×
 1
N
∑N
j=1 vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q
(j)))


=
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
φN (i)E
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(i)))
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q
(j)))

=
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
φN (i)φN (k)E

vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(i)))

×vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(k)))


where moving from the second line to the third makes use of the independence of
agents’ draws from ΦN and the linearity of the expectation operator. This, in turn,
may be rewritten as
Cov
[{q}v¨N,t, {q}v˜N,t] = N
N

∑N
i=1 φN (i)
2 Σvv
+
∑N
i=1
∑N
k 6=i φN (i)φN (k)E

vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(i)))

×vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q−1
(k)))



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Since this is the same expression as that for V ar
[{q}v¨N,t] above, we therefore have
lim
N→∞
Cov
[{q}v¨N,t, {q}v˜N,t] = Σ{q}v˜v˜
and, hence, that
lim
N→∞
E
[({q}v¨N,t − {2}v˜t)2] = Σ{q}v˜v˜ − 2Σ{q}v˜v˜ + Σ{q}v˜v˜
= 0
as required.
3. Cov
[{p}v˜t, {q}v˜t] = Σ{p}v˜v˜ ∀p < q
To prove this, we will first consider Cov
[{p}v˜t, {p+1}v˜t] and later consider q ≥ p+ 2.
Cov
[{p}v˜N,t, {p+1}v˜N,t] = E

 1
N
∑N
i=1 vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(i)

×
 1
N
∑N
j=1 vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p+1
(j)


=
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(i)
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p+1
(j)

Focussing on the final term, note that
E
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(i)
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p+1
(j)

=
N∑
k=1
φN (k)E
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(i)
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(k)

= φN (i) Σvv +
N∑
k 6=i
φN (k)E
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(i)
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(k)

= φN (i) Σvv + (1− φN (i)) Σpv˜v˜ (N)
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Substituting this back into the above then gives
Cov
[{p}v˜t, {p+1}v˜t] = 1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(φN (i) Σvv + (1− φN (i)) Σpv˜v˜ (N))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(φN (i) Σvv + (1− φN (i)) Σpv˜v˜ (N))
=
1
N
Σvv +
1
N
N∑
i=1
(1− φN (i)) Σpv˜v˜ (N)
In the limit, this becomes
lim
N→∞
Cov
[{p}v˜N,t, {p+1}v˜N,t] = Σpv˜v˜
which establishes the result for q = p+ 1. For q = p+ 2, note that
E
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(i)
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p+2
(j)

=
N∑
k=1
φN (k)E
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(i)
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p+1
(k)

=
N∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
φN (k)φN (l)E
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(i)
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(l)

=
N∑
l=1
φN (l)E
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(i)
vt
δt · · · δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
(l)

which is the same as for q = p + 1. It should be clear that this same process would
apply for all q ≥ p+ 2, which establishes the result.
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Appendix 2.C Proof of theorem 1.
The state vector of interest and its law of motion are conjectured to be:
Xt ≡

xt
Et [Xt]
{1}E˜t [Xt]
{2}E˜t [Xt]
...

= FXt−1 +G1ut +G2zt +G3et +G4zt−1 (2.26)
while agents’ private/public and social signals are given by:
spt (i) = D1xt +D2Xt−1 +R1vt (i) +R2et +R3zt−1 (2.27a)
sst (i) = λ
′
1Et−1 (δt−1 (i)) [Xt−1] + λ
′
2xt−1 + λ
′
3vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) (2.27b)
Together, these describe a linear state space system to which a Kalman filter provides
the optimal linear estimator (in the sense of minimising mean squared error).
As discussed in the main text, the system described here is not in the form of
a classic state space problem, both because of the presence of the lagged state in
agents’ signals and because of the moving average component of the law of motion.
Lemma 1 demonstrated that we do not need to include zt in the agents’ state vector
of interest. To deal with the lagged observations, we follow Nimark (2011b) in
developing a modified Kalman filter that does not require the stacking of the state
vectors of interest.
To begin, we define the matrices Sx, Ts and Twq as the matrices that select xt,
Et [Xt] and
{q}E˜t [Xt] respectively from Xt (e.g., Tw2Xt =
{2}E˜t [Xt]).
We also define the general notation that θt|q (i) represents the error in agent i’s
period-q expectation regarding θt. In particular, we will use the following:
st|t−1 (i) ≡ st (i)− Et−1 (i) [st (i)] : signal innovation
Xt|t−1 (i) ≡ Xt − Et−1 (i) [Xt] : prior error
Xt|t (i) ≡ Xt − Et (i) [Xt] : contemporaneous error
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2.C.1 The filter
We proceed by deploying a Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation of agents’ signals. That
is, noting that the signal innovation
st|t−1 (i) ≡ st (i)− Et−1 (i) [st (i)] (2.28)
contains only new information available to i in period t, we conclude that it must
be orthogonal to any of j’s estimates based on information from earlier periods. We
can therefore use the standard result that E [x|y, z] = E [x|y] + E [x|z] when y⊥z,
so that
Et (i) [Xt] = E [Xt|It−1 (i)] + E
[
Xt|st|t−1 (i)
]
= Et−1 (i) [Xt] +Ktst|t−1 (i) (2.29)
for some projection matrix, Kt (the Kalman gain). Note that Kt does not require
an agent subscript as the problem is symmetric for all agents.
Optimality then requires that the projection matrix, Kt, be such that the signal
innovation, st|t−1 (i), is orthogonal to the projection error, Xt−Ktst|t−1 (i). That is,
we require that
E
[(
Xt −Ktst|t−1 (i)
)
st|t−1 (i)
′] = 0
Rearranging then gives an expression for the optimal Kalman gain:
Kt = E
[
Xtst|t−1 (i)
′] (E [st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (i)′])−1 ∀i (2.30)
which, since the unconditional expectations of Xt and all signal innovations are zero,
is simply
Kt = Cov(Xt, st|t−1 (i))
[
V ar
(
st|t−1 (i)
)]−1
In order to evaluate this, it is necessary to construct expressions for the innovation
in agents’ private and social signals. We consider each in turn.
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Agents’ private signals
To begin, we substitute the conjectured state law of motion into the private signal
equation to get:
spt (j) = (D1SxF +D2)Xt−1 +D1SxG1ut
+R1vt (j) +R2et +R3zt−1 (2.31)
where we have used the fact that xt is independent of network shocks to ignore the
G2zt and G4zt−1 components of Xt. From this, we see that i’s prior expectation of
her private signal will be given by
Et−1 (i) [s
p
t (i)] = (D1SxF +D2)Et−1 (i) [Xt−1] (2.32)
where we have made use of lemma 1 to drop the term in Et−1 (i) [zt−1]. Subtracting
equation (2.32) from (2.31) then gives the innovation in agents’ private signals as
spt|t−1 (i) = (D1SxF +D2)Xt−1|t−1 (i) +D1SxG1ut
+R1vt (j) +R2et +R3zt−1 (2.33)
where Xt|t (i) is i’s contemporaneous error in estimating Xt.
Agents’ social signals
For the social signal, and assuming temporarily that agents observe the actions of
only one competitor, we make use of proposition 1 to write the prior expectation as
Et−1 (i) [sst (i)] = λ
′
1Et−1 (i)
[
E˜t−1 [Xt−1]
]
+ λ′2Et−1 (i) [xt−1] + λ
′
3Et−1 (i) [v˜t−1]
Given that Et (i) [zt] = 0, SxXt = xt and Tw1Xt =
{1}E˜t [Xt], we can write this as
Et−1 (i) [sst (i)] = (λ
′
2Sx + λ
′
1Tw)Et−1 (i) [Xt−1] (2.34)
Subtracting (2.34) from (2.27b), we then have that the innovation in the agent’s
social signal is given by:
sst|t−1 (i) = λ
′
2SxXt−1|t−1 (i)
+ λ′1Et−1 (δt−1 (i)) [Xt−1]− λ′1TwEt−1 (i) [Xt−1]
+ λ′3vt−1 (δt−1 (i))
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Adding and subtracting λ′1TwXt−1 on the right-hand side then gives
sst|t−1 (i) = (λ
′
2Sx + λ
′
1Tw)Xt−1|t−1 (i)
− λ′1 (TwXt−1 − Et−1 (δt−1 (i)) [Xt−1])
+ λ′3vt−1 (δt−1 (i))
and finally now adding and subtracting λ′1Xt−1 on the right-hand side gives
sst|t−1 (i) = (λ
′
2Sx + λ
′
1Tw)Xt−1|t−1 (i)− λ′1Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
+ λ′1 (I − Tw)Xt−1
+ λ′3vt−1 (δt−1 (i))
Crucially, we have that the innovation in i’s social signal includes not only a term in
their own contemporaneous error from the previous period but also a term in their
observee’s error.
The combined signal innovation
Stacking the private, public and social signal innovations, we then obtain
st|t−1 (i) = M1Xt−1|t−1 (i) +M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i)) +M3Xt−1 (2.35a)
+N1ut +N2vt (i) +N3et +N4vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) +N5zt−1
where
M1 =
[
D1SxF +D2
λ′2Sx + λ
′
1Tw
]
M2 =
[
0
−λ′1
]
M3 =
[
0
λ′1 (I − Tw)
]
(2.35b)
N1 =
[
D1SxG1
0
]
N2 =
[
R1
0
]
N3 =
[
R2
0
]
N4 =
[
0
λ′3
]
N5 =
[
R3
0
]
(2.35c)
Considering two or more observees is then obtained by further stacking the signals
st|t−1 (i) = M1Xt−1|t−1 (i) +M2
[
Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i, 1))
Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i, 2))
]
+M3Xt−1 (2.36a)
+N1ut +N2vt (i) +N3et +N4
[
vt−1 (δt−1 (i, 1))
vt−1 (δt−1 (i, 2))
]
+N5zt−1
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where
M1 =
D1SxF +D2λ′2Sx + λ′1Tw
λ′2Sx + λ
′
1Tw
 M2 =
 0 0−λ′1 0
0 −λ′1
 M3 =
 0λ′1 (I − Tw)
λ′1 (I − Tw)
 (2.36b)
N1 =
D1SxG10
0
 N2 =
R10
0
 N3 =
R20
0
 N4 =
 0 0λ′3 0
0 λ′3
 N5 =
R30
0

(2.36c)
For the remainder of this appendix, we shall use the notation of a single observee on
the understanding that the signal innovation may be replace as above for an arbitrary
number of competitors observed.
Deriving the Kalman gain
We first expand the first term in equation (2.30) as
E
[
Xtst|t−1 (i)
′] = E

(FXt−1 +G1ut +G2zt +G4zt−1 +G3et)
×

M1Xt−1|t−1 (i)
+M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
+M3Xt−1
+N1ut +N2vt (i) +N3et
+N4vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) +N5zt−1

′

= E

(FXt−1)
(
M1Xt−1|t−1 (i)
)′
+ (FXt−1)
(
M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
)′
+ (FXt−1) (M3Xt−1)
′
+ (FXt−1) (N5zt−1)
′
+ (G1ut) (N1ut)
′
+ (G3et) (N3et)
′
+ (G4zt−1)
(
M1Xt−1|t−1 (i)
)′
+ (G4zt−1)
(
M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
)′
+ (G4zt−1) (M3Xt−1)
′
+ (G4zt−1) (N5zt−1)
′

(2.37)
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where we use the fact that period-t shocks are orthogonal to period-(t− 1) objects
and make use of assumption 2 (which grants us that limN→∞ φN (i) = 0 ∀i) to note
that there is no covariance between period-(t− 1) objects and vt−1 (i) ∀i.
Next, we note that for any j and any t, we may write
E
[
XtXt|t (j)
′] = E [(Xt|t (j) + Et (j) [Xt])Xt|t (j)′]
= E
[
Xt|t (j)Xt|t (j)
′]
= Vt|t
where the second equality makes use of the fact that since Et (j) [Xt] is spanned by
the set of orthogonal signal innovations
{
st|t−1 (j) , st−1|t−2 (j) , · · ·
}
and these are
orthogonal to Xt|t (j) by construction, then it must be that Et (j) [Xt] and Xt|t (j)
are orthogonal for all j and t. Note that Vt|t ≡ E
[
Xt|t (j)Xt|t (j)
′] ∀j is the variance
of each agent’s contemporaneous error (common to all agents as their problems are
symmetric).
Using this, we may rewrite (2.37) as
E
[
Xtst|t−1 (i)
′] = FVt−1|t−1M ′1
+ FVt−1|t−1M ′2
+ FUt−1M ′3
+ FG2ΣzzN
′
5
+G1ΣuuN
′
1
+G3ΣeeN
′
3
+G4ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+G4ΣzzN
′
5
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or, defining M ≡
[
M1 M2 M3
]
, as simply
E
[
Xtst|t−1 (i)
′] = F [Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1]M ′
+G1ΣuuN
′
1
+ FG2ΣzzN
′
5
+G3ΣeeN
′
3
+G4ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+G4ΣzzN
′
5 (2.38)
Turning to the second term in equation (2.30), we have that
E
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (i)
′] = E


M1Xt−1|t−1 (i)
+M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
+M3Xt−1
+N1ut +N2vt (i)
+N4vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) +N5zt−1 +N3et

×

M1Xt−1|t−1 (i)
+M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
+M3Xt−1
+N1ut +N2vt (i)
+N4vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) +N5zt−1 +N3et

′

= E


M1Xt−1|t−1 (i)
+M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
+M3Xt−1
+N5zt−1

×

M1Xt−1|t−1 (i)
+M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
+M3Xt−1
+N5zt−1

′

+M2E
[
Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))vt−1 (δt−1 (i))
′]N ′4
+N4E
[
vt−1 (δt−1 (i))Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
′]M ′2
+N1ΣuuN
′
1 +N2ΣvvN
′
2 +N4ΣvvN
′
4 +N3ΣeeN
′
3
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Expanding out the various cross-products then gives us
E
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (i)
′] = M1Vt−1|t−1M ′1 +M1Wt−1|t−1M ′2 +M1Vt−1|t−1M ′3
+M2Wt−1|t−1M ′1 +M2Vt−1|t−1M
′
2 +M2Vt−1|t−1M
′
3
+M3Vt−1|t−1M ′1 +M3Vt−1|t−1M
′
2 +M3Ut−1M
′
3
−M2Kt−1N2ΣvvN ′4
−N4ΣvvN ′2K ′t−1M ′2
+N1ΣuuN
′
1 +N2ΣvvN
′
2 +N4ΣvvN
′
4
+ (M1 +M2 +M3)G2ΣzzN
′
5
+N5ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+N3ΣeeN
′
3
where Wt|t ≡ E
[
Xt|t (i)Xt|t (j)
′] ∀i 6= j is the covariance between any two agents’
contemporaneous errors (common to all agent-pairs as their problems are symmetric
and the network is opaque so they each have the same probability of observing the
same target). Similarly to the covariance term, this may be written simply as
E
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (i)
′] = M
 Vt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1
Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1
M ′
−M2Kt−1N2ΣvvN ′4
−N4ΣvvN ′2K ′t−1M ′2
+N1ΣuuN
′
1 +N2ΣvvN
′
2 +N4ΣvvN
′
4
+ (M1 +M2 +M3)G2ΣzzN
′
5
+N5ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+N3ΣeeN
′
3 (2.39)
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Substituting (2.38) and (2.39) into (2.30) and gathering like terms, we arrive at:
Kt =

F
[
Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1
]
M ′
+G1ΣuuN
′
1
+FG2ΣzzN
′
5
+G4ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+G4ΣzzN
′
5
+G3ΣeeN
′
3

×

M
 Vt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1
Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1
M ′
+ (M1 +M2 +M3)G2ΣzzN
′
5
+N5ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
−M2Kt−1N2ΣvvN ′4
−N4ΣvvN ′2K ′t−1M ′2
+N1ΣuuN
′
1 +N2ΣvvN
′
2 +N4ΣvvN
′
4 +N3ΣeeN
′
3

−1
(2.40)
2.C.2 Evolution of the variance-covariance matricies
Unconditional variance of the state vector of interest
From the conjectured law of motion, we can read immediately that the variance of
the state vector of interest evolves as:
Ut = FUt−1F ′ (2.41)
+G1ΣuuG
′
1 +G2ΣzzG
′
2 +G3ΣeeG
′
3 +G4ΣzzG
′
4 + FG2ΣzzG
′
4 +G4ΣzzG
′
2F
′
Variance of agents’ expectation errors
First, subtracting Et−1 (i) [Xt] from each side of the state equation, we have:
Xt − Et−1 (i) [Xt] = F (Xt−1 − Et−1 (i) [Xt−1]) (2.42)
+G1ut +G2zt +G3et +G4zt−1
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Taking the variance of each side, we have that the prior variance will be given by:
Vt|t−1 = FVt−1|t−1F ′ (2.43)
+G1ΣuuG
′
1 +G2ΣzzG
′
2 +G3ΣeeG
′
3 +G4ΣzzG
′
4 + FG2ΣzzG
′
4 +G4ΣzzG
′
2F
′
Next, we subtract each side of equation (2.29) from Xt and rearrange to obtain
(Xt − Et (i) [Xt]) +Ktst|t−1 (i) = (Xt − Et−1 (i) [Xt]) (2.44)
Since the signal innovation is orthogonal to the contemporaneous error, Xt−Et (i) [Xt]
by construction, the variance of the right-hand side must equal the sum of the vari-
ances on the left-hand side, thereby giving:
Vt|t +Kt V ar
(
st|t−1 (i)
)
K ′t = Vt|t−1
or
Vt|t = Vt|t−1 −Kt

M
 Vt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1
Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1
M ′
+ (M1 +M2 +M3)G2ΣzzN
′
5
+N5ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
−M2Kt−1N2ΣvvN ′4
−N4ΣvvN ′2K ′t−1M ′2
+N1ΣuuN
′
1 +N2ΣvvN
′
2 +N3ΣeeN
′
3 +N4ΣvvN
′
4

K ′t
(2.45)
Covariance between agents’ expectation errors
First, from (2.42), we have that the prior covariance between two agents’ errors is
given by:
Wt|t−1 ≡ E
[
Xt|t−1 (i)Xt|t−1 (j)
′]
= FWt−1|t−1F ′ (2.46)
+G1ΣuuG
′
1 +G2ΣzzG
′
2 +G3ΣeeG
′
3 +G4ΣzzG
′
4 + FG2ΣzzG
′
4 +G4ΣzzG
′
2F
′
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Next, returning to equation (2.44)
(Xt − Et (i) [Xt]) = (Xt − Et−1 (i) [Xt])−Ktst|t−1 (i) (2.47)
note that agent i’s signal innovation will not necessarily be orthogonal to either of
j’s expectation errors, so we expand this fully to obtain
Wt|t = Wt|t−1
+KtCov
(
st|t−1 (i) , st|t−1 (j)
)
K ′t
− Cov (Xt|t−1 (i) , st|t−1 (j))K ′t
−KtCov
(
st|t−1 (i) , Xt|t−1 (j)
)
(2.48)
For the second term on the right-hand side, we have
E
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (j)
′] = E


M1Xt−1|t−1 (i)
+M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
+M3Xt−1
+N1ut +N2vt (i)
+N4vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) +N5zt−1 +N3et

×

M1Xt−1|t−1 (j)
+M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (j))
+M3Xt−1
+N1ut +N2vt (j)
+N4vt−1 (δt−1 (j)) +N5zt−1 +N3et

′

= E


M1Xt−1|t−1 (i)
+M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
+M3Xt−1
+N5zt−1

×

M1Xt−1|t−1 (j)
+M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (j))
+M3Xt−1
+N5zt−1

′

+N1ΣuuN
′
1
+N3ΣeeN
′
3
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Given i 6= j and assumption 2, it must be the case that i, j, δt−1 (i) and δt−1 (j) are
four different agents, almost surely. We therefore have
E
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (j)
′] = M
Wt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1Wt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1
Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1
M ′
+ (M1 +M2 +M3)G2ΣzzN
′
5
+N5ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+N1ΣuuN
′
1
+N3ΣeeN
′
3 (2.49)
For the third term, we have
Cov
(
Xt|t−1 (i) , st|t−1 (j)
)
= E


FXt−1|t−1 (j)
+G1ut
+G2zt
+G4zt−1
+G3et

×

M1Xt−1|t−1 (i)
+M2Xt−1|t−1 (δt−1 (i))
+M3Xt−1
+N1ut +N2vt (i)
+N4vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) +N5zt−1 +N3et

′

= F
[
Vt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1
]
M ′
+G1ΣuuN
′
1
+ FG2ΣzzN
′
5
+G4ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+G4ΣzzN
′
5
+G3ΣzzN
′
3 (2.50)
while the fourth term is the transpose of the same.
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Filter summary
In summary, the filter evolves through the following system of equations:
E
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (i)
′] = M
 Vt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1
Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1
M ′
+ (M1 +M2 +M3)G2ΣzzN
′
5
+N5ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
−M2Kt−1N2ΣvvN ′4
−N4ΣvvN ′2K ′t−1M ′2
+N1ΣuuN
′
1 +N2ΣvvN
′
2 +N4ΣvvN
′
4 (2.51a)
E
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (j)
′] = M
Wt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1Wt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1
Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1
M ′
+ (M1 +M2 +M3)G2ΣzzN
′
5
+N5ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+N1ΣuuN
′
1 (2.51b)
E
[
Xtst|t−1 (i)
′] = F [Vt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1 Ut−1]M ′
+G1ΣuuN
′
1
+ FG2ΣzzN
′
5
+G4ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+G4ΣzzN
′
5 (2.51c)
E
[
Xt|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (j)
′] = F [Vt−1|t−1 Wt−1|t−1 Vt−1|t−1]M ′
+G1ΣuuN
′
1
+ FG2ΣzzN
′
5
+G4ΣzzG
′
2 (M1 +M2 +M3)
′
+G4ΣzzN
′
5 (2.51d)
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Kt = E
[
Xtst|t−1 (i)
′] (E [st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (i)′])−1 (2.51e)
Ut = FUt−1F ′
+G1ΣuuG
′
1 +G2ΣzzG
′
2 +G4ΣzzG
′
4 + FG2ΣzzG
′
4 +G4ΣzzG
′
2F
′ (2.51f)
Vt|t−1 = FVt−1|t−1F ′
+G1ΣuuG
′
1 +G2ΣzzG
′
2 +G4ΣzzG
′
4 + FG2ΣzzG
′
4 +G4ΣzzG
′
2F
′ (2.51g)
Wt|t−1 = FWt−1|t−1F ′
+G1ΣuuG
′
1 +G2ΣzzG
′
2 +G4ΣzzG
′
4 + FG2ΣzzG
′
4 +G4ΣzzG
′
2F
′ (2.51h)
Vt|t = Vt|t−1 −KtE
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (i)
′]K ′t (2.51i)
Wt|t = Wt|t−1 +KtE
[
st|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (j)
′]K ′t
− E [Xt|t−1 (i) st|t−1 (j)′]K ′t
−KtE
[
st|t−1 (i)Xt|t−1 (j)
′] (2.51j)
Provided has all eigenvalues of F are within the unit circle, then there will exist a
steady state (i.e. time-invariant) filter, found by iterating these equations forward
until convergence is achieved.
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2.C.3 Confirming the conjectured law of motion
The state vector of interest and its law of motion are conjectured to be:
Xt ≡

xt
Et [Xt]
{1}E˜t [Xt]
{2}E˜t [Xt]
...

= FXt−1 +G1ut +G2zt +G3et +G4zt−1 (2.52)
To confirm this law of motion, we first combining equations (2.29) and (2.36) to
write the agents’ filter as:
Et (i) [Xt] = FEt−1 (i) [Xt−1]
+K

M1 (Xt−1 − Et−1 (i) [Xt−1])
+M2 (Xt−1 − Et−1 (δt−1 (i)) [Xt−1])
+M3Xt−1
+N1ut +N2vt (i) +N3et
+N4vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) +N5zt−1

Gathering like terms gives
Et (i) [Xt] = K (M1 +M2 +M3)Xt−1
+ (F −KM1)Et−1 (i) [Xt−1]
−KM2Et−1 (δt−1 (i)) [Xt−1]
+KN1ut
+KN2vt (i)
+KN3et
+KN4vt−1 (δt−1 (i))
+KN5zt−1 (2.53)
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Taking the simple average of equation (2.53) gives
Et [Xt] = K (M1 +M2 +M3)Xt−1
+ (F −KM1)Et−1 [Xt−1]
−KM2 {1}E˜t−1 [Xt−1]
+KN1ut
+KN3et
+KN4
{1}v˜t−1
+KN5zt−1
where I have used proposition 2 to replace
∫ 1
0
vt−1 (δt−1 (i)) di with {1}v˜t−1. But since
{1}v˜t−1 is part of zt−1, while Et−1 [Xt−1] and {1}E˜t−1 [Xt−1] are part of Xt−1, we can
simplify this down to:
Et [Xt] = {K (M1 +M2 +M3) + (F −KM1)Ts −KM2Tw1}Xt−1
+KN1ut
+KN3et
+K
([
N4 01×∞
]
+N5
)
zt−1 (2.54)
Next, taking the q-th weighted average of equation (2.53) gives
{q}E˜t [Xt] = K (M1 +M2 +M3)Xt−1
+ (F −KM1) {q}E˜t−1 [Xt−1]
−KM2 {q+1}E˜t−1 [Xt−1]
+KN1ut
+KN2
{q}v˜t
+KN3et
+KN4
{q+1}v˜t−1
+KN5zt−1
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where the last two terms have again made use of proposition 2. From this, we can
read immediately that
{q}E˜t [Xt] =
{
K (M1 +M2 +M3) + (F −KM1)Twq −KM2Twq+1
}
Xt−1
+KN1ut
+K
[
01×r(q−1) N2 01×∞
]
zt
+KN3et
+K
([
01×rq N4 01×∞
]
+N5
)
zt−1 (2.55)
where r is the number of elements in each agents’ vector of idiosyncratic shocks, vt (i).
Putting it all together, we substitute equations (2.54) and (2.55) into equation (2.52)
to arrive at
F =

[
A 0m×∞
]
K (M1 +M2 +M3) + (F −KM1)Ts −KM2Tw1
K (M1 +M2 +M3) + (F −KM1)Tw1 −KM2Tw2
K (M1 +M2 +M3) + (F −KM1)Tw2 −KM2Tw3
...

(2.56a)
G1 =

P
KN1
KN1
KN1
...

G2 =

0m×∞
0∞×∞
K
[
N2 01×r 01×r 01×∞
]
K
[
01×r N2 01×r 01×∞
]
...

(2.56b)
G3 =

0m×n
KN3
KN3
KN3
...

G4 =

0m×∞
K
([
N4 01×p 01×r 01×∞
]
+N5
)
K
([
01×p N4 01×r 01×∞
]
+N5
)
K
([
01×r 01×r N4 01×∞
]
+N5
)
...

(2.56c)
where m is the number of elements in the underlying state (xt) and n is the number
of elements in the vector of public signal noise (et). This confirms the conjectured
structure to the law of motion and implicitly defines the coefficient matricies. Note
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that since the matricies in (2.56) are recursive, finding the solution involves finding
the fixed point of the system for a given Kalman gain (K) and pre-chosen upper
limit (k∗) on the number of orders of expectations to include.
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Appendix 2.D Extending the model to dynamic
actions
We here consider an illustrative example of extending the model of this chapter to
consideration of dynamic actions. In particular, we allow agents’ decision rules to
be slightly more general, with an inclusion of agents’ expectations regarding the
next-period average action. That is, we suppose that individual decisions are made
according to the following rule:
gt (i) = α
′spt (i) + η
′
xEt (i) [Xt] + ηyEt (i) [gt] + ηzEt (i)
[
gt+1
]
(2.57)
where agents’ private signals are formed as
spt (i) = Bxt +Qvt (i)
We retain the assumption that the underlying state follows an AR(1) process:
xt = Axt−1 + Put
and still suppose that the full hierarchy of expectations regarding the underlying
state is given by:
Xt = E(0:∞)t [xt]
Our goal is to show that gt (i) may be expressed in the general form
gt (i) = λ
′
0wt−1 + λ
′
2Xt + λ
′
1Et (i) [Xt] + λ
′
3vt (i)
To do this, we start by taking the simple average of equation (2.57) to give:
gt = α
′Bxt + η′xEt [Xt] + ηyEt [gt] + ηzEt
[
gt+1
]
To keep the notation clean, define θt ≡ α′Bxt + η′xEt [Xt] so that
gt = θt + ηyEt [gt] + ηzEt
[
gt+1
]
We now substitute this equation back into itself in the second element (ηyEt [gt]):
gt = θt + ηyEt [θt] + η
2
yE
(2)
t [gt] + ηzEt
[
gt+1
]
+ ηyηzE
(2)
t
[
gt+1
]
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Repeating this process, in the limit (and using the fact that ηy ∈ (0, 1) and assuming
that average expectations don’t explode), this becomes:
gt =
( ∞∑
k=0
ηkyE
(k)
t [θt]
)
+
(
ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
gt+1
])
Now briefly consider θt and simple-average expectations of θt. We can write that:
θt = α
′Bxt + η′xE
(1)
t [Xt]
E
(1)
t [θt] = α
′BE
(1)
t [xt] + η
′
xE
(2)
t [Xt]
E
(2)
t [θt] = α
′BE
(2)
t [xt] + η
′
xE
(3)
t [Xt]
· · ·
Next, suppose that the matrix Ts selects the simple-average expectation of Xt from
Xt:
E
(1)
t [Xt] = TsXt
and that the matrix S selects xt from Xt (obviously S =
[
Il 0l×∞
]
where l is the
number of elements in xt):
xt = SXt
Then we can write:
θt = (α
′BS + η′xTs)Xt
E
(1)
t [θt] = (α
′BS + η′xTs)TsXt
E
(2)
t [θt] = (α
′BS + η′xTs)T
2
sXt
· · ·
or, in general,
E
(k)
t [θt] = (α
′BS + η′xTs)T
k
sXt
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The average period-t action can therefore be written as
gt = (α
′BS + η′xTs)
( ∞∑
k=0
(ηyTs)
k
)
Xt + ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
gt+1
]
= (α′BS + η′xTs) (I − ηyTs)−1Xt + ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
gt+1
]
= β′Xt + ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
gt+1
]
where β′ ≡ (α′BS + η′xTs) (I − ηyTs)−1. Next, substitute this back into itself for
the next-period average action:
gt = β
′Xt + ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
β′Xt+1 + ηz
∞∑
l=1
ηl−1y E
(l)
t+1
[
gt+2
]]
= β′Xt + ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y β
′E
(k)
t [Xt+1] + ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
ηz
∞∑
l=1
ηl−1y E
(l)
t+1
[
gt+2
]]
Next, we use the following conjectured aspect of the law of motion for Xt:
Et (i) [Xt+1] = Et (i) [FXt]
for some matrix of parameters F . This implies that
E
(k)
t [Xt+1] = FE
(k)
t [Xt]
and hence that
gt = β
′Xt + ηzβ′F
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t [Xt] + ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
ηz
∞∑
l=1
ηl−1y E
(l)
t+1
[
gt+2
]]
= β′Xt + ηzβ′F
( ∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y T
k
s
)
Xt + ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
ηz
∞∑
l=1
ηl−1y E
(l)
t+1
[
gt+2
]]
= β′Xt + ηzβ′FTs (I − ηyTs)−1Xt + ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
ηz
∞∑
l=1
ηl−1y E
(l)
t+1
[
gt+2
]]
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Next, expand the gt+2 term to give
gt = β
′Xt + ηzβ′FTs (I − ηyTs)−1Xt
+ ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
ηz
∞∑
l=1
ηl−1y E
(l)
t+1
[
β′Xt+2 + ηz
∞∑
m=1
ηm−1y E
(m)
t+2
[
gt+3
]]]
= β′Xt
+ ηzβ
′FTs (I − ηyTs)−1Xt
+ β′
(
ηzFTs (I − ηyTs)−1
)2
Xt
+ ηz
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1y E
(k)
t
[
ηz
∞∑
l=1
ηl−1y E
(l)
t+1
[
ηz
∞∑
m=1
ηm−1y E
(m)
t+2
[
gt+3
]]]
Continued substitution then arrives at:
gt = β
′
∞∑
j=0
(
ηzFTs (I − ηyTs)−1
)j
Xt
which, in turn, becomes
gt = (α
′BS + η′xTs) (I − ηyTs)−1
(
I − ηzFTs (I − ηyTs)−1
)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a′
Xt
Using this simple expression of gt = a
′Xt, we can substitute it back into the agents’
individual decision rule to obtain
gt (i) = α
′ (Bxt +Qvt (i)) + (η′x + ηya
′ + ηza′F )Et (i) [Xt]
= α′B︸︷︷︸
λ′2
xt + (η
′
x + ηya
′ + ηza′F )︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ′3
Et (i) [Xt] + α
′Q︸︷︷︸
γ′4
vt (i)
which is now in the necessary form. As an aside, taking a simple average of this
gives
gt = α
′BSXt + (η′x + ηya
′ + ηza′F )Et [Xt]
which implies the following constraint on the coefficients of the decision rule (α, ηx,
ηy, ηz) and the expectation transition matrix (F ):
a′ = α′BS + (η′x + ηya
′ + ηza′F )Ts
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Chapter 3
Networks and Inflation
Abstract
This paper presents a model of price setting wherein firms partially inform
their decisions by watching price changes by other firms across an observation
network. Within a context of imperfect common knowledge and for a wide
range of plausible and commonly observed network structures, idiosyncratic
shocks are shown to not “wash out” in aggregate prices. These aggregate
effects are also shown to be persistent despite the underlying idiosyncratic
shocks being entirely transitory and firms having complete flexibility in their
price-setting. The model is therefore able to explain a variety of recently
documented stylised facts regarding price setting, including the observation
that short-lived price changes appear to contain macroeconomic content.
3.1 Introduction
This paper develops a network learning-based microfoundation for cost-push shocks,
with the aggregate price level able to persistently deviate from it’s long-run trend
despite (a) the absence of any aggregate shocks to the economy; (b) firms being free
to adjust their prices every period; and (c) network shocks (comprised of weighted
sums of idiosyncratic shocks) being purely transitory.
That idiosyncratic shocks are an important aspect of firms’ price-setting decisions
is now universally accepted. However, it remains commonly assumed that since the
shocks themselves must cancel out,1 the effects of those shocks on firms’ decisions
1Over a continuum of agents, that mean-zero idiosyncratic shocks must sum to zero is true by
definition; if they did not, they would necessarily include an aggregate component.
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must also wash out in aggregation. In such a setting, firm-specific shocks can only
contribute to aggregate dynamics by causing sluggish responses to aggregate shocks,
because firms take time to be sure that a given shock is truly common to all firms.
In contrast to this, recently documented evidence from studies of micro-level price
changes suggests that those price changes most likely to have been driven by idiosyn-
cratic factors do not cancel out and therefore do indeed appear to contain content
of macroeconomic importance.
To achieve the emergence of aggregate effects from idiosyncratic shocks, this
chapter makes applied use of the model developed in the previous chapter: we sup-
pose that firms with complete price-setting flexibility learn about the state of the
economy by observing each other’s prices in a directed network and set their own
prices on the basis of their marginal costs and, for reasons of strategic complement-
arity, their beliefs regarding the average price.
With unobserved aggregate variables following an AR(1) process, we show that
the full hierarchy of firms’ expectations will follow an ARMA(1,1) process, with
current and lagged weighted averages of firms’ idiosyncratic shocks entering at an
aggregate level. For sufficiently irregular networks (i.e. when the link distribution
is sufficiently non-uniform) these weighted sums are shown to not converge to zero,
thereby adding aggregate volatility to the system. Despite idiosyncratic shocks being
purely transitory, the aggregate volatility they induce through the network is also
shown to exhibit (endogenous) persistence.
This chapter therefore adds to the burgeoning literature on deriving aggregate
volatility from agents’ idiosyncratic shocks. Key in this field to date includes the
work by Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Saleh (2012).2 Examining the
idea of firms operating within an inter-sectoral supply network, they demonstrate
idiosyncratic productivity shocks leading to volatility in aggregate output and, for
finite networks, derive an upper limit for the rate at which aggregate volatility de-
clines as the number of firms increases. For sufficiently asymmetric trading networks,
they show that aggregate volatility need not vanish at all. In another vein, Gabaix
(2011) demonstrates how aggregate volatility can emerge from idiosyncratic shocks
2The work of this paper was first developed independently by Carvalho (2010) and Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Saleh (2010) and later combined to the paper referenced in the text.
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when the distribution of firm sizes exhibits fat tails, even when those firms do not
trade directly with each other. Each of these share with the current chapter an
emphasis on unequal, or fat-tailed, distributions. In the model of Gabaix (2011),
aggregate volatility arises because the largest firms contribute disproportionately to
aggregate production, while in that by Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-
Saleh (2012), it emerges through those firms whose output is most extensively used
as an intermediate good by other firms. In the current paper, with network-based
learning, it derives from firms whose price changes are most readily observed.
It may be noted that because firms may choose to observe the prices of other firms
with whom they do not trade and are not competitors (a perfectly reasonable action
provided that their marginal costs are correlated), this model also represents a novel
transmission mechanism for inflation across industries or geographies independent
of it’s path along production chains. However, the origin of an observation network
remains largely outside the scope of the current paper, which takes the network as
exogenously given.
When firms exist in an observation network that includes (a) repeated actions;
(b) Bayesian updating; and (c) strategic interaction, it becomes necessary for them
to estimate not only the simple average of all firms’ expectations (for reasons of
strategic interaction), but also the expectations of their individual observees and, in
turn, their observees’ expectations of others again. As the number of agents in the
network expands, this causes an explosion in the size of the state vector quite apart
from the presence of higher-order expectations (see section 1.2 in the first chapter
for more detail) and has typically been thought to prevent closed-form analysis in
anything other than trivially small networks.
To date, research in network learning has therefore abandoned one of these three
assumptions in order to achieve tractability. For example, in abandoning the assump-
tion of repeated actions, Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) characterise
the (Bayesian) equilibrium of a sequential learning model for a general stochastic
sampling process and demonstrate that so long as no group of agents is excessively
influential, there will be asymptotic learning of the truth when private beliefs are
unbounded. In giving up on rational (Bayesian) learning, Golub and Jackson (2010)
study learning in a setting where agents “na¨ıvely” update their beliefs regarding a
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fixed state of the world by taking weighted averages of their neighbour’s opinions.
In contrast to earlier work in this sub-field, they are able to demonstrate that with
such heuristic learning, individual beliefs converge to the truth for a broad variety of
networks (provided they are sufficiently large) and provide upper and lower bounds
on the rate of convergence. Finally, Mueller-Frank (2013) details a formal structure
for Bayesian learning over an undirected social network (i.e. with pairwise sharing)
in the absence of strategic concerns by agents. He notes the extreme practical diffi-
culties of actually implementing such a rule, both for the agents in principle and the
researcher more generally.
In contrast to these, this paper makes use of results presented in the previous
chapter that permit the inclusion of all three assumptions regarding network learning
by combining them with a fourth: network opacity. By denying agents knowledge
of the exact topology of the network and instead supposing that they know only
the (i.i.d.) distribution from which observation targets are drawn and do not learn
about the structure of the network over time, firms’ state vector of interest includes
an infinite sequence of weighted average expectations instead of individual agents’
expectations. Because of the recursive nature of firms’ learning, this sequence will
be of decreasing importance to the hierarchy of simple-average expectations, so an
arbitrarily accurate approximation of the full solution may then be found by selecting
a sufficiently high cut-off for the number of weighted-average expectations to include,
together with the standard cut-off for the number of higher-orders of expectation.
This paper falls broadly within and was initially inspired by the literature on
imperfect common knowledge (where firms possess incomplete information about
aggregate state variables because of imperfect signals). The idea that real effects
may arise from nominal disturbances through imperfect information dates to Lucas
(1972) and, more recently, Woodford (2003). The solution method developed by
this paper builds upon that put forward by Nimark (2008, 2011a), who introduced
dynamic pricing and idiosyncratic shocks in marginal costs to the Woodford (2003)
paper. Other recent work in this area includes Adam (2007), who looked at optimal
monetary policy in the Woodford setting and Melosi (2012), who uses the Survey of
Professonal Forecasters to estimate a DSGE model with price setters experiencing
imperfect common knowledge.
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Of course, firms existing within observation networks need not only feed into
a setting of imperfect common knowledge. It might also, for example, be readily
applied to the rational inattention work of Sims (2003) or the “sticky information”
literature of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Reis (2006). In this latter case, if we sup-
pose that a full information update is costly and observing the price of a competitor
less so, it is easy to see that a natural incentive emerges for a firm to delay a full
update and instead “free ride” on the price changes of their competitors. Explora-
tion of network learning in these other settings would be a fruitful area of research.
However, as shown below, evidence from a variety of surveys of firms’ price-setting
behaviour suggests that the imperfect common knowledge setting may be the more
likely reason for firms’ observation of each others’ prices.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides evidence
of the key assumptions of this paper. Section 3.3 then presents a DSGE model in
which firms are free to adjust their prices every period, but suffer from incomplete
information and seek to remedy this by observing each others’ prices in a network.
Section 3.4 presents simulation results, while section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Evidence
In this section we gather evidence in support of the key assumptions of this chapter’s
model. In particular, we argue here that (a) firms set their prices, in part, on the
basis of observed prices posted by individual competitors; and (b) this is done within
a context of imperfect common knowledge, in the sense of Woodford (2003).
That firms operate within not just transactional but also observational networks
is to some extent intuitive, or even self evident. An independent coffee shop will
obviously take note of the prices offered by their competitors, including both other
independent outlets nearby and larger chains such as Starbucks. The model presented
here goes further than this, however, because firms might also observe the price
movements of businesses that are not direct competitors or suppliers in order to
learn about factors common to all firms. When the manager of a book shop observes
a price change at a Thai restaurant next door, for example, or even a car mechanic
around the corner, they obtain information about movements in average marginal
costs and local demand, thereby improving their ability to ascertain that portion of
their own cost or demand changes that are idiosyncratic.
We here first describe evidence from a number of price-setting surveys conducted
(typically by or on behalf of central banks) in the 1990s and 2000s and then explore
what evidence may be garnered from recent studies of directly observed price changes.
3.2.1 Price-setting surveys
Starting with the work of Blinder (1991) and Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, and Rudd
(1998) in the United States and continuing through to the first half of the 2000s,
a variety of surveys were conducted in an attempt to shed light on precisely how
firms set prices. These include work in the UK (Hall, Walsh, and Yates, 1997);
Sweden (Apel, Friberg, and Hallsten, 2005); Japan (Nakagawa, Hattori, and Tak-
agawa, 2000); Canada (Amirault, Kwan, and Wilkinson, 2006); and nine euro-zone
countries (Fabiani, Druant, Hernando, Kwapil, Landau, Loupias, Martins, Matha¨,
Sabbatini, Stahl, and Stokman, 2005).3
3Countries included were: Austria (Kwapil, Baumgartner, and Scharler, 2005); Belgium (Aucre-
manne and Druant, 2005); France (Loupias and Ricart, 2004); Germany (Stahl, 2005); Luxembourg
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When looking at those firms following partially or completely state-based pricing,4
Canadian firms listed price changes by competitors as the most important cause in
triggering an adjustment, as did those in Sweden. In Spain, 53% of firms reported
that competitors’ price movements were important factors in triggering their own
price changes. In considering the magnitude of price changes, 25% of surveyed UK
firms reported basing their prices on those of their competitors. This figure agreed
with the 27% of surveyed eurozone firms reporting the same, although this ranged
from 13% in Portugal to 38% in France. In the Netherlands, where the survey was
unique in including very small firms among those polled, this figure was 21.6% overall
but rose sharply to 34.1% for firms employing only one worker.
These responses are strongly supportive of the idea that firms observe each others’
prices, and we can only assume that they do so as a result of some form of imperfect
information; that they learn something from their observations.
However, that firms observe each others’ prices does not, in itself, speak to why
they might do so. If, for example, firms experience significant costs in gathering in-
formation and developing optimal price plans in the style of the “sticky information”
models of Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006, 2007) and Reis (2006), then mimicking the
price changes of one’s competitors may be a useful short-cut. A fair approximation of
the firm’s optimal price could then be achieved by observing the prices of competitors
with similar production technologies and who face similar demand. Alternatively, if
firms face strategic complementarity in their price-setting and there are unobserv-
able aggregate state variables in the style of Woodford (2003) and Nimark (2008),
observing other firms’ decisions may be used to inform businesses of the average
actions or beliefs of their competitors.
Fortunately, the surveys also queried firms as to their opinions regarding the
reasons for price stickiness, from which four theories stand out as being significant:
implicit contracts, explicit contracts, cost-based pricing and coordination failure. All
of these were among the top five recognised reasons in all 14 surveys when they were
(Lu¨nnemann and Matha¨, 2006); the Netherlands (Hoeberichts and Stokman, 2010); Portugal (Mar-
tins, 2005); and Spain (Alvarez and Hernando, 2005).
4The alternative being to use entirely time-based pricing, whereby firms adjust their prices at
a set (average) frequency irrespective of economic conditions.
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included in the options put to surveyed firms. In stark contrast, menu costs and
its more recent variant, information costs, were among the least supported ideas,
being in the bottom three reasons for most European surveys and Canada. Only in
America and Austria were these costs placed in the middle of the group, menu costs
being cited as the sixth most proximate cause of price rigidity in the United States
and seventh in Austria and information costs coming sixth in Austria.
The low importance attached to information costs suggests that while there may
be imperfect information, it does not manifest in the form of infrequently updated
information sets. On the contrary, the strong recognition of coordination concerns
and cost-based pricing are supportive of this paper’s underlying model: the former
suggests that businesses are concerned with their strategic complementarity in price-
setting and the latter that (presumably marginal) costs drive movements in prices.
3.2.2 Stylised facts from observed price changes
Although early work suggested that most prices change around once per year,5 the
seminal work by Bils and Klenow (2004) observed that the median duration of prices
in CPI data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) was 4.3 months, a
frequency almost three times higher than previously thought. This triggered a rush
of further work exploring and broadly characterising microeconomic price changes.
Klenow and Malin (2010) provide an excellent survey of this literature and provide
a summary in the form of ten stylised facts. Among these are that:
1. prices change at least once a year, twice in America;
2. temporary price changes – both reductions and increases – around more rigid
“reference prices” are common and do not cancel out in aggregation, suggesting
that some macroeconomic content is present in the more frequent updates;
3. price changes are typically larger than those needed to keep up with infla-
tion, suggesting that idiosyncratic factors weigh more heavily on a firm’s price-
setting decision than aggregate factors;
4. changes in relative prices tend to be short lived, suggesting that idiosyncratic
shocks are less persistent than aggregate disturbances; and
5See, for example, Taylor (1999).
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5. price changes are generally linked to changes in marginal costs, particularly
wages.
The first of these dictates that we require some form of structural, or real rigidity
in addition to firms’ nominal rigidities – a “contract multiplier,” in the words of
Taylor (1980) – to explain the sluggish responses observed in aggregate price indicies.6
The second and third points suggest that even if firms’ idiosyncratic shocks have zero
mean and “cancel out” when averaged, average temporary price changes (that are
presumably based upon them) do not cancel out. Finally, the fourth and fifth points
are suggestive of a model in which firms’ marginal costs are subject to persistent
aggregate shocks and only transitory idiosyncratic shocks.
The model presented in this paper is consistent with all of the above stylised
facts and with observations of rigidity in aggregate prices. Because firms are able to
observe the prices of any other firm, it also represents a framework for the transmis-
sion of inflation (and hence, its persistence) across industries or geographies and not
simply along production chains.
6See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) or Romer and Romer (2004) for
the USA, or Peersman and Smets (2003) for the Euro area.
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3.3 The Model
In this section we construct and analyse a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium
(DSGE) model in which firms make use of network learning in their pricing decisions.
The real economy is presented here in a standard model with no capital. A repres-
entative household purchases differentiated goods via a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
aggregator and supplies labour to firms. Monopolistic firms produce the goods and
sell them to the household, with prices able to be adjusted costlessly every period.
Persistent aggregate shocks occur within the household’s preferences, the central
bank’s interest rate policy and economy-wide TFP, while firms also face idiosyn-
cratic, transitory shocks to their demand, nominal wages and productivity. Only the
main results are presented here; readers interested in the full derivation are referred
to appendix 3.A.
In what follows, unless otherwise indicated, lower-case letters are used to denote
(natural) log deviations from the long-run steady state values of the corresponding
upper-case variables (e.g. yt ≡ ln (Yt)− ln (Y ss)).
3.3.1 The household
Each period, a representative household maximises
EHHt
 ∞∑
s=0
βs
eCt+sC
1− 1
σ
t+s − 1
1− 1
σ
− eHt+sH
1+ 1
ψ
t+s
1 + 1
ψ

 (3.1)
subject to a standard budget constraint and where EHHt [·] is the mathematical ex-
pectation conditional on the household’s information set in period t (defined below);
Ct is aggregate consumption; Ht is the aggregate labour supply; σ is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution; ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply; and Ct and
Ht are persistent, mean zero shocks (specified below) to the utility of consumption
and the disutility of labour respectively. The shock to the disutility of labour may
be considered a reduced-form way of capturing broad shocks to the labour supply,
such as a temporary impairment to labour mobility.
Aggregate consumption is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over individual
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consumption goods:
Ct =
(∫ (
e−vy,t(j)Ct (j)
) ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(3.2)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution and vy,t (j) is a transitory, mean zero, idiosyn-
cratic shock to the household’s demand for good j (defined below). The household’s
subsequent first-order conditions are:
Wt
Pt
eCtC
− 1
σ
t = e
HtH
1
ψ
t (3.3)
eCtC
− 1
σ
t = β (1 + it)E
HH
t
[
eCt+1C
− 1
σ
t+1
1
Πt+1
]
(3.4)
where Wt/Pt is the real wage; it is the net nominal interest rate; and Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1
is the gross rate of inflation. It can also be shown that household demand for good
j is given by:
Ct (j) =
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−ε
Cte
vy,t(j) (3.5)
and the aggregate price level by:
Pt =
(∫
Pt (j)
1−ε dj
) 1
1−ε
(3.6)
3.3.2 Firms
Each good is produced by a single firm according to a common production function
that deploys labour with decreasing marginal productivity:
Yt (j) = At (j)Ht (j)
1−α (3.7)
with each firm’s productivity, At (j), given by:
ln (At (j)) = At + va,t (j) (3.8)
where At is a persistent, mean zero, aggregate shock and va,t (j) is a transitory, mean
zero, idiosyncratic shock (each specified below) to the firm’s productivity, broadly
defined. Firm j’s real marginal cost is then:
MCt (j) = (1 + η)
Wt (j)
Pt
1
At (j)
(
Yt (j)
At (j)
)η
(3.9)
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where η ≡ α
1−α is the elasticity of marginal cost w.r.t. output and Wt (j) is the
nominal wage paid by the firm, defined as:
Wt (j) ≡ Wtevw,t(j) (3.10)
where vw,t (j) is a transitory, mean zero shock to the firm’s wage bargaining. Shocks
to At (j) should therefore be broadly interpreted as a reduced-form means of captur-
ing shocks to firms’ marginal costs other than those that act through demand or the
(real) wage.7
Firms engage in static pricing – i.e. they are free to costlessly update their prices
in every period – so that results presented here represent real rigidity, not nominal.
Given the results of Bils and Klenow (2004) and subsequent research, it is arguably
best to assume that there exists no nominal rigidity in at least some industries.
In this case, firm j’s optimal price in each period will be a simple markup over
that period’s nominal marginal cost, subject to the limits of j’s information set:
Pt (j) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
Et (j) [PtMCt (j)] (3.11)
3.3.3 Market clearing
All markets clear each period, so that:
Yt (j) = Ct (j)∀t, j (3.12a)
Ht =
∫
Ht (j) dj ∀t (3.12b)
which implies that aggregate output is given by:
Yt = ZtH
1−α
t (3.13)
where aggregate TFP, Zt, combines individual firm productivities and distortions
from relative prices and transitory shocks to relative demand:
Zt ≡
(∫
At (j)
−(1+η)
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−ε(1+η)
e−(1+η)vy,t(j)dj
)− 1
1+η
(3.14)
7This obviously includes productivity shocks, but may be considered to also include shocks to
the firm’s marginal costs from other factors of production.
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3.3.4 The central bank
To close the model, we assume that the central bank sets nominal interest rates
according to the Taylor-like policy function:
it = κyE
CB
t [yt] + κpiE
CB
t [pit+1] + Mt (3.15)
where ECBt [·] is the mathematical expectation conditional on the central bank’s
information set in period t (defined below) and Mt is a persistent, mean zero shock
to monetary policy (specified below). Note that the component against inflation is
against expected future inflation rather than current inflation, to provide a more
accurate characterisation of modern central banking practice.
3.3.5 Stochastic processes
The underlying state of the economy, xt, therefore contains four aggregate shocks:
xt ≡
[
At Ct Ht Mt
]′
(3.16)
Of these, the shocks to productivity (At) and the disutility of labour (Ht) are pure
supply shocks as they enter the model only through firms’ marginal costs (although
note that the latter acts via higher real wages); the shock to monetary policy (Mt)
is a pure demand shock as it only enters through the IS (Eular) relation; and the
shock to the utility of consumption (Ct) has both supply and demand aspects in
that it affects both the spending/saving decision and the labour supply.
The underlying state is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
xt = Axt−1 + ut (3.17)
where ut is a vector of period-t innovations identically and independently distributed
as N (0, I) and A is a matrix of fixed and commonly known parameters.
Idiosyncratic shocks to firms’ productivity (va,t (j)), wages (vw,t (j)) and demand
(vy,t (j)) are gathered together as
vt (j) ≡
va,t (j)vw,t (j)
vy,t (j)
 (3.18)
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The vector vt (j) is entirely transitory, fully independent and jointly distributed as
N (0, σ2vI).
3.3.6 Firms’ (linearised) marginal costs
We show in the appendix that firms’ (linearised) real marginal costs are given by
mct (j) =
(
η +
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
yt + ηvy,t (j)− ηε (pt (j)− pt) + ωt (j) (3.19)
where ωt (j) is the combined supply shock for firm j in period t:
ωt (j) ≡ Bxt +Qvt (j) (3.20a)
B =
[
− (1 + η)
(
1 + 1
ψ
)
−1 1 0
]
(3.20b)
Q =
[
− (1 + η) 1 0
]
(3.20c)
From this, we define
....
mct (j) to be a partial average of the firm’s real marginal cost:
the real marginal cost that firm j would incur without idiosyncratic demand shocks
and if called upon to produce the average quantity (i.e. if vy,t (j) = 0 and yt (j) = yt),
but still with idiosyncratic supply shocks:
....
mct (j) ≡
(
η +
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
yt + ωt (j) (3.21)
Finally, we define mct as the (true) average real marginal cost. That is, the real
marginal cost a firm would incur if facing the average demand and experiencing
the average supply shock (i.e. if producing the average quantity of output and
experiencing no idiosyncratic shocks):
mct ≡
(
η +
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
yt +Bxt (3.22)
3.3.7 Information and the network structure
Households and the central bank are assumed to possess complete information,8 so
that:
ECBt [Xt−s] = E
HH
t [Xt−s] = Xt−s ∀s ≥ 0
8An arguably more plausible (and certainly more interesting) scenario would be to restrict the
household and central bank to less than complete information so that dynamics might arise from
their higher-order expectations of each others’ and firms’ beliefs. Exploration of such a setting is
held for future research.
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for any variable Xt, and to update their beliefs rationally, so that:
ECBt [Xt+s] = E
HH
t [Xt+s] = E [Xt+s|Ωt] ∀s ≥ 1
where Ωt is the set of all possible information available in period t.
Firms possess only incomplete information. We make an assumption of joint
rationality, in the sense of Nimark (2008), so that all firms know the structure and the
coefficients of the solution presented in section 3.3.9 below and firm j’s information
set evolves as:
I0 (j) =
{
F,G1, G2, G3,γp,γy, δy, σ
2
v/σ
2
u,Φ
}
(3.23a)
It (j) = {It−1 (j) , st (j)} (3.23b)
with st (j) being their set of public, private and social signals in period t.
For private signals, we will always maintain that firms observe their current-
period supply shock (ωt (j)) and the quantity of goods they produced and sold in
the previous period (yt−1 (j)). For public signals, we will variously suppose that all
firms receive common, but imperfect, signals of the previous period’s price level and
real GDP.
In addition to these, we suppose that firms receive social signals by observing the
previous-period prices set by individual competitors across an observation network
characterised by link distribution Φ. That is, st (j) includes the set gt−1 (δt−1 (j)),
where δt−1 (j) is firm j’s period-t draw from Φ, mapping them onto the index of a
subset of firms that reset their price in period t− 1.
For simplicity, the network is assumed to be effectively destroyed and redrawn
each period. It therefore satisfies assumption 1 of chapter 2: that the network is
opaque. The network is further assumed to be asymptotically irregular, in that the
distribution Φ satisfies assumption 2 of chapter 2 so that, by proposition 2, we can
define a vector of network shocks as:
zt ≡

{1}v˜t
{2}v˜t
{3}v˜t
...
 ∼ N (0,Σzz) Σzz =

Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ · · ·
Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ Σ
{2}
v˜v˜ Σ
{2}
v˜v˜ · · ·
Σ
{1}
v˜v˜ Σ
{2}
v˜v˜ Σ
{3}
v˜v˜ · · ·
...
...
...
. . .
 (3.24a)
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where
{q}v˜t = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
vt
δt(· · · (δt︸ ︷︷ ︸
q
(i)))
 (3.24b)
Σ
{q}
v˜v˜ = (1− (1− ζ∗)q) Σvv (3.24c)
and where ζ∗ ≡ limN→∞
∑N
i=1 φN (i)
2 is the degree of irregularity in the network, with
ζ∗ = 0 indicating an asymptotically uniform link distribution and ζ∗ = 1 indicating
a degenerate distribution.
The precise origin of the network (in this case, the origin of Φ) is largely left
for future research and is here assumed to be exogenous. However, we do make two
points of note in this regard.
First, we observe that social optimality dictates that there be at least some de-
gree of irregularity in the network. When firms have incomplete information and
face strategic complementarities, there is an incentive for them to overcome the co-
ordination problem by all observing the same signal (i.e. have the distribution be
degenerate, with everybody observing the price of one particular firm with prob-
ability 1). However, doing so would maximise the variance of the network shocks
(which, recall, are aggregated idiosyncratic shocks). A social planner constrained to
only choosing the distribution Φ would therefore face a trade-off.9 A uniform dis-
tribution would minimise aggregate volatility and so raise welfare, but a degenerate
distribution would solve the price-coordination problem. Exactly how non-uniform
a distribution (i.e. how irregular a network) would be optimal would therefore be
determined by the strength of the strategic complementarity. A higher coefficient
against the average price in the individual firm’s optimal decision rule would make
the coordination problem more important and so result in a more asymmetric op-
timal distribution.
Second, we conjecture that the constrained social planner’s optimal distribution
will be a stable equilibrium. That is, conditional on all other firms drawing the iden-
tity of their observees from the distribution Φ, it will be optimal for any individual
9Of course, an unconstrained social planner would not face the informational or coordination
problems in the first place.
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firm to do the same. In appendix 3.B we provide a proof that this is true for a simple
setting where a continuum of firms set static (i.e. one-period) prices and decide on
the probabilities to assign to each of two potential observees.
3.3.8 Timing
Each period is divided into two phases, with the full gamut of innovations for the
period occurring as the period begins.
1. In phase one, firms observe their public and private signals and the previous-
period prices of a number of their competitors. Using this information, they
set their prices for the current period.
2. In phase two, the central bank and the representative household, both of whom
have full information, set the market-clearing interest rate and average nominal
wage. The household reveals the quantity demanded from each firm at the
given prices, firms discover their current-period marginal cost and produce the
goods. The household consumes the goods entirely.
The key point of this timing arrangement is to ensure that while firms receive
signals and know in advance that markets will clear, they cannot know exactly what
their marginal cost will be, even in the current period (because they do not know
what demand will be), when setting their prices.
3.3.9 Characterising the model solution
As per theorem 1 from chapter 2, the opaque nature of firms’ observation network im-
plies that their network learning problem will involve the simple-average expectation
(because of firms’ concern with the simple-average price) and a sequence of weighted
average expectations because of the irregularity and opacity of the network. The full
hierarchy of firms’ expectations regarding xt will therefore be defined recursively as:
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Xt ≡

xt
Et [Xt]
{1}E˜t [Xt]
{2}E˜t [Xt]
...

(3.25)
and will follow an ARMA(1,1) process given by:
Xt = FXt−1 +G1ut +G2zt +G3et +G4zt−1 (3.26)
On the demand side of the economy, we have the familiar linearised household Eular
equation (3.4) and the central bank’s policy function (3.15):
yt = Et [yt+1]− σEt [it − pit+1] + σ (Ct − Et [Ct+1])
it = κyyt + κpiEt [pit+1] + Mt
where Et [·] is the full-information expectation formed by the representative house-
hold and the central bank. We combine these two to write simply
yt =
1
1 + σκy
Et [yt+1 − σ (κpi − 1) (pt+1 − pt)] + µ′yxt (3.27a)
where µy is given by
µ′y =
σ
1 + σκy
([
0 1 0 −1
]
−
[
0 1 0 0
]
A
)
(3.27b)
On the supply side of the economy, with firms free to adjust their prices in every
period, the linearised expression for their decision rule will be
pt (j) = Et (j)
[
pt +
1
1 + εη
....
mct (j)
]
(3.28)
where
....
mct (j) is the real marginal cost faced by a firm with an idiosyncratic demand
shock of zero that is called upon to produce the average quantity of goods.
With firms observing ωt (j) directly and defining χ ≡
(
1
1+εη
)(
η + 1
σ
+ 1+η
ψ
)
, we
show in the appendix that the aggregate price level may then be written as
pt =
(
1
1 + εη
)
Bxt +
∞∑
k=0
ξkE
(k+1)
t
 (χµ′y + ξ ( 11+εη)B)xt
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
(yt+1 + σ (1− κpi) pt+1)

(3.29a)
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where
ξ ≡ 1−
(
1
1 + εη
)(
η +
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)(
σ
1 + σκy
)
(1− κpi) (3.29b)
which is to say that the aggregate price level is a function of the current period
average supply shock and the full hierarchy of average expectations regarding (a)
the current period average supply shock; (b) the next period’s aggregate demand;
and (c) the next period’s price level. Note that in order for the aggregate price to
be well defined, we require ξ ∈ (0, 1) and that this requires κpi < 1.10
The reduced-form solution
The solution may then be found by the method of undetermined coefficients. That
is, in addition to the law of motion for firms’ beliefs (3.26), we next posit (and verify)
reduced-form solutions of the following form:
pt = γ
′
pXt (3.30a)
yt = γ
′
yXt + δ
′
yzt (3.30b)
and similarly suppose expressions for the real wage and hours worked as:
wt − pt = γ ′$Xt + δ′$zt (3.30c)
ht = γ
′
hXt + δ
′
hzt (3.30d)
Note that current-period network shocks do not appear in the reduced-form expres-
sion for the price level because firms do not contemporaneously observe any signals
that rely upon them. Network shocks do appear in the expressions for all real vari-
ables, however, because of the assumptions that (a) the representative household and
central bank have full information; and (b) markets clear.
10If the central bank’s reaction function (3.15) were to also include a term in current inflation as
well (for example, it = κyyt+κpi0pit+κpi1Et [pit+1]+ Mt) then the final term in the expression for ξ
would be (1 + κpi0 − κpi1), therefore allowing a stronger response to expected next-period inflation.
We have not done so here in order to ensure that firms’ prices are not backward looking.
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In appendix 3.A.5, we confirm the reduced-form solution and derive the following
conditions under which it holds:
γ ′p =
(
BSx +
( (
χµ′y + ξB
)
Sx
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
γ ′yF
)
(I − ξTs)−1 Ts
)
× (I − (1− ξ)F (I − ξTs)−1 Ts)−1 (3.31a)
γ ′y =
(
µ′ySx +
σ
1 + σκy
(1− κpi)γ ′p (F − I)
)(
I − 1
1 + σκy
F
)−1
(3.31b)
δ′y =
1
1 + σκy
(
γ ′y + σ (1− κpi)γ ′p
)
G3 (3.31c)
γ ′$ =
(
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
γ ′y +
[
−1+η
ψ
−1 1 0
]
Sx (3.31d)
δ′$ =
(
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
δ′y (3.31e)
γ ′h = (1 + η)γ
′
y − (1 + η)
[
1 0 0 0
]
Sx (3.31f)
δ′h = (1 + η) δ
′
y (3.31g)
In appendix 3.A.6, we characterise firms’ signal vectors in terms of the state
vector of interest and show that theorem 1 from the previous chapter applies, so
that the posited state law of motion (3.26) is indeed correct.
Determinacy of the solution
Given the assumptions that the central bank (a) does not respond to current inflation
and (b) responds to next-period inflations with a coefficient less than one, the reader
may be concerned about the determinacy of the model as, on the face of it, this
violates the Taylor Principle that monetary authorities respond by more than one-
for-one to inflation. However, it should be noted that the Taylor principle relates to
settings where firms have access to full information, which does not apply here.
Instead, uniqueness of the solution is established by, first, the method of undeter-
mined coefficients pinning down expressions for γp, γy and δy (so that pt and yt are
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linear functions of firms’ hierarchy of expectations and network shocks only) and,
second, the recursive projection of firms’ expectations onto the complete history of
their observables via a Kalman filter to pin down the law of motion for Xt under
incomplete information (i.e. to demonstrate that Xt is a function of fundamental
shocks only) in an extension of the methodology of Nimark (2008, 2011a).
Unlike the matrix decomposition methods of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or Klein
(2000), the solution methodology here does not identify the range of parameters for
which a unique solution exists. In particular, the assumption that κpi ∈ (0, 1) is
not a requirement for determinacy. It is instead a necessary condition for firms to
place decreasing weight on higher-order expectations so that the full solution may be
well approximated by simulating only a finite subset of Xt. Indeed, for the baseline
parameterisation outlined below, convergence to a stable solution appears to require
values of κpi ≥ 0.5.
3.3.10 Finding the solution
Finding the true solution to the model requires working with expectations of infinite
order, which cannot be handled in practice. However, so long as ξ (3.29b) lies between
zero and unity, the model places decreasing weight on higher order expectations
(a weight of ξk is applied to the average k-th order expectation), an arbitrarily
accurate approximation of the solution may be found by truncating firms’ expectation
hierarchy at an upper limit, k∗, of the number of orders to include. Recall, from the
previous chapter, that the recursive nature of agents’ (here firms’) learning and the
AR process for the underlying state ensures that decreasing weight is also applied
to higher weighted average expectations, thus allowing us to also impose an upper
limit, p∗, on the number of compound expectations to include.
For a given set of parameters and chosen values for k∗ and p∗, the solution is
obtained by finding the fixed point of the system (3.26), (3.30) and (3.31).
In practice, given the size of state vector, Xt, care must be taken to avoid the
numerical instability issues described in the previous chapter. Since the solution
here involves finding the simultaneous fixed points of three systems of equations –
the Kalman filter and the state law of motion from the previous chapter; and the
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macroeconomic coefficients detailed above – the root loop of the solution algorithm
must be expanded to:
repeat
Update the filter by one step, using equation (2.13)
Update the law of motion by one step, using equation (2.14)
Update the macroeconomic coefficients by one step, using equation (3.31)
until all three converge
120
3.4. Simulation
3.4 Simulation
Table 3.1 lists baseline parameters for the simulation presented below. Most values
should be uncontroversial, but a number of points bear highlighting. First, note
that each aggregate state variable (i.e. each element of xt) is assumed to follow an
independent AR(1) process, with interaction between them occurring only within
the broader model. Given the simplicity of the model, this is arguably too restrictive
an assumption – for example, a monetary policy shock (Mt) could plausibly affect
commodity prices which in the current model would appear as an aggregate shock
to marginal costs (At), implying that a realistic simulation should permit the two to
covary – but is nevertheless made in order to ensure that the firms’ learning problem
is as easy as possible and thus to avoid any bias to the strength of our results.
Parameter Value Description
A 0.6I4 The AR(1) transition matrix for the underlying state
P I4 The map from true aggregate shocks to the underlying state
Σuu I4 The variance-covariance matrix for true aggregate shocks
Σvv 5I3 The variance of idiosyncratic shocks
κy 0.5 The CB’s coefficient against current real GDP
κpi 0.5 The CB’s coefficient against expected next-period inflation
ε 3 The own-price elasticity of demand
σ 1/3 The elasticity of intertemporal substitution
ψ 1.5 The Frisch elasticity of labour supply
η 0.5 The elasticity of marginal cost (≡ α
1−α , α = 0.333)
q 2 The number of competitors observed by each firm
ζ∗ 0.2 The degree of irregularity in firms’ observation network
(0 = uniform, 1 = degenerate)
ξ 0.743 The relative importance of higher-order expectations
(implied by parameters above)
Table 3.1: Baseline parameterisation
Next, because we wish to focus on the relative effect of idiosyncratic shocks, we
normalise the variance of all true aggregate shocks to 1 and vary only the idiosyncratic
shock variance (with a baseline value of 5). The degree of irregularity in the firms’
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observation network, ζ∗, represents a new concept in this paper and cannot be known
with any certainty. For our baseline, we set it to 0.2, which is the value that would
emerge from a power-law distribution with a shape parameter of γ = 1.5. Note that
with these values, the implied variance of the aggregated idiosyncratic shocks, {1}v˜t
and {2}v˜t, are 1.0 and 1.8 respectively.
Finally, as a baseline, we suppose that firms observe their private signals (i.e. their
current-period supply shock and their previous-period quantity demanded) and the
previous-period prices of two competitors, but no public signals.
In everything that follows, period 0 denotes the period immediately prior to any
shock occurring (the economy is invariably assumed to be in steady-state in period
0) and period 1 denotes the “on impact” period.
3.4.1 Responses to aggregate shocks
Baseline responses
Figures 3.1 to 3.4 plot impulse responses following shocks of one standard deviation
to each of the four underlying state variables under the baseline parameterisation.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.00 
0.05 
0.10 
0.15 
0.20 
Real GDP
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
−2.00 
−1.50 
−1.00 
−0.50 
0.00 
Price Level
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
−2.00 
−1.50 
−1.00 
−0.50 
0.00 
Hours
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
−1.00 
−0.50 
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
Period
Real Wage
(a) Aggregate variables
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.00 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
1.00 
E
(k)
[0A]
 
 
k = 0
k = 1
k = 2
k = 3
k = 4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.00 
0.05 
0.10 
0.15 
0.20 
E
(k)
[0C ]
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
−0.20 
−0.15 
−0.10 
−0.05 
0.00 
E
(k)
[0H ]
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
−0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.04 
0.06 
Period
E
(k)
[0M ]
(b) Hierarchies of simple-average
expectations
Figure 3.1: IRFs following a one s.d. shock to firms’ aggregate productivity
In each case, firms cannot be certain about the origin of the shock and sub-
sequently believe that a combination of all four aggregate shocks (and idiosyncratic
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shocks) have occurred. The impulse responses of macroeconomic variables are gener-
ally of the expected sign, although for the price level following a shock to the utility
of consumption, the supply-side effect (through the labour supply) dominates the
demand side effect (through the Eular equation), leading to a price decline.
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Figure 3.2: IRFs following a one s.d. shock to the utility of consumption
Note, too that firms’ beliefs respond on impact for the first three shocks, but with
a one period lag for the monetary policy shock. This is because the three shocks
with supply-side effects are observable immediately through firms’ marginal costs,
but the latter affects only demand, which firms do not observe at the time of setting
their prices.
The lag in observability of demand also explains why the magnitude of the re-
sponse of real GDP is so much larger than that for the price level following a monetary
policy shock. In contrast, for shocks to the three variables with supply-side effects,
the magnitude of price changes is greater than that for real GDP, reflecting the
immediacy of firms’ signals and their freedom to adjust their prices every period.
Varying the standard parameters of the system induces expected changes in the
impulse responses. Instead, we next focus on varying the three parameters that affect
firms’ network learning.
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Figure 3.3: IRFs following a one s.d. shock to the disutility of labour
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Figure 3.4: IRFs following a one s.d. monetary policy shock
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Figure 3.5: IRFs for various numbers of competitors observed
124
3.4. Simulation
Varying the number of competitors observed
Figure 3.5 shows impulse responses for real GDP and the price level following shocks
to aggregate productivity or monetary policy for a variety of numbers of competitors
observed. The addition of extra observees tightens all impulse responses for all
shocks, but has a marked effect in reducing the magnitude (but not the persistence)
of deviations of the price level from trend as individual firms are better able to form
estimates of the average price.
Varying the network irregularity
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Figure 3.6: IRFs for various degrees of network irregularity
Figure 3.6 plots the same impulse responses for a variety of values of ζ∗. As with
increasing the number of competitors observed, making the observation network more
irregular tightens the IRFs slightly for the supply-side shock, but has its largest effect
in the IRF for the price level following a monetary policy shock. Differently to the
previous case, however, increasing ζ∗ not only lowers the magnitude of the deviation,
but lowers its persistence as well. This is because of the subsequent increased ability
of observations of competitors’ prices to act as a common signal, thereby representing
a herding device.
Varying the relative signal variance
Figure 3.7 plots the same impulse responses for different levels of variance in firms’
idiosyncratic shocks.
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Figure 3.7: IRFs for different levels of relative signal variance
3.4.2 Responses to network shocks
To say that the economy experiences a network shock, we mean that a full suite of
idiosyncratic shocks occur whose combined effect does not “wash out” in aggregate.
In the context of the current model, this means that the more prominent firms happen
to experience shocks in one direction (say, for example, a cost increase causing their
prices to go up) while more obscure firms experience shocks in the opposite direction.
On average across all firms, these shocks cancel out almost surely, but because the
firms note each others’ prices in an observation network that is irregular, a typical
firm is more likely to observe a competitor’s price rise than fall. From this, they
may conclude (a) that average costs have indeed gone up; or (b) that, at the least,
other businesses will believe that they have gone up. In either event, it becomes
rational for the typical firm to increase their own price too, even in the absence of
other signals suggesting such an action.
Baseline responses
Figures 3.8 to 3.10 plot impulse responses following shocks of one standard deviation
to each of the three innovations in {1}v˜t and the corresponding conditionally expected
value in the other network shocks under the baseline parameterisation.11
In general, despite network shocks having the same variance as underlying state
shocks under the baseline parameterisation, their effects are roughly one order of
magnitude smaller and, while persistent, less so than for aggregate shocks. This
11Recall that corollary 2 following proposition 2 in the previous chapter gives us that
E
[{q}v˜t | {1}v˜t = a] = a ∀q ≥ 2.
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latter point is not surprising given that idiosyncratic shocks are purely transitory, so
that all persistence demonstrated here derives from real rigidities evoked from firms’
learning and herding behaviour.
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Figure 3.8: IRFs following a one s.d. shock to v˜A,t
For idiosyncratic shocks to prominent firms’ productivity, the direction of devi-
ations for real GDP and the price level are the same as for an aggregate productiv-
ity shock, but since aggregate productivity does not actually increase, this is only
achieved through a temporary boost in the demand for labour by firms. This is
because the average firm does not experience any change in their productivity, but
having seen price falls at their competitors, believes that average productivity has
increased. Concluding that average prices will fall with the productivity rise, firms
then lower their individual prices (making their beliefs self-fulfilling). The lower
price level prompts greater demand and, without any actual increase in average
productivity, this is met through an increased demand for labour.
Idiosyncratic shocks to prominent firms’ wage bargaining have almost identical,
but inverse, effects as for idiosyncratic productivity shocks, as because both are
visible to firms only through their observation of the combined supply-side shock.
Firms’ inability to fully differentiate between the two explains why expectations of
both aggregate productivity and aggregate labour-supply shocks move in response.
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Figure 3.9: IRFs following a one s.d. shock to v˜W,t
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Figure 3.10: IRFs following a one s.d. shock to v˜Y,t
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Interestingly, real GDP falls following a positive demand shock among more vis-
ible firms. The mistaken perception of extra aggregate demand causes firms to raise
their prices in anticipation and this actually causes demand to fall.
Varying the number of competitors observed
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(a) Following a one s.d. shock to v˜A,t
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Figure 3.11: IRFs for various numbers of competitors observed
Figure 3.11 shows impulse responses for real GDP and the price level following
shocks to prominent firms’ productivity and demand for a variety of numbers of
competitors observed. When firms observe no competitors’ prices, there is no effect
on aggregate variables, but as the number of observed competitors increases, the
magnitude of the aggregate response correspondingly rises.
Varying the network irregularity
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Figure 3.12: IRFs for various degrees of network irregularity
Figure 3.12 shows impulse responses for real GDP and the price level following
shocks to prominent firms’ productivity and demand for a variety of values of ζ∗.
For more irregular networks, observed prices are more concentrated among the more
prominent firms, meaning that they serve as a better coordination device for herding.
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This leads to a subsequent increase in the magnitude of aggregate deviations from
trend following a network shock.
Varying the relative signal variance
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Figure 3.13: IRFs for different levels of relative signal variance
Figure 3.13 shows impulse responses for real GDP and the price level following
shocks to prominent firms’ productivity and demand for different levels of variance
in firms’ idiosyncratic shocks. Although the variance of network shocks is increasing
in the variance of firms’ idiosyncratic shocks, the increase in aggregate response is
much more muted than for increases in network irregularity. This is because as firms’
idiosyncratic variance increases, the informational value of individual firms’ prices
decreases, creating an offsetting effect.
3.4.3 Trade-offs in volatility
Figures 3.5 and 3.11 make clear that under the baseline parameterisation, there is a
trade-off in aggregate volatility involved in firms increasing the number of competit-
ors they observe. With no competitors observed, there are no network shocks and so
no volatility from this source, but the magnitude of deviations following aggregate
shocks – particularly monetary shocks – is correspondingly higher. To illustrate this
trade-off, figure 3.14 plots the distribution of impulse responses that would occur
following each of the four aggregate shocks for various numbers of competitors ob-
served if network shocks are free to occur while aggregate shocks are held to their
expected paths. Dotted lines represent 2 s.d. bands for the distribution of impulse
responses that would occur, conditional on the given path for the four aggregate
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Figure 3.14: IRFs for aggregate shocks with indicative bands for network shocks
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shocks.12 Increasing the number of competitors observed leads to a clear increase
in volatility attributable to network shocks. In some cases, this may be enough to
swamp the aggregate effects of the shock to the underlying state (although note that
the IRFs shown here are for 1 s.d. shocks to underlying state variables, while the
dashed lines represent 2 s.d. bands for the effects of network shocks).
Another way of exploring this is to perform a variance decomposition. Table 3.2
shows the share of unconditional variance in Real GDP and the Price Level that can
be attributed to network shocks under the baseline parameterisation for different
numbers of competitors observed and different degrees of asymmetry in the network.
Although the share is quite low for real GDP, between 1% and 2% of unconditional
q \ζ∗ 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
2 0 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.14
3 0 0.06 0.15 0.24 0.32
4 0 0.12 0.30 0.46 0.61
(a) Real GDP
q \ζ∗ 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11
2 0 0.08 0.21 0.35 0.51
3 0 0.19 0.50 0.85 1.22
4 0 0.37 0.99 1.67 2.36
(b) Price Level
Table 3.2: Share of unconditional variance attributable to network shocks (%)
volatility in the aggregate price level may be attributable to network shocks under
the baseline parameterisation, even for quite low numbers of competitors observed.
This is still relatively low, and so indicates that network shocks may be best described
as explaining noise around deviations due to aggregate shocks. However, the share
of volatility attributable to network shocks does increase notably as the number of
observees or the degree of network irregularity increases. For q = 4 and ζ∗ = 0.5,
network shocks contribute 3% of unconditional volatility in the price level.
12That is, were a researcher to simulate the economy described here by giving a persistent shock
to one of the underlying aggregate state variables, holding all other aggregate state variables to
zero and having a full gamut of idiosyncratic shocks occur in every period, the subsequent impulse
responses would fall within the dashed lines 95% of the time.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that firms set their prices while operating in an observation
network, making use of competitors’ prices to learn about the aggregate state of
the economy. That firms operate in a network and that they do so in a model of
imperfect common knowledge is motivated by the observation that when surveyed,
a large fraction of firms across North America and Europe admit to looking to other
firms in deciding both the timing and the magnitude of price changes and do so out
of a desire to coordinate pricing changes with competitors.
When the observation network between firms is asymptotically irregular and the
network is opaque, the results of chapter 2 apply, so that the effects of firms’ mean
zero idiosyncratic shocks do not “wash out” with aggregation. Instead, firms’ hier-
archy of average expectations will follow an ARMA(1,1) process with current and
lagged network shocks (weighted sums of firms’ idiosyncratic shocks) entering at
an aggregate level. The recursive nature of agents’ learning then implies that the
aggregate effects of idiosyncratic shocks will be persistent, despite the individual
agents’ shocks being entirely transitory, with this persistence increasing in the de-
gree of strategic complementarity, the asymmetry of the network and the persistence
of any aggregate shocks.
These persistent aggregate effects therefore represent a network learning-based
microfoundation for cost-push shocks, with the aggregate price level able to persist-
ently deviate from it’s long-run trend despite (a) the absence of any aggregate shocks
to the economy; (b) firms being free to adjust their prices every period; and (c) net-
work (i.e. idiosyncratic) shocks being purely transitory. Because firms may choose
to observe the prices of other firms with whom they are are not direct competitors,
this also represents a novel transmission mechanism for inflation across industries or
geographies independent of it’s path along production chains.
In contrast to the common assumption that idiosyncratic shocks cancel out in
aggregation, the emergence of aggregate-level price changes based on short-lived
idiosyncratic shocks is consistent with evidence garnered from a variety of observed
panels of micro price changes. The level of aggregate volatility induced through
network learning is increasing in the number of competitors observed, the asymmetry
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of the network and the relative variance of idiosyncratic shocks.
This model clearly calls for future work to estimate the parameters of the model
– particularly q, ζ∗ and σ2v/σ
2
u. While the obvious choice in this would be to pursue
data on a panel of firms, the differential responses of aggregate variables predicted
here following aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks may permit such an estimation
even in the absence of individual firm data. The implications for optimal monetary
policy are a second area of research that warrants further work. Just as previous
work has suggested that monetary authorities focus their attention on the “stickiest”
prices, it may also be necessary to focus on the most visible prices in the economy.
Finally, further research into the origins of firms’ observation networks would seem
a fruitful area for exploration.
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Appendix 3.A Derivation
This appendix provides a full derivation of the model of dynamic price setting with
network learning presented in the text. We suppose that in steady state there are no
shocks; technology and real output are constant; prices are constant; and all firms
make the same decisions:
Yt (j) = Y
ss
At (j) = A
ss
Πt = Π
ss = 1
Wt (j) = W
ss
t+s = W
ss
Gt (j) = G
ss = P ss
MCt (j) = MC
ss
Qt+s|t = Qss = 1
We normalise P ss = 1 and denote lower-case letters as log-deviations from the steady-
state (e.g. xt ≡ ln (Xt)− ln (Xss)).
3.A.1 The household and central bank
The derivation of the representative household’s optimality conditions is entirely
standard and therefore omitted.
Substituting the market-clearing requirements (3.12) into the household’s Euler
equation gives:
eCtY
− 1
σ
t = β (1 + it)E
HH
t
[
eCt+1Y
− 1
σ
t+1
1
Πt+1
]
and linearising this gives:
yt = E
HH
t [yt+1]− σEHHt [it − pit+1] + σ
(
Ct − EHHt [Ct+1]
)
Noting that the household and the central bank both have full information, we can
therefore write:
yt = Et [yt+1]− σ (it − Et [pit+1]) + σ (Ct − Et [Ct+1])
it = κyyt + κpiEt [pit+1] + Mt
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Combining these two then gives a linearised expression for aggregate demand in the
economy:
yt =
1
1 + σκy
Et [yt+1 + σ (κpi − 1) (pt+1 − pt)] + µ′yxt
with µy given by
µ′y =
σ
1 + σκy
([
0 1 0 −1
]
−
[
0 1 0 0
]
A
)
which is equation (3.27) in the main text.
3.A.2 The market-clearing (average) wage
The idiosyncratic nominal wage faced by firm j in period t is given by:
wt (j) = wt + vw,t (j) (3.32)
where vw,t (j) is a transitory, mean zero shock and wt is the market-clearing nominal
wage. To find this, we will substitute the aggregate demand for labour into the
household’s labour supply curve. We start by substituting the individual firm’s
production function (3.7) into the labour market clearing condition (3.12) to obtain:
Ht =
∫ (
Yt (j)
At (j)
)1+η
dj
Further substituting in the firm’s demand function (3.5) gives:
Ht =
∫ 
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ε
Yte
vy,t(j)
At (j)

1+η
dj
= Y 1+ηt
∫
At (j)
−(1+η)
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−ε(1+η)
e−(1+η)vy,t(j)dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Z−(1+η)t
Rearranging (recall that 1 + η = 1
1−α), we arrive at:
Yt = ZtH
1−α
t
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which is equation (3.13) in the text. Substituting this into the household’s labour
supply FOC gives:
Wt
Pt
= eHt−CtY
1
σ
+ 1+η
ψ
t Z
− 1+η
ψ
t
Linearising this gives:
wt − pt =
(
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
yt − 1 + η
ψ
zt − Ct + Ht
While the aggregate TFP (3.14) linearises as:
− (1 + η) zt =
∫
− (1 + η) (at (j) + vy,t (j))− ε (1 + η) (pt (j)− pt) dj
But since pt =
∫
pt (j) dj in a linear approximation and
∫
vy,t (j) dj = 0 by definition,
this is just:
zt =
∫
at (j) dj = At
so that the equilibrium real wage in period t is given by:
wt − pt =
(
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
yt − 1 + η
ψ
At − Ct + Ht (3.33)
For reference, recall that σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ψ is the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply and η is the elasticity of marginal cost.
3.A.3 Firms’ marginal costs
Linearising the firm’s marginal cost (3.9) and demand (3.5) gives:
mct (j) = wt (j)− pt + ηyt (j)− (1 + η) at (j) (3.34)
yt (j) = yt + vy,t (j)− ε (pt (j)− pt) (3.35)
Substituting the latter of these into the former gives:
mct (j) = (wt (j)− pt) + ηyt + ηvy,t (j)− ηε (pt (j)− pt)− (1 + η) at (j)
Substituting in (3.32) and (3.33) for j’s real wage, we then obtain:
mct (j) =
(
η +
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
yt + ηvy,t (j)− ηε (pt (j)− pt) + ωt (j) (3.36)
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where ωt (j) is the combined supply shock for firm j in period t, defined as:
ωt (j) ≡ Bxt +Qvt (j) (3.37a)
B =
[
− (1 + η)
(
1 + 1
ψ
)
−1 1 0
]
(3.37b)
Q =
[
− (1 + η) 1 0
]
(3.37c)
Next, we define
....
mct (j) to be a partial average of the firm’s real marginal cost:
the real marginal cost that firm j would incur without idiosyncratic demand shocks
and if called upon to produce the average quantity (i.e. if vy,t (j) = 0 and yt (j) = yt),
but still with idiosyncratic supply shocks:
....
mct (j) ≡ (wt (j)− pt) + ηyt − (1 + η) at (j)
=
(
η +
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
yt + ωt (j) (3.38)
Finally, we define mct as the (true) average real marginal cost. That is, the
real marginal cost a firm would incur if facing the average demand and experiencing
the average supply shock (i.e. if producing the average quantity of output and
experiencing no idiosyncratic shocks):
mct ≡ (wt − pt) + ηyt − (1 + η) At
=
(
η +
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
yt +Bxt (3.39)
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3.A.4 Firms’ price-setting under static pricing
When all firms are free to adjust their prices every period, prices will be expressed
as a simple markup over their expected nominal marginal costs:
Pt (j) =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
Et (j) [PtMCt (j)]
Linearising this then gives the simple:
pt (j) = Et (j) [pt +mct (j)]
Substituting in equation (3.36) and gathering like terms then gives:
pt (j) = Et (j)
[
pt +
1
1 + η
(
....
mct (j) + ηvy,t (j))
]
= Et (j)
[
pt +
1
1 + η
....
mct (j)
]
(3.40)
where
....
mct (j) is defined in equation (3.38) above and the second equality makes use
of the fact that vy,t (j) is an entirely transitory shock and firms do not discover their
demand until after setting their prices.
We next define χ ≡
(
1
1+εη
)(
η + 1
σ
+ 1+η
ψ
)
and obtain the aggregate price level
by taking the simple average of (3.40):
pt = Et [pt + χyt] +
(
1
1 + εη
)∫ 1
0
Et (j) [ωt (j)]
With our assumption that firms always observe ωt (j) directly, this becomes:
pt = Et
[
pt + χ
(
1
1 + σκy
Et [yt+1 + σ (1− κpi) (pt+1 − pt)] + µ′yxt
)]
+
(
1
1 + εη
)
Bxt
= Et
[
χ
(
1
1 + σκy
(yt+1 + σ (1− κpi) pt+1) + µ′yxt
)]
+
(
1
1 + εη
)
Bxt + ξEt [pt]
where
ξ ≡ 1−
(
1
1 + εη
)(
η +
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)(
1
1 + σκy
)
σ (κpi − 1)
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Substituting this back into itself then eventually yields:
pt =
∞∑
k=0
ξkE
(k)
t
[(
1
1 + εη
)
Bxt + Et
[
χ
(
1
1 + σκy
(yt+1 + σ (1− κpi) pt+1) + µ′yxt
)]]
=
(
1
1 + εη
)
Bxt +
∞∑
k=0
ξkE
(k+1)
t
 (χµ′y + ξ ( 11+εη)B)xt
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
(yt+1 + σ (1− κpi) pt+1)

which is equation (3.29a) in the main text.
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3.A.5 Solving the model under static pricing, part 1:
Coefficients for aggregate variables
We have the following conjectured solution to the model:
Xt = FXt−1 +G1ut +G2zt +G3zt−1 +G4et
pt = γ
′
pXt
yt = γ
′
yXt + δ
′
yzt
wt − pt = γ ′$Xt + δ′$zt
ht = γ
′
hXt + δ
′
hzt
and here confirm this structure by deriving expressions for the γ∗ and δ∗ coefficients.
Firms’ signal extraction problem and the law of motion for Xt are addressed below
in section 3.A.6.
Real GDP
Starting with the linearised expression for aggregate demand (3.27) and making use
of the conjectured solution, we have:
yt =
1
1 + σκy
Et [yt+1 + σ (1− κpi) (pt+1 − pt)] + µ′yxt
=
1
1 + σκy
Et
[
γ′yXt+1 + σ (1− κpi)
(
γ′pXt+1 − γ′pXt
)]
+ µ′yxt
We next note that since the household and central bank have full information, their
expectation of the next-period state will be given by:
Et [Xt+1] = FXt +G3zt
Making use of this, we can then write:
yt =
1
1 + σκy
(
γ′y (FXt +G3zt) + σ (1− κpi)
(
γ′p (FXt +G3zt)− γ′pXt
))
+ µ′yxt
=
{
µ′ySx +
1
1 + σκy
(
γ′yF + σ (1− κpi) γ′p (F − I)
)}
Xt
+
{
1
1 + σκy
(
γ′y + σ (1− κpi) γ′p
)
G3
}
zt
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which is to say that
γ ′y = µ
′
ySx +
1
1 + σκy
(
γ ′yF + σ (1− κpi)γ ′p (F − I)
)
δ′y =
1
1 + σκy
(
γ ′y + σ (1− κpi)γ ′p
)
G3
Gathering the terms in γy then gives
γ ′y =
(
µ′ySx +
σ
1 + σκy
(1− κpi)γ ′p (F − I)
)(
I − 1
1 + σκy
F
)−1
Hours and the real wage
Starting with the expression for the equilibrium real wage (3.33) and substituting in
the conjectured solution, we have
wt − pt =
(
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)(
γ ′yXt + δ
′
yzt
)
+
[
−1+η
ψ
−1 1 0
]
xt
or, gathering terms,
wt − pt =
{(
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
γ ′y +
[
−1+η
ψ
−1 1 0
]
Sx
}
Xt
+
(
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
δ′yzt
from which we can immediately read that
γ ′$ =
(
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
γ ′y +
[
−1+η
ψ
−1 1 0
]
Sx
δ′$ =
(
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
δ′y
Linearising the aggregate production function (3.13) and making use of the fact that
zt = At (shown above) then gives us
ht = (1 + η) (yt − At)
= (1 + η)
(
γ ′yXt + δ
′
yzt
)− (1 + η) [1 0 0 0]xt
so that
γ ′h = (1 + η)γ
′
y − (1 + η)
[
1 0 0 0
]
Sx
δ′h = (1 + η) δ
′
y
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The aggregate price level
Substituting the conjectured solution into the expression for the aggregate price level
(3.29a), we obtain
pt = BSxXt +
∞∑
k=0
ξkE
(k+1)
t

(
χµ′y + ξB
)
SxXt
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
(γyXt+1 + δyzt+1)
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
σ (1− κpi)γ ′pXt+1

Next, noting that firms have no knowledge of the current-period or future network
shocks
Et (j) [zt+s] = 0 ∀s ≥ 0
we consequently have that
Et (j) [Xt+1] = FEt (j) [Xt] ∀j
and, as such, the aggregate price level is given by
pt = BSxXt +
∞∑
k=0
ξkE
(k+1)
t

(
χµ′y + ξB
)
SxXt
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
γ ′yFXt
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
σ (1− κpi)γ ′pFXt

= BSxXt +

(
χµ′y + ξB
)
Sx
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
γ ′yF
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
σ (1− κpi)γ ′pF
 ∞∑
k=0
ξkE
(k+1)
t [Xt]
Noting that E
(k)
[Xt] = T
k
sXt, this becomes
pt =
BSx +

(
χµ′y + ξB
)
Sx
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
γ ′yF
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
σ (1− κpi)γ ′pF
 (I − ξTs)−1 Ts
Xt
from which we can immediately read that
γ ′p = BSx +

(
χµ′y + ξB
)
Sx
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
γ ′yF
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
σ (1− κpi)γ ′pF
 (I − ξTs)−1 Ts
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Finally, we gather the terms in γ ′p to arrive at
γ ′p =
(
BSx +
( (
χµ′y + ξB
)
Sx
+χ
(
1
1+σκy
)
γ ′yF
)
(I − ξTs)−1 Ts
)
× (I − (1− ξ)F (I − ξTs)−1 Ts)−1
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3.A.6 Solving the model under static pricing, part 2:
Firms’ learning and the evolution of Xt
In order to characterise the law of motion for the hierarchy of firms’ expectations,
we need to first derive expressions for the signals they receive. We here step through
these in order before moving onto the firms’ signal extraction problem.
The (current period) combined supply shock
From equation (3.37), firm j’s combined supply shock is given by:
ωt (j) ≡ Bxt +Qvt (j)
B =
[
− (1 + η)
(
1 + 1
ψ
)
−1 1 0
]
Q =
[
− (1 + η) 1 0
]
where
vt (j) =
va,t (j)vw,t (j)
vy,t (j)

The (previous period) quantity demanded
Recall that firm j’s linearised demand function (3.35) is given by:
yt (j) = yt + vy,t (j)− ε (pt (j)− pt)
Since firm j must have known their own price with certainty, news from the previous
period’s quantity demanded must come in the form:
yt−1 (j) + ε pt−1 (j) = yt−1 + vy,t−1 (j) + ε pt−1
Making use of the posited solution and gathering like terms then gives:
yt−1 (j) + ε pt−1 (j) =
(
γ ′y + εγ
′
p
)
Xt−1 + δ′yzt−1 +
[
0 0 1
]
vt−1 (j)
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The (previous period) prices set by individual competitors
From equation (3.40), note that firm j’s pricing decision is given by:
pt (j) = Et (j)
[
pt +
1
1 + η
....
mct (j)
]
and their partial average marginal cost (3.38) by:
....
mct (j) =
(
η +
1
σ
+
1 + η
ψ
)
yt + ωt (j)
Making use of the posited solution and gathering like terms, we can therefore write
the pricing rule as:
pt (j) = λ
′
1xt + λ
′
2Et (j) [Xt] + λ
′
3vt−1 (j) (3.41)
where
λ1 =
1
1 + εη
B′ (3.42a)
λ2 = γp + χγy (3.42b)
λ3 =
1
1 + εη
Q′ (3.42c)
Recall that it will be necessary to step this back one period in order to consider firm
i in period t observing gt−1 (j) where j = δt−1 (i).
If we take the simple average of equation (3.41), we get:
pt = (λ
′
1Sx + λ
′
2Ts)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=γ′p
Xt
This represents an alternative way of deriving the γp vector and so is a handy way
of confirming the logic of the previous section.
Firms’ signal extraction problem
Given the posited solution, we therefore have that agents observe the following
private signal:
spt (i) =
[
ωt (i)
yt−1 (i) + ε pt−1 (i)
]
= D1xt +D2Xt−1 +R1vt (i) +R2zt−1
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where
D1 =
[
B
0
]
D2 =
[
0
γ ′y + εγ
′
p
]
R1 =
[
Q[
0 0 1
]] R2 = [ 0
δ′y
]
These, and the expression for individual firms’ prices (3.41), are in format used in
theorem 1 of chapter 2 and since the model here also satisfies assumptions 1 and
2 of the same chapter, theorem 1 therefore holds. In aggregate, the hierarchy of
expectations will therefore follow the law of motion:
Xt ≡

xt
Et [Xt]
E˜t [Xt]
Êt [Xt]
 = FXt−1 +G1ut +G2zt +G3zt−1
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Appendix 3.B An irregular network is a stable
equilibrium
In this appendix we demonstrate a first step towards proving the conjecture that
an irregular observation network among price-setting firms is a stable equilibrium.
Looking at a simplified setting where a continuum of firms each decides on an ex-
ante probability with which they will observe each of just two candidates, (A)nne or
(B)ill, we show that symmetric mixed strategies (i.e. everyone assigning the same
probability to A) will be an equilibrium. To begin, we first define
αi ≡ Pr (Agent i observes A)
Given a common payoff function, pi (αi, α−i), where α−i represents the α’s of all
agents except agent i, we wish to consider the problem in which agents solve
max
αi
pi (αi, α−i) subject to α−i = α
for some value α ∈ (0, 1). It’ll therefore be an equilibrium if
pi1 (α, α) = 0
So, what is pi (αi, α−i)? We take a very simple example with just static pricing. The
optimal price for firm i is
p∗t (i) = pt + χyt
where p is the average price, y is real GDP and χ is an inverse measure of strategic
complementarity. The economy is cash-in-advance so that
mt = yt + pt
and so
p∗t (i) = (1− χ) pt + χmt
Note that χ = 0 corresponds to complete strategic complementarity, while χ = 1
corresponds to no strategic complementarity at all. Not observing either of the
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elements on the right hand side, agent i instead chooses to minimise the expected
square of their deviation from this optimum
−1
2
Et (i)
[
(pt (i)− p∗t (i))2
]
and so sets
pt (i) = Et (i) [p
∗
t (i)]
Selecting αi then amounts to choosing what value of αi will provide the best estimate
of p∗t (i) in the sense of minimising the mean (i.e. expected) square error.
pi (αi, α) = −1
2
E
[
(Et (i) [p
∗
t (i)]− p∗t (i))2
]
Substituting in our expression for i’s optimal price gives
pi (αi, α) = −1
2
E
[
((1− χ) {Et (i) [pt]− pt}+ χ {Et (i) [mt]−mt})2
]
Since we have a continuum of agents, agent i’s contribution to the average price can
be ignored. Suppose that the price chosen by firm j when observing A is given by
pt (j, A) = δpt (A) + et (j)
where p (A) is the price set by firm A and E [et (j)] = 0 ∀j, t. This last requirement
will hold when both firm j and firm A receive unbiased and independent signals
regarding mt and mt has an unconditional expectation of zero. The equivalent setting
applies for when j observes B. Then the average price will be given by
pt = αδpt (A) + (1− α) δpt (B)
Now consider agent i’s expectation conditional on observing A:
E [pt|pt (A)] = αδpt (A) + (1− α) δE [pt (B) |pt (A)]
= αδpt (A) + (1− α) δpt (A)
= δpt (A)
where the second equality assumes that the prices of A and B are unbiased signals
of each other. Agent i’s payoff is then
pi (αi, α) = −1
2
E

 (1− χ)
{
[αi (δpt (A) + et (i)) + (1− αi) (δpt (B) + et (i))]
−δ [αpt (A) + (1− α) pt (B)]
}
+χ {Et (i) [mt]−mt}

2

149
3.B. An irregular network is a stable equilibrium
Supposing still further that an observation of A and an observation of B are equally
useful in improving agent i’s estimate of mt, we can then see that agent i’s first order
condition in their selection of αi is given by
−E
 (1− χ)
{
[αi (δpt (A) + et (i)) + (1− αi) (δpt (B) + et (i))]
−δ [αpt (A) + (1− α) pt (B)]
}
+χ {Et (i) [mt]−mt}
 (δpt (A)− δpt (B)) = 0
which simplifies down to
E
 (1− χ)
{
αi (δpt (A) + et (i))
+ (1− αi) (δpt (B) + et (i))− αδpt (A)− (1− α) δpt (B)
}
+χ {Et (i) [mt]−mt}
 = 0
On average, agent i’s expectation of mt will be correct (E [Et (i) [mt]] = mt) so this
just becomes
E [{αi (δpt (A) + et (i)) + (1− αi) (δpt (B) + et (i))− αpt (A)− (1− α) pt (B)}] = 0
Since the unconditional expectation of et (i) is zero, this collapses to
αi = α
as required!
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Chapter 4
Price-setting under asymmetric
TransLog preferences and incomplete
information
Abstract
I explore firms’ optimal price-setting behaviour when facing TransLog house-
hold preferences. I first solve explicitly for a firm’s best-response pricing rule
under full information, including an endogenous market-exit condition, and
next show that in partial equilibrium under incomplete information, larger
firms will focus more on movements in marginal cost while smaller firms will
place more weight on changes in consumer preferences and competitors’ prices.
In general equilibrium, I characterise and estimate the effect of two distinct
sources of real rigidity that emerge from TransLog preferences: first, the well-
known curvature in demand and, second, the dramatic increase in complexity
of firms’ signal-extraction problems. Because household preferences are not
fully uniform, the model also represents a channel through which firms’ trans-
itory idiosyncratic shocks can result in persistent aggregate volatility.
4.1 Introduction
Many – indeed, the vast majority of – macroeconomic models that employ monopol-
istic competition make use of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator for a repres-
entative household’s preferences across individual consumption goods. This choice
is motivated by both the analytical ease with which it is deployed and the paucity
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of controlling parameters, which aids in estimation. However, the Dixit-Stiglitz ag-
gregator produces demand functions with constant (and, for the simplest and most
common case, common) elasticities of demand for every good and, consequently,
constant optimal mark-ups over marginal costs in firms’ price-setting decisions.
This then imposes that each firm’s consideration of other firms’ prices comes
only through consideration of its own nominal marginal costs. Strategic comple-
mentarity is therefore limited to only emerging through nominal input prices (such
as wages) and the effect of aggregate demand on real marginal costs. True Bertrand
competition is effectively assumed away.
That firms’ mark-ups vary over time is a well-established fact, however. Standard
practice in the literature has therefore been to suppose that mark-ups are subject
to exogenous and persistent shocks,1 an approach that seems odd given the explicit
assumption (via the choice of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator) that they are constant.
This paper illustrates that by adopting a more realistic model of household de-
mand, two important sources of real rigidity in price adjustment emerge, even when
firms possess full and costless flexibility in their price setting. First, as initially ex-
plored by Kimball (1995), allowing firms’ demand schedules to be curved (in log-log
space) ensures that even when firms possess full information, an increase in their
marginal costs will not be fully passed through to their prices because of considera-
tion for the concomitant loss of demand. In other words, each firm’s price setting rule
involves taking an opinion on both its likely marginal cost and its optimal mark-up.
Second, the inclusion of strategic complementarity through true price competition
(i.e. the need to select its mark-up) poses each firm a dramatically more complex
signal extraction problem when operating under incomplete information.
In particular, we here look at optimal price-setting for monopolistically compet-
itive firms facing non-uniform TransLog preferences (a special case of the Almost
Ideal Demand setting of Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Work by Bergin and Feen-
stra (2000) has previously looked at TransLog preferences as a means of achieving
endogenous persistence following aggregate shocks. By working with a specific, para-
meterised model, they are able to avoid the Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000)
1See, for example, Smets and Wouters (2003).
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criticism that the generalised Kimball (1995) aggregator permits arbitrarily strong
curvature in demand. However, Bergin and Feenstra limit their attention to full
uniformity in household preferences across goods and still require nominal rigidity2
to achieve any persistence following a monetary shock. Given the recent challenges
to nominal rigidity in individual prices, both from theoretical and empirical grounds
(see chapter 1 for more detail), there is a need to explore sources of real rigidity that
do not rely on individual price stickiness.
In contrast, the current chapter permits non-uniformity in household preferences
across goods. We first consider firms’ price-setting problem under full information.
We derive an explicit, non-linear expression for each firm’s price as a function of its
marginal cost and the prices of its competitors3 and demonstrate the existence of a
unique Nash equilibrium in prices and an endogenous market exit condition.
In a linearised, partial equilibrium setting under uncertainty, we demonstrate
(a) that in addition to needing to form an expectation of the aggregate price level
in order to estimate its marginal cost, each firm must also estimate a firm-specific
weighted-average of its competitors’ prices in order to account for price competition;
and (b) that larger firms will place relatively more weight on their marginal cost,
while smaller firms will focus primarily on their competitors’ prices and transitory
shifts in the distribution of consumer demand.
In general equilibrium under uncertainty, full non-uniformity in preferences is un-
fortunately intractable, so we instead impose a setting of near-uniformity in steady-
state preferences, wherein firms’ steady-state mark-ups and shares of household ex-
penditure are the same, but their prices and marginal costs are not. In other words,
we allow for the existence of low-price, high-volume businesses alongside high-price,
low-volume businesses in steady state.
In this setting, despite firms having full price-setting flexibility and access to
public signals of aggregate variables, significant persistence in aggregate variables
2They suppose that firms operate under staggered contracts, with each firm’s price fixed for
two periods and half of all firms able to adjust in each period.
3Note that while a firm’s price still equals a mark-up over its marginal cost, this only implicitly
identifies its price under systems with curved demand since a price change will also affect its market
share and, hence, its optimal mark-up.
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emerges following shocks to both productivity and monetary policy. Finally, be-
cause of the non-uniformity in household preferences, the model presents a mech-
anism through which transitory idiosyncratic shocks cause persistent movements in
aggregate variables. Using a parameterisation based on the distribution of firm sizes
in the United States, we tentatively estimate that as much as 5% of observed volat-
ility in the aggregate price level may be attributable to idiosyncratic factors.
This work therefore adds to existing literature of Gabaix (2011), Acemoglu,
Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Saleh (2012) and chapter 3 of this thesis in identi-
fying an idiosyncratic source of aggregate volatility.
Methodologically, this chapter (like chapter 2) adapts and extends the techniques
developed by Nimark (2008, 2011b) for finding the solution of incomplete information
problems with strategic interaction when agents observe lagged signals of aggregate
variables. As with chapter 2, the model here requires that agents consider multiple
compound expectations (a simple-average and a weighted-average), but unlike that
chapter, there is no requirement here to truncate the number of expectations in the
agents’ state vector of interest. That is, we here emerge with exactly two aggregated
expectations of interest.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief
overview of TransLog preferences and the Almost Ideal Demand System. Section
4.3 next outlines the broader model of household and central bank behaviour and
discusses the information available to each agent. Section 4.4 solves the price-setting
problem under full information and illustrates the magnitude by which curvature
of the demand curve can affect price changes. Section 4.5 then considers the firms’
problem under incomplete information, both in general for partial equilibrium and
with near-uniformity in preferences for general equilibrium. Section 4.6 illustrates
these general equilibrium results by presenting a series of simulations following both
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks before section 4.7 concludes.
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4.2 TransLog preferences and the Almost Ideal
Demand System
This section presents a brief overview of TransLog preferences and the Almost Ideal
Demand System (AIDS). Readers already familiar with these systems of demand
may skip immediately to the model in section 4.3 below.
The Almost Ideal Demand System was originally devised by Deaton and Muell-
bauer (1980) as an empirical tool to permit the estimation of a generalised system
of demand. It is consistent with standard theory of consumer optimisation and, by
satisfying the conditions laid out by Muellbauer (1975, 1976), it aggregates exactly
and so admits a representative consumer. Transcendental Logarithm (TransLog)
preferences were developed earlier by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Tau (1975) and
are nested entirely within the Almost Ideal setting. We shall therefore present a brief
overview of the Almost Ideal framework first before then discussing the additional
restrictions required to obtain TransLog preferences.
4.2.1 The Almost Ideal Demand System
The Almost Ideal Demand System is itself based on the PIGLOG (price-independent,
generalised, linear-in-logarithms) model of consumer preferences, in which individual
preferences are described via the expenditure function:
ln [e (u,P )] = (1− u) ln [a (P )] + u ln [b (P )] (4.1)
where P is a vector of all prices and, with some exceptions,4 u varies from 0 (sub-
sistence) to 1 (bliss). The AIDS model then proposes particular functional forms for
ln [a (P )] and ln [b (P )], namely:
ln [a (P )] = α0 +
∑
i
α (i) ln (P (i)) +
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
γ∗ij ln (P (i)) ln (P (j)) (4.2a)
ln [b (P )] = ln [a (P )] + β0
∏
i
P (i)βi (4.2b)
4See the appendix of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for more detail.
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so that the expenditure function (4.1) becomes:
ln [e (u,P )] = α0 +
∑
i
α (i) ln (P (i))
+
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
γ∗ij ln (P (i)) ln (P (j)) + uβ0
∏
i
P (i)βi (4.3)
Under this specification, the Marshallian (i.e. uncompensated) demand function
for good i, expressed as a share of total nominal expenditure, is:
P (i)Q (i)
N
≡ s (i) = α (i) +
∑
j
γij ln (P (j)) + βi ln
(
N
P
)
(4.4)
where γik ≡ 12 (γ∗ik + γ∗ki), N is income (and total nominal expenditure) and P is the
aggregate price index, defined as:
ln (P) ≡ α0 +
∑
i
α (i) ln (P (i)) +
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
γij ln (P (i)) ln (P (j)) (4.5)
The following restrictions are then added for the system to comply with standard
consumer theory:
J∑
i=1
α (i) = 1,
J∑
i=1
γij = 0 ∀j and
J∑
i=1
βi = 0 (4.6)
for adding up (i.e. to ensure that
∑
s (i) = 1);
J∑
j=1
γij = 0 ∀i (4.7)
to ensure that demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero (and the expendit-
ure function homogenous of degree one); and
γ∗ij = γ
∗
ji ∀i, j (4.8)
to ensure the symmetry of the substitution matrix.
The following set of elasticities of demand may then be derived from equation
(4.4). Assuming that total nominal expenditure (i.e. income) does not change with
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movements in individual prices and conditional on the prices of all other goods, the
(positive) own-price elasticity of demand for good i is:
εii =
∣∣∣∣∂ lnQ (i)∂ lnP (i)
∣∣∣∣
= 1− ∂ ln s (i)
∂ lnP (i)
= 1− 1
s (i)
[
γii − βi
(
α (i) +
∑
k
γki ln (P (k))
)]
, (4.9)
the cross-price elasticity of demand for good i following a change in the price of good
j is:
εij =
1
s (i)
[
γij − βi
(
α (j) +
∑
k
γkj ln (P (k))
)]
; and (4.10)
the income elasticity of demand for good i is:
ηi = 1 +
βi
s (i)
(4.11)
It is immediately apparent that this framework possesses the potential for consid-
erably richer dynamics following an aggregate shock than might be expected with the
Dixit-Stiglitz or Kimball aggregators. With each firm’s elasticity being dependent on
a weighted sum of all other firms’ prices, optimal mark-ups will be both time-varying
and different for every firm. Indeed, the super-elasticity of demand – the elasticity of
the own-price elasticity, sometimes called the curvature of demand – can be shown
(a derivation is provided in appendix 4.A.1) to be:
ξii ≡ ∂ ln εii
∂ lnP (i)
=
1
εii
[
(εii − 1)2 + βiγii
s (i)
]
(4.12)
4.2.2 TransLog preferences
TransLog preferences are nested within the Almost Ideal system. They are obtained
by supposing that the income elasticity of demand is unitary for all goods (i.e. there
are no luxury or necessary goods).
βi = 0⇔ ηi = 1 ∀i (4.13)
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In other words, TransLog preferences are the AIDS model with the further imposition
that preferences be homothetic.5 This then reduces the expression for i’s share of
expenditure to
s (i) = α (i) +
∑
j
γij ln (P (j)) (4.14)
and the expressions for cross-price elasticity, own-price elasticity and own-price
super-elasticity of demand to
εij =
γij
s (i)
; (4.15)
εii = 1− γii
s (i)
; and (4.16)
ξii =
(εii − 1)2
εii
(4.17)
respectively. Note that in this setting, each good’s super-elasticity is unambiguously
positive and increasing in the own-price elasticity.
Supposing that good i is produced by a monopolist, the optimal mark-up over
marginal costs for that good will be given by
µi =
εii
εii − 1 = 1−
s (i)
γii
(4.18)
so that we can rewrite the super-elasticity as
ξii =
εii − 1
µi
=
εii
µ2i
(4.19)
4.2.3 An initial comparison to other demand systems
In the near-ubiquitous CES demand system of Dixit and Stiglitz, where the own-price
and cross-price elasticities of demand are common and constant, each firm will have
a common and constant optimal mark-up over its (potentially different) marginal
costs. In contrast, in the TransLog and Almost Ideal settings, when a firm raises its
price in such a way as to lower its share of aggregate spending (i.e. in the absence
5Recall that a preference relation over bundles within R+ is homothetic if, when x ∼ y, we also
have that αx ∼ αy for any α ≥ 0.
158
4.2. TransLog preferences and the Almost Ideal Demand System
of sufficient price increases from its competitors), its own-price elasticity of demand
will rise, causing its optimal mark-up to fall and so partially offset the increase in
price.
Furthermore, since the super-elasticity is strictly positive and increasing under
TransLog preferences and generally so under AIDS,6 this dampening effect becomes
convexly stronger for larger price increases, thereby creating a strong incentive for
firms to avoid lifting their prices above their aggregate reference prices.
In this respect, the AIDS framework is quite similar to the demand system implied
by the Kimball (1995) aggregator. As with Kimball’s preferences, aggregate price
rigidity here will be highly sensitive to anything that impedes price coordination.
In the absence of concrete knowledge that their competitors are also raising their
prices, firms will temper any increases of their own, thereby increasing the persistence
of the effects of any nominal shock to the economy. However, there are two key
differences between the Kimball and Almost Ideal demand frameworks. First, where
Kimball preferences allow for arbitrarily strong curvature in demand (a fact criticised
as unrealistic by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2000), the Almost Ideal system
exhibits well-defined and moderate curvature in demand. Next, unlike the Kimball
demand system, the Almost Ideal setting explicitly models asymmetries in household
preferences across goods, both in their base market shares and their sensitivity to
movements to other firms’ prices. Because of the latter, each firm needs to consider a
firm-specific reference price, formed as a weighted average of its competitors’ prices,
in addition to the aggregate price level.
It is, of course, possible to model unequal preferences across goods within the
Dixit-Stiglitz setting by use of nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
functions. However, this approach is not readily able to be extended to unequal
preferences over a continuum of goods and, in any event, will still produce constant
elasticities of demand and so is unable to speak to the real rigidities embodied in
time-varying mark-ups.
6Technically, the super-elasticity can be negative under AIDS for sufficiently large values of βi,
but empirical estimates of βi are typically quite low. See also the discussion of Dossche, Heylen,
and Van den Poel (2010) regarding the number of goods with positive super-elasticities.
159
4.2. TransLog preferences and the Almost Ideal Demand System
While the assumption that firms’ own-price elasticity can vary is a clear gen-
eralisation from the CES framework of Dixit-Stiglitz, the assumption here that the
super-elasticity of demand is strictly positive is arguably still too restrictive. Dossche,
Heylen, and Van den Poel (2010) examine scanner data for a large euro area retailer
using a modified version of the Almost Ideal framework7 and find that as many as
42% of goods have a negative super-elasticity (denoted “curvature” in their paper).
However, the median super-elasticity across all items is positive (0.8) and higher still
across non-food items (1.14). When limiting attention to items with an estimated
(absolute value of) elasticity of unity or greater (ε ≥ 1), only 26% of items have
a negative super-elasticity and the median super-elasticity is 1.7. Elasticity and
super-elasticity were found to be strongly positively correlated, with a correlation
coefficient of 0.53.
7The authors add a behavioural extension to the AIDS model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980),
justified by an appeal to loss aversion, that permits them to freely estimate demand super-elasticities
which would otherwise be fully determined by own-price elasticities.
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4.3 The model
The model considered here is standard in its treatment of households’ intertemporal
decision making and labour supply; the central bank’s monetary policy; and firms’
production technologies. It differs principally from the basic New Keynesian model
in three aspects: first, that TransLog preferences are used to capture differentiation
across consumption goods; second, that those preferences are not assumed to be
symmetric over goods; and third, that firms operate under incomplete information.
In order to emphasise the real rigidity invoked by the model, prices are assumed to
be perfectly flexible.
Each of these innovations has been separately explored in the literature. Bergin
and Feenstra (2000) demonstrated endogenous persistence following monetary shocks
with TransLog preferences, staggered pricing and a production structure that used
the final good as an intermediate good, but also made the simplifying assumption of
full uniformity in preferences. Woodford (2003) examined the persistence obtained
from firms’ possessing incomplete information regarding shocks to nominal GDP
under Dixit-Stiglitz preferences and static (i.e. flexible) price setting. Nimark (2008)
later extended this to include idiosyncratic shocks to marginal costs and dynamic
pricing in the style of Calvo (1983). However, to our knowledge, these ideas have
not previously been brought together in a single model.
Uncertainty will enter the model on both the supply and demand sides of the
economy. On the supply side, firms will experience both aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic shocks to their marginal costs in the form of movements in their productivity.
On the demand side, aggregate shocks will be delivered by monetary policy, while
idiosyncratic shocks will apply to households’ relative preferences across goods.
Notation
We generally make use of the notation that an uppercase letter denotes the variable
itself; a lowercase letter is the (natural) log of that variable; a variable with an asterisk
denotes the value of that variable in steady-state (defined below); and a variable with
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a hat represent the deviation of that variable from its value in steady-state.8
xt ≡ ln (Xt) x̂t ≡ xt − x∗
The two exceptions to this rule will be firms’ share of household expenditure (st (i))
and the interest rate (it). In both these cases, the lowercase letter denotes the
variable itself. It remains the case that ŝt (i) = st (i)− s (i)∗ and ît = it − i∗.
4.3.1 The household
Each period, the representative household maximises9
EHHt
 ∞∑
s=0
βs
C
1− 1
σ
t+s − 1
1− 1
σ
− H
1+ 1
ψ
t+s
1 + 1
ψ

 (4.20)
subject to the budget constraint
WtHt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + Tt = PtCt +Bt (4.21)
where EHHt [·] is the mathematical expectation conditional on the household’s in-
formation set in period t (defined below); Ct is aggregate (real) consumption; Ht is
the aggregate labour supply; σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution; ψ is the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply; Wt is the nominal wage rate; Bt denotes holdings
of one-period risk-free bonds; it is the nominal interest rate; and Tt combines firm
profits and nominal lump sum transfers. The aggregate first-order conditions for the
household’s problem are therefore standard:
H
1
ψ
t =
Wt
Pt
C
− 1
σ
t (4.22)
C
− 1
σ
t = β (1 + it)E
HH
t
[
C
− 1
σ
t+1
1
Πt+1
]
(4.23)
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross rate of inflation.
8It should be noted that this notation differs slightly to that of the preceding chapters. This is
necessary because the previous two chapters had no need to refer to the log of variables, only their
log deviation, while this chapter refers to both.
9Note that β here is the household’s discount factor, as distinct from the coefficient governing
the income elasticity of demand used above.
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Household preferences over differentiated consumption goods for a given amount
of nominal expenditure (Nt = PtCt) are represented in TransLog form, as described
in section 4.2.2 above. We therefore have the following expression for household
demand for good i:
Ct (i) =
st (i)PtCt
Pt (i)
(4.24)
In addition to those outlined earlier, we make two further assumptions regarding
household preferences:
αt (i) =
1
J
[ζi + v
α
t (i)] (4.25a)
γij > 0 ∀j 6= i (4.25b)
The first of these (4.25a) declares αt (i), which we refer to as the firm’s base market
share,10 to be the sum of an underlying, fundamental preference (α (i)∗ ≡ 1
J
ζi) and
a time-varying, stochastic component (vαt (i) is a mean zero shock, defined below).
Recall that we must have
∑
i αt (i) = 1 in every period.
The second assumption (4.25b) states that all goods are gross substitutes for each
other. This ensures that cross-price elasticities of demand are all strictly positive
(εij > 0 ∀i 6= j); that the absolute values of all own-price elasticities of demand are
strictly greater than one (εii > 1 ∀i);11; and that the vector of equilibrium prices
under full information is unique (see section 4.4).
By comparison, existing literature on the use of TransLog preferences in macroe-
conomic models (see, for example, Bergin and Feenstra, 2000) has tended to suppose
complete uniformity in preferences across goods by imposing the following restric-
tions on α and Γ:
αt (i) =
1
J
∀i, t (4.26a)
γii = −γ
J
∀i ; γij = γ
J (J − 1) ∀j 6= i (4.26b)
10Named such because, if all firms were to charge the same price, it would be their share of
household expenditure
11Combined with the homogeneity restriction (4.7), (4.25b) ensures that that γii < 0 ∀i and,
hence, that εii > 1.
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While easier to work with, these assumptions have shielded from view some important
aspects of firms’ price-setting behaviour and their informational requirements, as will
be shown below in a partial equilibrium setting.
However, when moving to a general equilibrium setting, it will still be necessary
to impose what we call near-uniformity in steady-state preferences in order to achieve
tractability. This will include uniformity in Γ (the matrix of γij, equation 4.26b) and
uniformity in steady-state expenditure shares, but will retain the asymmetry in base
market shares. Some of the dynamics implied by our partial equilibrium results will
therefore not be present in our simulations. Section 4.3.7 covers this in more detail.
4.3.2 The firm
Production
Each good is produced by a single firm according to a common production function
that deploys labour with decreasing marginal productivity:
Yt (i) = At (i)Ht (i)
1
1+η (4.27)
where η > 0. Each firm’s productivity, At (i), is given by
ln (At (i)) = ln (A (i)
∗) + At + v
A
t (i) (4.28)
where A (i)∗ is firm i’s intrinsic productivity, while At and v
A
t (i) are mean zero
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks (each specified below) to the firm’s productivity,
broadly defined. Firm i’s nominal marginal cost is then
MCt (i) = (1 + η)
Wt
At (i)
1+ηYt (i)
η (4.29)
so that η is the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. Shocks to At (i) may
therefore be considered a reduced-form means of capturing shocks to firms’ marginal
costs other than those that act through demand or the wage. When combined with
market clearing (see below), we can replace Yt (i) with the household’s quantity
demanded (4.24) to give
MCt (i) = (1 + η)
Wt
At (i)
1+η
(
st (i)PtYt
Pt (i)
)η
(4.30)
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Price setting
Although it remains our opinion that nominal rigidities represent the basis of some
aggregate persistence, we here suppose that all firms are free to costlessly adjust their
prices at the start of every period in order to highlight the real rigidities embodied
in the current model. Firms’ optimal price-setting rules under TransLog preferences
will be examined in detail in sections 4.4 and 4.5 below.
4.3.3 Market clearing
All markets clear each period, so that:
Yt (i) = Ct (i) ∀t, i
Ht =
∫
Ht (i) di ∀t
(4.31)
This implies that aggregate output is given by:
Ct = Yt = ZtH
1
1+η
t (4.32)
where aggregate TFP, Zt, combines individual firm productivities, household prefer-
ences and a distortion from relative prices
Zt ≡
(∫ (
At (i)
st (i)
Pt (i)
Pt
)−(1+η)
di
)− 1
1+η
(4.33)
4.3.4 The central bank
To close the model, we assume that the central bank sets nominal interest rates
according to the Taylor-like policy function
ît = κyE
CB
t [ŷt] + κpiE
CB
t [pit+1] + 
M
t (4.34)
where variables with a hat are deviations from steady-state, ECBt [·] is the mathemat-
ical expectation conditional on the central bank’s information set in period t (defined
below) and Mt is a persistent, mean zero shock to monetary policy (specified below).
Note that the component against inflation is against expected future inflation rather
than current inflation, to provide a more accurate characterisation of modern central
banking practice.
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4.3.5 Information and timing
The representative household and the central bank are assumed to possess full in-
formation at all times, so that
EHHt [·] = ECBt [·] = E [·|Ωt] (4.35)
where Ωt is the set of all information that exists in period t. In contrast, firms have
incomplete information, so that
Et (i) [·] = E [·|It (i)] (4.36)
where each period, firm i observes its own output from the previous period; its
own productivity for the current period; and common, but imperfect signals for the
previous period’s aggregate price level and aggregate output:
It (i) = {It−1 (i) , Yt−1 (i) , At (i) ,Pt−1eep,t , Yt−1eey,t} (4.37)
Timing
Each period obeys the following timing
1. Innovations are drawn.
2. Firms observe It (i) and set their prices simultaneously.
3. The representative household and the central bank observe the full state of the
economy and determine the interest rate, the real wage and the quantities of
goods demanded for the given prices.
4. Firms produce the goods and the representative household consumes them.
Note, in particular, that firms do not observe any changes in households’ relative
preferences or the composition of their productivity shock before setting their prices.
4.3.6 Stochastic processes
The model contains uncertainty in the form of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks
on both the supply and demand sides of the economy, plus measurement error in
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aggregate statistics. We suppose that underlying aggregate shocks are persistent
and follow AR(1) processes with Gaussian innovations.
At = ρ
A
 
A
t−1 + u
A
t where u
A
t ∼ N
(
0, σ2A
)
(4.38a)
Mt = ρ
M
 
M
t−1 + u
M
t u
M
t ∼ N
(
0, σ2M
)
(4.38b)
Measurement errors are transitory and Gaussian.
ep,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2ve
)
(4.38c)
ey,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2ve
)
(4.38d)
Idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be transitory. Those to productivity are assumed
to be Gaussian
vAt (i) ∼ N
(
0, σ2vA
)
(4.38e)
while those to demand are left unspecified, except to note that they must satisfy
E [vαt (i)] = 0 ∀i, t (4.38f)
V ar (vαt (i)) = σ
2
vα ∀i, t
αt (i) ∈ (0, 1) ∀i, t∑
i
αt (i) = 1 ∀t
All innovations are assumed to be fully independent from each other, both contem-
poraneously and across time.
Aggregated idiosyncratic shocks
As will be shown below, the following two linear aggregations of idiosyncratic shocks
also enter into the model:
v˜At ≡
∑
i
α (i)∗ vAt (i) (4.39a)
v˜αt ≡
∑
i
α (i)∗ vαt (i) (4.39b)
Since α (i)∗ ∈ (0, 1) ∀i and ∑i α (i)∗ = 1, these are weighted averages of firms’
idiosyncratic shocks. These statistics will not, in general, converge to zero as J →∞
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because of the unequal weights applied across the firms’ shocks. As discussed in
section 1.3 of chapter 1, a power law distribution in the weights is sufficient to
ensure that the Law of Large Numbers will not hold and we do indeed observe a
power law distribution in firm sizes in the data.
4.3.7 Steady-state
With firms already possessing full flexibility in their price setting, we define a steady-
state equilibrium to be that which holds when (a) there are no shocks to the system;
and (b) this fact is common knowledge (i.e. a special case of firms also having full
information).
Although not used in partial equilibrium – i.e. when considering only firms’
prices, taking aggregate demand and wages as given – the following assumptions of
near-uniformity in steady-state preferences will be required when considering general
equilibrium:
γii = −γ
J
∀i ; γij = γ
J (J − 1) ∀j 6= i (4.40a)
p∗ =
1
J − 1
∑
j 6=i
p (j)∗ = 0 ∀i (4.40b)
s (i)∗ =
1
J
∀i (4.40c)
It is helpful to explicitly enumerate what is and what is not uniform across goods
under these assumptions. Things that are uniform across goods:
• Firms’ consideration of price-competition: Γ
• Steady-state expenditure shares: s (i)∗ = 1
J
• Steady-state mark-ups: µ∗i = 1− s(i)
∗
γii
= 1 + 1
γ
Things that are not uniform across goods:
• Steady-state base market shares: α (i)∗
• Steady-state prices: p (i)∗
• Steady-state marginal costs: MC (i)∗
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In other words, we capture a world in which, even in steady-state, there exist low-
price, high-volume businesses operating next to high-price, low-volume businesses.
Applying (4.40a) - (4.40c) to the definition of expenditure share (4.14) gives a
simple expression for each firm’s steady-state price:
p (i)∗ =
1
γ
(ζi − 1) (4.41)
The RHS expresses, as a percentage, how far firm i’s price is above the simple-average
price when in steady-state. Plugging this into equation (4.5), we see that the log of
the aggregate price level in steady-state is zero (this emerges from the normalisation
that the simple-average price be zero):
p∗ ≡ ln (P∗) = 0 (4.42)
With a constant steady-state mark-up, pinning down a firm’s price must also pin
down its marginal cost. Our assumption of near-uniformity therefore gives a direct
mapping between a firm’s steady-state base market share, ζi, and its steady-state
productivity, A (i)∗:
ln (A (i)∗) =
1
1 + η
ln
[(
1 +
1
γ
)
(1 + η)W ∗
(
1
J
Y ∗
)η]
− 1
γ
(ζi − 1) (4.43)
At first glance, this might appear to suggest that firms with higher base market
share are less productive. However, it should be remembered that At (i) here should
be construed as capturing all factors of production other than labour. A low value
of A (i)∗ in this context is a shorthand means of saying that firm i has a lot of
non-labour costs.
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4.4 Price-setting under full information
Because firms are free to update their prices in every period, we can limit our atten-
tion to the one-period profit function:
Πt (i) = st (i)Nt − C
(
st (i)Nt
Pt (i)
)
= st (i)Nt
(
1− MCt (i)
Pt (i)
)
(4.44)
When firms have access to full information, there is no need to consider their expect-
ations and the profit function can be maximised directly to give the usual expression
of price as a mark-up over marginal costs:
Pt (i)
MCt (i)
= µi,t =
εii,t
εii,t − 1 (4.45)
However, this only pins down Pt (i) implicitly in this context as the mark-up is
endogenous under TransLog preferences. As the firm’s price rises (Pt (i) ↑), its market
share falls (st (i) ↓), driving its own-price elasticity higher (εii,t ↑) and, hence, their
optimal mark-up lower (µi,t ↓).
Instead, appendix 4.A.2 provides a derivation of the following explicit solution
for price-setting under TransLog preferences.
Proposition 3. When monopolistically competitive firms face a system of demand
characterised by TransLog preferences, conditional on each firm’s share of household
expenditure remaining within st (i) ∈ (0, 1), the optimal one-period, full-information
price is given by
Pt (i)
MCt (i)
= νi,t =W
(
eφt(i)
MCt (i)
)
= ω (φt (i)− ln (MCt (i))) (4.46)
where φt (i) is defined as
φt (i) ≡ 1− 1
γii
(
αt (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γij ln (Pt (j))
)
(4.47)
Furthermore, when all goods are gross substitutes, there exists a unique positive,
globally stable Nash equilibrium in prices, P ∗t = P
∗ (αt,MCt ; Γ), that may be found
by iterating through (4.46) - (4.47) from any non-zero initial price vector.
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W (·) is the Lambert W function, defined as the inverse of f (W) = WeW ; and
ω (·) is the Wright ω function, defined as ω (x) ≡ W (ex). Section 4.4.1 below provides
brief descriptions of these two functions.
The adjusted mark-up associated with the optimal price is no longer a simple
expression of the firm’s elasticity of demand, but is instead a function of the firm’s
marginal cost (i.e. the mark-up over marginal costs is itself a function of those mar-
ginal costs) and other firms’ prices. In particular, since W (·) is strictly increasing,
(4.46) makes clear that in the absence of concurrent price increases by its competit-
ors, a firm’s optimal mark-up declines as its marginal cost increases. Likewise, φ (i)
and, hence, the adjusted mark-up, is increasing in firm i’s base market share and a
weighted sum of its competitors’ prices.
Note that
∑
j 6=i (−γij/γii) = 1, so that φt (i) contains a firm-specific weighted
average of other firms’ prices. φt (i) is related to the firm’s endogenous mark-up, µi,t,
in the following manner
φt (i) = 1− st (i)
γii︸ ︷︷ ︸
µi,t
+ ln (Pt (i)) (4.48)
Consequently, we can use (4.48) to identify the prices at no-exit boundaries:
Pt (i)|st(i)=1 = e
φt(i)−1+ 1γii (4.49a)
Pt (i)|st(i)=0 = eφt(i)−1 (4.49b)
If a firm’s price is too high, its share of household expenditure will fall to zero (i.e.
it will exit the market), while if its price is too low, it will capture the entire market
(i.e. force other firms to exit). That TransLog preferences include an endogenous exit
rule is independently interesting, but we rule these possibilities out by assumption.
In essence, this amounts to assuming that shocks are not too large.
4.4.1 The Lambert W and Wright ω functions
Illustrative plots of W (x) and ω (x) are provided in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: The Lambert W and Wright ω functions in the real domain. Both plots
include the 45◦ line for reference.
The Lambert W function
The Lambert W function, sometimes called the Omega function or the product
logarithm, is defined as the inverse function of f (W) = WeW . For all x ∈ R+,
W (x) is continuous, single valued, weakly positive, strictly increasing and concave.
It has key values of W (0) = 0 and W (e) = 1; and its first derivative is given by
dW(x)
dx
= W(x)
x(1+W(x)) for x /∈
{
0,−1
e
}
, with dW(x)
dx
∣∣∣
x=0
= 1.
The Wright ω function
The Wright ω function, defined for x ∈ R as ω (x) ≡ W (ex), was first introduced
and its properties discussed at length by Corless and Jeffrey (2002). For all x ∈ R+,
ω (x) is continuous, single valued, strictly positive, strictly increasing and convex. It
has key values of ω (0) =W (1) ≈ 0.56714 and ω (1) = 1. For x ≥ 1, it lies beneath
the 45◦ line and its first derivative is given by dω(x)
dx
= ω(x)
1+ω(x)
, so that lim
x→∞
ω′ (x) = 1.
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4.4.2 The optimal price as best response
Equations (4.46) - (4.47) express the optimal money price for firm i as a function
of three objects – its nominal marginal cost, its base market share and a weighted
average of other firms’ prices. Combining these equations, we can rewrite the optimal
price as:
Pt (i)
MCt (i)
= νi,t =W
e1−αt(i)γii ∏
j 6=i
(
Pt (j)
MCt (i)
)−γij
γii
 (4.50)
This formulation of price as a best response function makes clear that firm i’s optimal
mark-up is a function of its competitors’ prices relative to i’s own marginal cost.
It is informative to consider the shape of this decision rule, as it helps understand
firms’ out-of-equilibrium pricing behaviour and so offers a precursor to section 4.5,
where we consider price-setting under uncertainty. First, we have that the optimal
price is strictly increasing in all three inputs:
∂Pt (i)
∂MCt (i)
=
(νi,t)
2
1 + νi,t
> 0
∂Pt (i)
∂Pt (j)
=
(
νi,t
1 + νi,t
)
MC (i)
P (j)
(
−γij
γii
)
> 0
∂Pt (i)
∂αt (i)
=
(
νi,t
1 + νi,t
)
MC (i)
(
− 1
γii
)
> 0
Note that if γii is decreasing in the number of goods, as embodied in the uniformity-
in-Γ restriction of (4.26b), then the sensitivity of price to base market share will be
increasing in the same. When the number of goods is large, small fluctuations in
consumers’ relative preferences can have large effects on optimal prices. Second, we
have that the optimal price is strictly concave in marginal cost and other prices, but
strictly convex in base market share; and that the cross-derivatives are all strictly
positive (full details of these derivatives may be found in appendix 4.A.2):
∂2Pt (i)
∂MCt (i)
2 < 0
∂2Pt (i)
∂MCt (i) ∂Pt (j)
> 0
∂2Pt (i)
∂Pt (j)
2 < 0
∂2Pt (i)
∂MCt (i) ∂αt (i)
> 0
∂2Pt (i)
∂αt (i)
2 > 0
∂2Pt (i)
∂Pt (j) ∂αt (i)
> 0
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These emphasise the importance of co-ordination in firms’ price-setting decisions. A
firm’s ability to raise its price with its marginal cost is contingent on a concomitant
rise in its competitors’ prices, although this is partially mitigated if the firm com-
mands a larger base market share. This feature of TransLog preferences is further
illustrated in figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
MC (i)
P (i)
 
 
Dixit-Stiglitz (µ = 1.5)
P (−i) = 2
P (−i) = 6
P (−i) = 10
(a) Cross-section by other firms’ prices.
α (i) = 0.2, γii = −1
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Figure 4.2: Optimal price under full-information by nominal marginal cost.
Figure 4.2 plots firm i’s full-information price as a function of its nominal mar-
ginal cost, with cross-sections shown by other firms’ prices and base market share.
Segments shown as solid lines are those in which the firm obtains an expenditure
share bounded by 0 and 1, while segments shown as dashed lines fall outside these
bounds (too low a price and the firm captures all household expenditure, too high
a price and its share falls to zero). By way of comparison, the optimal price under
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences is also shown, assuming an elasticity of ε = 3.
The concavity of the price-setting rule implies that the optimal price is some-
times below and sometimes above that suggested by the Dixit-Stigliz framework,
depending on the marginal cost. With a flatter slope than the constant mark-up
setting, this figure provides a simple illustration of the real rigidity embodied in
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TransLog (and AIDS) preferences. Events that lower a firm’s marginal cost, such
as productivity improvements, will not cause that firm to lower their price so far as
it would under a constant mark-up scheme. Likewise, the best response to inflation
in a firm’s input prices (such as wages) is to raise its output price by less than un-
der a constant mark-up scheme when taking other firms’ prices as given because of
concerns regarding strategic complementarity. Indeed, for firms that receive a very
low fraction of household expenditure, increases in marginal cost in the absence of
increases in competitors’ prices will cause a less than one-for-one increase in prices
( ∂Pt(i)
∂MCt(i)
< 1).
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(a) Cross-section by nominal marginal cost.
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Figure 4.3: Optimal price under full-information by a weighted average of other
firms’ prices.
Next, figure 4.3 shows that optimal prices are concave in other firms’ prices
and quite strongly so when marginal costs are low. Note, for example, that when
MC (i) = 2, a price of 3 (i.e. a mark-up of 1.5) is only achieved when other firms’
prices are roughly 4.
It is worth emphasising again that this strategic complementarity is firm-specific,
with firm i being interested in the weighted-average ln (P (−i)) = ∑j 6=i (−γij/γii) ln (P (j))
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of its competitors’ prices.12 This implies a reduced opportunity for policy makers
to assist coordination by publishing aggregate price statistics. With each firm inter-
ested in a different weighted sum, the aggregate price level will, at best, act as an
imperfect signal to each firm’s pricing problem.
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Figure 4.4: Optimal price under full-information by base market share.
Finally, figure 4.4 shows that a firm’s optimal price increases convexly in its base
market share, but only quite weakly so. This convexity is strongest when marginal
costs are high relative to other firms’ prices, but doing so very quickly approaches
the st (i) = 0 boundary. In other words, an increasing base market share allows a
firm to raise its price, but it is generally not enough to offset falls in (or failures to
increase) other firms’ prices or its own marginal cost.
12Recall that the Γ matrix is symmetric and each row sums to zero, but there is no requirement
that off-diagonal elements be equal. Indeed, such a case would be highly unusual.
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4.4.3 Equilibrium prices under full information
Although each firm’s best response to a common shock to marginal costs is to temper
any price increase by lowering its mark-up, it will typically be the case that the equi-
librium mark-up under full information is independent of the aggregate components
of marginal cost. To see this, rewrite equation (4.50) as
νi,t =W
e1−αt(i)γii ∏
j 6=i
(
MCt (j)
MCt (i)
νj,t
)−γij
γii

Recall that a firm’s nominal marginal cost (4.30) is given by
MCt (i) = (1 + η)
Wt
At (i)
1+η
(
st (i)PtYt
Pt (i)
)η
Because it is the ratio of firms’ marginal costs that matter for the equilibrium mark-
up, all of the common components – wages, aggregate productivity and aggregate
demand – will necessarily cancel out so that
MCt (j)
MCt (i)
=
(
At (i)
At (j)
)1+η (
st (j)Pt (i)
st (i)Pt (j)
)η
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4.5 Price-setting under uncertainty
Under uncertainty, firm i’s problem is to choose Pt (i) to maximise its expected
one-period profit, taking aggregate expenditure and other firms’ prices as given
max
Pt(i)
Et (i)
[
st (i)Nt
(
1− MCt (i)
Pt (i)
)]
(4.51)
where E (i) [·] ≡ E [·|I (i)] is the mathematical expectation conditional on informa-
tion available to firm i at the start of the period, defined in section 4.3.5. Maintaining
the notation that lower-case letters are the natural log of their upper-case counter-
parts, the corresponding first order condition (a derivation of this and the linear
approximation below is provided in appendix 4.A.3) is
Et (i) [γiie
nt ] = Et (i)
[
γiie
nt+mct(i)−pt(i) (φt (i)− pt (i))
]
Denoting variables with an asterisk as being that variable in steady-state and vari-
ables with a hat above them to be that variable’s deviation from steady-state – e.g.,
p̂t (i) ≡ pt (i)− p (i)∗ – we can construct a first-order Taylor series approximation of
firm i’s pricing rule around the no-shock, full-information equilibrium. Unlike the
rule for the canonical Dixit-Stiglitz model – p̂t (i) = Et (i) [m̂ct (i)] – the TransLog
system’s pricing rule is:
p̂t (i) =
(
1− 1
1 + µ∗i
)
Et (i) [m̂ct (i)]
+
(
1
1 + µ∗i
)
Et (i)
[(−1
γii
)
α̂t (i) +
∑
j 6=i
(−γij
γii
)
p̂t (j)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=φ̂t(i)
(4.52)
where µ∗i = 1 − s(i)
∗
γii
is the mark-up employed by firm i in steady-state. A number
of interesting results emerge from this pricing rule.
First, and most obviously, a firm’s price is increasing in both its marginal cost
and its mark-up, with the mark-up contribution being a positive combination of its
base market share and its competitors’ prices. That each firm’s price increases in
its base market share is not surprising. An increase in α̂t (i) represents a shift in
households’ relative preferences towards good i, which grants the producer greater
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pricing power. Note that this variable is scaled by γii, the parameter governing the
price sensitivity of i’s market share. If γii is small, an increase in consumer preference
for good i will have a large effect on its price.
Next, we see that for the purposes of setting its mark-up, firm i is interested in
a firm-specific weighted average of competitors’ prices and not the aggregate price
level.13 This inclusion of competitors’ prices in the pricing equation is in addition
to those brought in via marginal costs as would be typical in the constant-mark-up
setting.
Finally, since each firm’s steady-state mark-up increases with its market share,
we have that larger firms will, ceteris paribus, place relatively more weight on move-
ments in their marginal costs than on movements in their competitors’ prices or
consumer preferences. Similarly, smaller firms will pay more attention to price com-
petition and consumer preferences, relative to their larger counterparts.
Of course, if a firm’s marginal cost is increasing in the quantity of goods it
produces, this acts as a further source of real rigidity no matter what the model
of demand. Linearising and substituting the expression for firms’ nominal marginal
costs (4.30) into (4.52) and exploiting the transitory nature of idiosyncratic shocks
to demand, we obtain:
p̂t (i)
TL = Et (i)
[
θi p̂t + (1− θi)
∑
j 6=i
(−γij
γii
)
p̂t (j)
]
+
(
θi
1 + η
)
Et (i) [$̂t − (1 + η) ât (i) + ηŷt] (4.53)
where $̂t is the real wage and η is the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to
output, while θi ≡
(
µ∗i (1+η)
1+µ∗i (1+ηε∗ii)
)
∈ (0, 1). Each firm will estimate three broad
objects: the aggregate price level; a firm-specific weighted average of other firms’
prices; and the real components of its marginal cost.
The nominal considerations include a component from the firm’s marginal cost
and a component from its mark-up, thereby clearly delineating firms’ price concerns
13Recall that γii < 0; γij ≥ 0 ∀i, j; and
∑
j 6=i (−γij/γii) = 1.
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with respect to its cost of doing business and with respect to the strategic comple-
mentarity of price competition. Since θi is increasing in α (i)
∗, we have that larger
firms will focus more on the real determinants of marginal cost and the aggregate
price level, while smaller firms will place more weight on price competition.
This pricing rule embodies two distinct sources of real rigidity above the standard
Dixit-Stiglitz framework. First, it accounts for curvature in demand and the corres-
ponding variation in firms’ mark-ups. Second, it requires that firms estimate multiple
aggregated price statistics (because of asymmetries in consumer preferences) in an
environment where only one – the aggregate price level – is published.
It is possible to separate these two effects by examining the pricing rule with
complete uniformity in preferences as a part-way point between Dixit-Stiglitz pricing
and the more realistic TransLog environment. Imposing complete uniformity gives
us that p̂t =
∑
j 6=i
(
−γij
γii
)
p̂t (j) = p̂t ∀i, so that (4.53) may be written as
p̂t (i)
UTL = Et (i)
[
p̂t
]
+
(
µ∗
1 + µ∗ (1 + ηε∗)
)
Et (i) [$̂t − (1 + η) ât (i) + ηŷt] (4.54)
where the superscript “UTL” is used to denote “Uniform TransLog.” By contrast,
the linearised pricing rule under Dixit-Stiglitz preferences is
p̂t (i)
DS = Et (i)
[
p̂t
]
+
(
1
1 + ηε
)
Et (i) [$̂t − (1 + η) ât (i) + ηŷt] (4.55)
Firms are interested in the same estimating the same objects under both envir-
onments, but attribute less weight to the real components of marginal cost under
TransLog preferences ( µ
1+µ(1+ηε)
< 1
1+ηε
), reflecting the fact that variable mark-ups
reduce any response to changes in marginal cost.
4.5.1 Applying near-uniformity in preferences
The pricing rule of equation (4.53) is, in general, intractable when seeking to in-
clude it in a simulated general equilibrium model. This is because when aggregating
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(substituting 4.53 back into itself), it stipulates that firms consider J + 1 different
compound expectations: one for the aggregate price level plus a different one for
every firm. As shown in chapter 1, the state vector will therefore explode in J (in
addition to in the number of higher-orders).
To progress further, is is therefore necessary now to apply our assumption of near
uniformity in preferences (4.40a) - (4.40c). These simplify the pricing rule (4.53) to
p̂t (i)
NUTL = Et (i)
[
θ p̂t + (1− θ) p̂t
]
+
(
µ∗
1 + µ∗ (1 + ηε∗)
)
Et (i) [$̂t − (1 + η) ât (i) + ηŷt] (4.56)
where the superscript “NUTL” is used to denote “Near-Uniform TransLog”; θ =(
µ∗(1+η)
1+µ∗(1+ηε∗)
)
; and 1
J−1
∑
j 6=i
p̂t (j) = p̂t ∀i. In particular, we now have that every
firm is interested in exactly the same two linear combinations of individual firms’
prices. This unfortunately removes the result that large and small firms place differ-
ent weights on supply and demand considerations (equality in steady-state expendit-
ure shares means that the θis must be equal). Even so, it remains the case that since
firms are interested in two different aggregate price statistics but observe only one,
their ability to find the optimal price will be impaired relative to the STL case.
We show in appendix 4.A.4 that under near-uniformity, the linearised aggregate
price level (4.5) is given by
p̂t = ˜̂pt + 1
γ
v˜αt (4.57)
where
˜̂pt ≡∑
i
α (i)∗ p̂t (i) and v˜αt ≡
∑
i
α (i)∗ vαt (i)
which is to say that the aggregate price level is a weighted average of all prices plus
a transitory aggregated preference shock.
We also show in appendix 4.A.4 that linearising the household’s intratemporal
first-order condition (4.22), aggregate production (4.32) and aggregate TFP (4.33),
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and substituting them into (4.56) then gives
p̂t (i)
NUTL = θ∗Et (i) [p̂t] + (1− θ∗)Et (i)
[
p̂t
]
(4.58)
+ Et (i)
[
θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
ŷt − θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
At − θvAt (i)
]
where θ∗ = θ
(
1 + 1
ψ
)
. Note that an expectation regarding the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock remains here while that of the demand shock does not because it is
something about which the firm can form an expectation. By observing the com-
bined (aggregate plus idiosyncratic) shock to its costs, a firm can and will form an
opinion on what of that is common to all firms and the remainder must, by definition,
be their idiosyncratic component. By contrast, no information available to the firm
allows them to move away from its a priori expectation of its idiosyncratic demand
shock; namely, that it be zero.
4.5.2 Higher-order expectations
Linearising the household Eular equation (4.23) gives
ŷt = Et [ŷt+1]− σ
(̂
it − Et [p̂t+1 − p̂t]
)
(4.59)
We shown in appendix 4.A.5 that substituting (4.59), the central bank’s policy rule
(4.34), and the linearised aggregate price level (4.57) into (4.58), and recognising
that Et (i) [v
α
t (j)] = 0 ∀j, gives
p̂t (i)
∗ = λ∗1Et (i)
[
p̂t
]
+ λ∗2Et (i)
[ ˜̂pt]
+ λ∗3Et (i) [p̂t+1] + λ
∗
4Et (i) [ŷt+1]
+ λ∗5Et (i)
[
At
]
+ λ∗6Et (i)
[
Mt
]
+ λ∗7 ât (i) (4.60)
for ∗ ∈ {NUTL,UTL,DS}. The λ∗∗ coefficients are described in detail in the ap-
pendix, although we note here that under some mild restrictions on the central bank’s
policy function, we have
λ1 ∈ (0, 1) ; λ2 ∈ (0, 1) ; and λ1 + λ2 ∈ (0, 1)
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These restrictions are necessary to ensure that decreasing weight is placed against
higher-order expectations and, hence, to ensure that the system is stable.
Equation (4.60) describes each firm’s pricing rule as a linear combination of two
aggregate price statistics: a weighted -average price and a simple-average price.14 We
show in appendix 4.A.5 that if we take the simple average of equation (4.58) and
repeatedly substitute it in for p̂t, we obtain
p̂t (i) = Et (i)
[ ∞∑
k=0
λk1E
(k)
t
[
λ2 ˜̂pt + λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ5 + λ1λ7) At + λ6Mt ]
]
+ λ7 ât (i) (4.61)
where E
(k)
t [·] is the k-th order simple-average expectation and we use the standard
notation that the 0-th order expectation of an object is the object itself.
For Uniform TransLog and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, we note that λ2 = 0 and
that the aggregate price level is just the simple-average price, so that
p̂∗t = λ
∗
7 
A
t (4.62)
+
∞∑
k=0
(λ∗1)
k E
(k+1)
t
[
λ∗3p̂
∗
t+1 + λ
∗
4ŷt+1 + (λ
∗
5 + λ
∗
1λ
∗
7) 
A
t + λ
∗
6 
M
t
]
for ∗ ∈ {UTL,DS}.
For Near-Uniform TransLog preferences, on the other hand, we now take the
weighted average of (4.61), repeatedly substitute it back in for ˜̂pt and then combine
the result with the expression for the aggregate price level (4.57) to arrive at
p̂∗t = λ
∗
7
(
At + v˜
A
t
)
+
1
γ
v˜αt (4.63)
+ E˜t
[
δ′E(0:∞)t
[
λ∗3p̂
∗
t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ
∗
5 + λ
∗
1λ
∗
7 + λ
∗
2λ
∗
7) 
A
t
+λ∗6
M
t + λ
∗
2λ
∗
7v˜
A
t
]]
where ∗ = “NUTL”; E(0:∞)t [·] is the hierarchy of all permutations of the two com-
pound expectations; and δ assigns geometrically decreasing weights to each, with λ∗1
14For TransLog preferences, the weighted-average price is for the aggregate price level (through
the nominal marginal cost) and the simple-average price for price competition through the mark-up.
For Symmetric TransLog and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, only the simple-average is required.
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raised to the power of the number of orders of Et [·] and λ∗2 raised to the power of
the number of orders of E˜t [·].
For example, a weight of (λ∗1) (λ
∗
2)
2 is applied to bothEt
[
E˜t
[
E˜t [·]
]]
and E˜t
[
Et
[
E˜t [·]
]]
as there are two orders of weighted-average expectations and one order of simple-
average expectations in each.
4.5.3 Firms’ learning
We define xt to be the vector of aggregate shocks:
xt ≡
[
At
Mt
]
(4.64)
and Xt as the full hierarchy of expectations regarding xt formed in period t:
Xt ≡ E(0:∞)t [xt] =
 xtEt [Xt]
E˜t [Xt]
 (4.65)
In the linearised model, firms receive the following vector of signals each period
(see the definition of firms’ information sets (4.37)):
qt (i) =

ŷt−1 + ey,t
p̂t−1 + ep,t
ŷt−1 (i)
ât (i)
 (4.66)
Note that there is no need to include the firm’s previous-period price as it must neces-
sarily have been a function of It−1 (i), meaning that it contains no new information
in period t. The firm’s previous-period quantity is still relevant, though, as firms do
not observe the demand they face each period until after setting their prices. The
period t − 1 individual quantity demanded therefore contains news to a firm when
setting its price in period t.
We show in appendix 4.A.7 that this signal vector may be written as
qt (i) = C1Xt + C2Xt−1 +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+R3et (4.67)
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Because of the linearity of the underlying system, the best linear estimator – in the
sense of minimising the mean squared error – will be a Kalman filter:1516
Et (i) [Xt] = Et−1 (i) [Xt] +K {qt (i)− Et−1 (i) [qt (i)]} (4.68)
In appendix 4.A.6 we derive expressions for the time-invariant Kalman gain mat-
rix (K) and the corresponding variance-covariance matrix (V ), making use of the
techniques developed by Nimark (2011b) to account for firms’ signal vectors (4.67)
including lagged components without the need to stack the current state on the
previous.
Taking simple and weighted averages of (4.68), we then show that the following
law of motion for the hierarchy of firms’ expectations emerges:
Xt = FXt−1 +G1ut +G2v˜t +G3et (4.69)
where
ut =
[
uAt
uMt
]
v˜t =
[
v˜At
v˜αt
]
et =
[
ep,t
ey,t
]
(4.70)
Note that the Kalman filter is performing two roles here. It both represents the rule
by which firms update their expectations and defines the law of motion for the state
vector of interest.
4.5.4 Solving the model
We now have that in addition to (4.69) describing the law of motion for the hierarchy
of firms’ expectations, the economy is characterised by the following expression for
real GDP:
ŷt =
1
1 + σκy
Et [ŷt+1]− σ
1 + σκy
(
(κpi − 1)Et [p̂t+1 − p̂t] + Mt
)
15If all shocks were drawn from Gaussian distributions, it would be the best such estimator,
linear or otherwise.
16The derivation of the standard Kalman filter may be found in most texts on dynamic macroe-
conomics (e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004) or timeseries analysis (e.g. Hamilton, 1994).
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and one of (4.62) or (4.63) for the price level, depending on which demand system
is being used. We show in appendix 4.A.7 that this system may be written as
ŷ∗t = γ
∗′
y Xt + δ
∗′
y v˜t (4.71a)
p̂∗t = γ
∗′
p Xt + δ
∗′
p v˜t (4.71b)
p̂
∗
t = γ
∗′
p Xt (4.71c)
ŵ∗t = γ
∗′
wXt + δ
∗′
w v˜t (4.71d)
where ∗ ∈ {DS,UTL,NUTL}. Note that under Dixit-Stiglitz and Uniform Trans-
Log preferences, (a) the law of large number ensures that v˜t = 0 ∀t almost surely,
and (b) the aggregate price level and the simple-average price are the same. The
terms in v˜t and the distinction between the two aggregated prices only matter when
preferences are not fully uniform across goods in steady-state.
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4.6 Simulations
Table 4.1 lists baseline parameters for the simulation presented below. As in chapter
3, the coefficient against expected next-period inflation is less than unity in order to
ensure the existence of a non-explosive solution.
Parameter Value Description
σ 0.5 The elasticity of intertemporal substitution
ψ 1.5 The Frisch elasticity of labour supply
ε∗ii 3.0 The steady-state own-price elasticity of demand
ζ∗ 0.063 The degree of asymmetry in steady-state base market shares
η 0.5 The elasticity of marginal cost (≡ α
1−α , α = 0.333)
κy 0.5 The CB’s coefficient against current real GDP
κpi 0.5 The CB’s coefficient against expected next-period inflation
ρA 0.6 AR(1) coefficient for aggregate TFP shocks
ρM 0.6 AR(1) coefficient for monetary shocks
σ2v
σ2u
5 Relative volatility of idiosyncratic shocks
Table 4.1: Baseline parameterisation
For the two TransLog demand systems, the steady-state own-price elasticity of
demand ties down the deep parameter γ that controls cross-price elasticity (ε∗ii = 1+
γ). For Near-Uniform TransLog preferences, ζ∗ ≡ limJ→∞ 1J
∑J
i=1 (ζi)
2 characterises
the degree of asymmetry in the distribution of steady-state base market shares. The
value of 0.063 was chosen as this corresponds to a Zeta distribution with a shape
parameter of γ = 1.2517 and Axtell (2001) finds that the size of firms in the USA,
when estimated over a 10 year period, are well characterised by such a distribution.
In everything that follows, period 0 denotes the period immediately prior to any
shock occurring (the economy is invariably assumed to be in steady-state in period
0) and period 1 denotes the “on impact” period.
17See assumption 2 in chapter 2. The same logic applies here, with the p.d.f. φN (i) simply
replaced with αJ (i)
∗
.
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4.6.1 Comparing demand systems
Figure 4.5 plots impulse responses for each of the three demand systems following
one s.d. shocks to each of the two underlying state variables under the baseline
parameterisation.
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(a) Aggregate TFP shock
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(b) Monetary Policy shock
Figure 4.5: IRFs for the three systems of demand
The impulse responses for Dixit-Stiglitz and Uniform TransLog preferences are
very similar for both aggregate shocks. For the shock to productivity, firms on impact
attribute their private observations of productivity increases to idiosyncratic factors
and consequently lower their prices only somewhat. In period 2, they observe the
change in aggregate variables and their private demand that occurred in period 1
and immediately respond fully to the shock. Prices and real GDP then return to
zero as the underlying shock itself dies away. For the shock to monetary policy,
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since firms observe no contemporary signal of household demand before setting their
prices, there is no change in aggregate prices on impact and real GDP absorbs all
of the effect. In period 2, upon observing aggregate signals and their own quantities
from the impact period, firms’ prices adjust fully and real GDP essentially returns to
zero (the slight positive effect in period 2 arises from firms’ average expectation that
there is a slight increase in aggregate TFP as well - see figure 4.6a below). In other
words, with firms having full flexibility in their price-setting, we essentially have the
standard result of money being neutral, with monetary policy shocks having only a
transitory real effect and prices capturing the aggregate effects thereafter.
However, Near-Uniform TransLog preferences induce responses that stand in
marked contrast. For the shock to productivity, the same 1 standard deviation innov-
ation as under Dixit-Stiglitz and Uniform TransLog preferences produces responses
that are more subdued, noticeably more hump-shaped and considerably more per-
sistent than those of UTL or DS (so that relative to their peak response, NUTL
preferences induce very much more persistent responses). The aggregate price level
and the simple-average price move essentially one-for-one. For a monetary shock,
despite the absence of any nominal rigidity and firms having access to the same in-
formation as under UTL or DS preferences, the neutrality of money result is lost:
the subdued price response of NUTL grants the policy shock a considerably more
persistent effect on real GDP.
To appreciate the increased persistence associated with NUTL preferences, we
look at impulse responses for firms’ hierarchies of simple-average expectations re-
garding the two underlying state variables following each of the two shocks. First,
figure 4.6 plots those hierarchies for UTL and NUTL preferences following an ag-
gregate TFP shock.
Under Uniform TransLog preferences, on impact, firms attribute the majority
of their observed increases in productivity to idiosyncratic forces (because of the
latter’s higher variance). In period 2, the public signals regarding aggregate variables
in period 1 increase the average belief considerably, but the measurement errors in
those public signals mean that the average belief is still below the truth. Firms
in period 2 also partially attribute the increase in real GDP to increased demand
following a monetary policy shock, although this belief dies away very quickly over
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(a) Uniform TransLog (UTL) preferences
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(b) Near-Uniform TransLog (NUTL) preferences
Figure 4.6: Hierarchies of simple-average expectations following a TFP shock
the next few periods. The impulse responses for aggregate beliefs under Dixit-Stiglitz
preferences are broadly the same as those shown in figure 4.6a.
Under Near-Uniform TransLog preferences, the responses on impact are identical
to those under UTL preferences, but thereafter differ considerably. Because firms
must estimate both the aggregate price level and the simple-average price, but only
receive public signals regarding the former, they incorrectly attribute some of the
movements in their signals to shocks in both the level and the distribution of de-
mand. This leads average expectations regarding aggregate TFP to be higher and
considerably more persistent than the truth, and those regarding monetary shocks
to also be more persistent (although still quite small).
Figure 4.7 next plots the equivalent graphs following a monetary policy shock.
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(a) Uniform TransLog (UTL) preferences
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Figure 4.7: Hierarchies of simple-average expectations following a monetary policy
shock
For UTL preferences (DS preferences are largely the same), the absence of any
signal of aggregate demand before setting their prices in a given period means that
firms’ beliefs do not move on impact. In period 2, the observed signal of real GDP
from period 1 raises their expectations regarding both underlying variables, but in
period 3 the information they receive in period 2 partially confirms that a monetary
policy shock has occurred and so lowers their estimates of aggregate TFP. Beliefs
regarding the former then follow the truth back to zero, while the latter have returned
to zero after a handful of periods.
For NUTL preferences, there is likewise no on-impact response, but additional
persistence thereafter. Average expectations regarding aggregate TFP rise higher
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and persist throughout, while those regarding the monetary shock fall to zero from
above the truth. Once again, these reflect the more challenging signal extraction
problem faced by firms under NUTL preferences.
4.6.2 Aggregate volatility from idiosyncratic shocks under
NUTL preferences
Under Near-Uniform TransLog preferences, the aggregate price level is comprised of
the weighted -average of individual firms’ prices and the weighted-average of firms’
idiosyncratic shocks in that period, with the weights given by firms’ steady-state
base market shares. Since the weighted-average of idiosyncratic shocks need not
be subject to the law of large numbers, NUTL preferences therefore give rise to
aggregate volatility emerging from firms’ idiosyncratic shocks.
To illustrate this, figures 4.8 and 4.9 plot aggregate impulse responses and the
hierarchies of simple-average expectations following shocks to v˜At and v˜
α
t respectively.
That is, following situations in which firms with relatively large steady-state marginal
costs experience positive shocks while firms with relative small steady-state marginal
costs experience negative shocks (recall that in steady-state all firms receive the same
share of household expenditure; see section 4.3.7 for a description of steady-state).
A shock to more expensive firms’ productivity (figure 4.8) induces aggregate
responses that are suggestive of a true aggregate shock to productivity. The aggregate
price (which is a weighted-average) falls on impact, but the simple-average price does
not because the law of large numbers holds for it. Demand rises because of the fall
in the aggregate price level. In period 2, all firms observe that real GDP rose and
the aggregate price level fell in period 1 and consequently, the average firm believes
that an aggregate productivity shock has occurred (although it cannot dismiss the
possibility of a monetary shock being the source of the increased real GDP). As such,
the simple-average firm also reduces its price, leading to a larger movement in real
GDP. Over time, firms quite quickly disregard the likelihood of a monetary policy
shock being the cause but only reduce their expectations of an aggregate TFP shock
gradually.
Under the baseline specification, movements in real GDP and the aggregate price
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(b) Hierarchy of simple-average expectations under NUTL preferences
Figure 4.8: Responses to a 1 s.d. shock to v˜At
level are roughly half of the magnitude of those following a true aggregate productiv-
ity shock (it remains the case that the magnitude of the price level movement is quite
a bit larger than that of real GDP) and somewhat less persistent. This stands in
contrast to the previous chapter that examined the aggregate effect from network
shocks, in which responses were roughly an order of magnitude smaller.
For a preference distribution shock that favours more expensive firms (figure 4.9),
firms receive no signal of the shocks on impact and so do not adjust their prices, but
real GDP increases mechanically. In period 2, seeing the increase in real GDP and
no movement in the aggregate price from period 1, firms attribute the shock to
both aggregate TFP and monetary policy. Both beliefs contribute to an increase
in firms’ prices in period 2, causing overall demand to fall enough to counteract the
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Figure 4.9: Responses to a 1 s.d. shock to v˜αt
mechanical increase in real GDP that emerges from the shock. The drop in real GDP
and increase in the aggregate price in period 2 induces the average firm in period 3
to largely unwind its belief in a monetary policy shock, but remains consistent with
an aggregate TFP shock. Firms’ prices subsequently remain elevated and real GDP
below trend until the shock dissipates.
Relative to an aggregate demand shock (to monetary policy), a shock to the
distribution of demand under the baseline specificiation induces a price level response
of roughly half the magnitude, but a relatively much smaller response in real GDP.
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Variance decomposition
Table 4.2 shows the share of unconditional variance in real GDP and the aggregate
price level that can be attributed to idiosyncratic shocks under NUTL preferences
and the baseline parameterisation for different degrees of asymmetry in steady-state
distribution of firms’ base market shares. For Near-Uniform TransLog preferences
ζ∗ Real GDP Aggregate price level
0 0 0
0.02 0.19 1.54
0.04 0.35 3.22
0.06 0.49 5.01
0.08 0.62 6.87
0.10 0.74 8.78
Table 4.2: Share of unconditional variance attributable to idiosyncratic shocks (%)
under the baseline parameterisation (ζ∗ = 0.063), roughly 0.5% of unconditional
volatility in real GDP and 5.0% unconditional volatility in the aggregate price level
are attributable to idiosyncratic shocks. Recall that the baseline parameterisation
corresponds to a Zeta distribution with a shape parameter of γ = 1.25.
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4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the possibility of making use of TransLog preferences in
a macroeconomic model when household preferences are not uniform across goods
and firms are free to adjust their prices every period (thereby avoiding both the
Lucas critique under purely time-based price setting rules and the complexity of
aggregation under state-based pricing systems) but face incomplete information.
Under TransLog preferences, firms continue to set their price as a mark-up over
their nominal marginal costs, but the mark-up is endogenous. A price rise lowers a
firm’s share of household expenditure, which raises its own-price elasticity of demand
and, hence, lowers its optimal mark-up, thereby dampening any response to a change
in marginal cost. Under full information, we solve for an explicit solution to the firm’s
pricing problem and note that an endogenous market-exit condition arises in response
to sufficiently large shocks to marginal cost (that necessitate prices sufficiently high
as to cause the firm’s expenditure share to be zero).
Under incomplete information, firms’ signal extraction problem implies that (a)
larger firms will place relatively more weight on movements in their marginal costs,
while smaller firms will place more weight on movements in competitors’ prices or
consumer preferences; and (b) when considering competitors’ prices, every firm must
consider two distinct sums: the aggregate price level (as part of its estimation of
nominal marginal cost) and a firm-specific weighted sum of competitors’ prices.
The pricing rule under full TransLog preferences is, in general, intractable to ag-
gregation. This is because each firm, in considering a weighted sum of other firms’
prices, must also consider the weighted-average price specific to each of its compet-
itors. This recursion creates an explosion in the size of the state vector quite apart
from that arising from higher-order expectations (see section 1.2.1 in chapter 1).
To simplify, we suppose that the representative household exhibits TransLog pref-
erences with near-uniformity in steady-state preferences : firms’ steady-state shares
of household expenditure and their mark-ups are all equal, but their marginal costs
and prices are not. With Near-Uniform TransLog (NUTL) preferences, all firms are
interested in estimating the same two sums of individual prices: A weighted-average
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price18 that comprises the aggregate price level and a simple-average price that affects
movements in their mark-ups.
We compare the performance of NUTL preferences in a small DSGE model to
corresponding models with fully Uniform TransLog (UTL) or Dixit-Stiglitz (DS)
preferences. UTL and DS preferences are shown to induce very similar impulse
responses following shocks to aggregate TFP or monetary policy. In contrast, impulse
responses in the NUTL framework were generally more subdued, more hump-shaped
and considerably more persistent. Despite firms experiencing no nominal rigidity
and observing the same signals as under UTL or DS preferences, monetary shocks
are clearly non-neutral beyond the period in which the shock occurs.
The inclusion of weighted-average prices also implies that the law of large num-
bers may not hold, so that firms’ idiosyncratic shocks can have aggregate effects
on the economy. In the context of NUTL preferences, this occurs when firms with
large steady-state marginal costs experience shocks in one direction while firms with
small steady-state marginal costs experience shocks in the other. We show that un-
der parameterisations that match the distribution of firm size in the United States,
idiosyncratic shocks in this sense may contribute 0.5% of unconditional volatility in
real GDP and 5.0% of volatility in the price level.
18With the weights given by firms’ steady-state base market share.
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Appendix 4.A Proofs
This chapter contains derivations and proofs of results in the main paper.
4.A.1 Own-price super-elasticity of demand within the
Almost Ideal Demand System
Taking note of equation (4.4):
P (i)Q (i)
N
≡ s (i) = α (i) +
∑
j
γij ln (P (j)) + βi ln
(
N
P
)
and equation (4.9):
εii = 1− 1
s (i)
[
γii − βi
(
α (i) +
∑
k
γki ln (P (k))
)]
The super-elasticity of demand is derived as follows, again taking income and other
firms’ prices as given:
ξii ≡ ∂ ln εii
∂ lnP (i)
=
1
εii
[
−
∂ 1
s(i)
[γii − βi (α (i) +
∑
k γki ln (P (k)))]
∂ lnP (i)
]
=
1
εii
[
βiγii
s (i)
+
1
s (i)
[
γii − βi
(
α (i) +
∑
k
γki ln (P (k))
)]
1
s (i)
∂s (i)
∂ lnP (i)
]
=
1
εii
βiγii
s (i)
+
{
1
s (i)
[
γii − βi
(
α (i) +
∑
k
γki ln (P (k))
)]}2
=
1
εii
[
βiγii
s (i)
+ (εii − 1)2
]
which is equation (4.17) in the main text.
4.A.2 Proof of proposition 3: Explicit solution for the
one-period optimal price under full information
Defining lower-case letters to be the (natural) log of their upper-case counterparts –
e.g. x (i) ≡ ln (X (i)) – and substituting equation (4.14) in for s (i), we can rewrite
198
4.A. Proofs
the monopolist’s one-period profit (4.44) as
Π (i) =
(
α (i) + γiip (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γijp (j)
)
en−C
((
α (i) + γiip (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γijp (j)
)
en−p(i)
)
Taking all parameters, other firms’ prices and aggregate expenditure as given, the
optimal price for a monopolist when free to adjust their price every period is therefore
found at the point p (i) such that the following first-order condition is satisfied
γiie
n − C ′ (Q (i))
(
γiie
n−p(i) −
(
α (i) + γiip (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γijp (j)
)
en−p(i)
)
= 0
Defining mc (i) ≡ ln (C ′ (Q (i))) as the log of marginal costs, we can rearrange this
to give
γii
(
p (i) + ep(i)−mc(i)
)
= γii − α (i)−
∑
j 6=i
γijp (j)
or
p (i) + ep(i)−mc(i) = 1− α (i)
γii
−
∑
j 6=i
γij
γii
p (j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡φ(i)
Denoting the right-hand side by φ (i), this in turn rearranges to
ln (P (i)) +
P (i)
C ′ (Q (i))
= φ (i) (4.72)
Taking the exponential of both sides and then dividing both sides by C ′ (Q (i)) gives(
P (i)
C ′ (Q (i))
)
e
(
P (i)∗
C′(Q(i))
)
=
1
C ′ (Q (i))
eφ(i)
The left-hand side is now in the form of the inverse of the Lambert W function, so
we can therefore write
P (i)
C ′ (Q (i))
=W
(
eφ(i)
C ′ (Q (i))
)
(4.73)
which is equation (4.46) in the main text.
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First and Second Derivatives
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∂MC (i)
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(
eφ(i)
MC (i)
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−W ′
(
eφ(i)
MC (i)
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∂P (i)
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)
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∂P (j)
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(
eφ(i)
MC(i)
)
MC (i)
P (j)
(
−γij
γii
)
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∂2P (i)
∂P (j)2
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1 +W
(
eφ(i)
MC(i)
)]2 MC (i)P (j)
(
−γij
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Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
The price-setting equation under full information (4.46) represents a mapping
T : RJ+ → RJ+ (4.74)
and a Nash equilibrium in prices will be a fixed point of this mapping. Clearly Pt = 0
will be one such fixed point, but we dismiss this as trivial. In order to demonstrate
the uniqueness of a non-zero vector of prices such that P ∗t = T (P
∗
t ), note that it
is insufficient to make use of the Banach (Contraction) Fixed-Point Theorem and
Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for demonstrating contraction (Blackwell, 1965), as
T is not a contraction: the derivatives are unbounded as prices approach zero.
Instead, we note that as T is concave and satisfies the following:
T (0) = 0
lim
P (j)→0
P (i) =∞ ∀j 6= i
lim
P (j)→∞
P (i) = 0 ∀j 6= i
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then it meets the requirements laid out by Kennan (2001) for uniqueness. Because
of its concavity and monotonicity, the mapping T (Pt) will therefore converge to the
unique P ∗t for any strictly positive starting vector of prices.
4.A.3 Static pricing rule under incomplete information
As both settings are with static pricing, the first-order condition for the full-information
case must hold in expectation here:
Et (i) [γiie
nt ] = Et (i)
[
γiie
nt+mct(i)−pt(i)
(
1− 1
γii
(
αt (i) + γiipt (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γijpt (j)
))]
We suppose that the Γ matrix remains constant and known, while all other variables
may vary over time. Denoting variables with an asterisk as being that variable in the
no-shock, full-information equilibrium and variables with a hat above them to be that
variable’s deviation from the no-shock equilibrium – that is, p̂t (i) ≡ pt (i)−p (i)∗, etc.
– a first-order Taylor series approximation of the left-hand side around the no-shock
equilibrium is simply
LHS ≈ γiien∗t + γiien∗tE (i) [n̂t]
Next, note that(
1− 1
γii
(
αt (i) + γiipt (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γijpt (j)
))
= 1− st (i)
γii
= µt (i)
so that a first-order approximation of the right-hand side is given by
RHS ≈ γiien∗t+mct(i)∗−pt(i)∗µt (i)∗
+ γiie
n∗t+mct(i)
∗−pt(i)∗µt (i)
∗E (i) [n̂t + m̂ct (i)− p̂t (i)]
− en∗t+mct(i)∗−pt(i)∗E (i)
[
α̂t (i) + γiip̂t (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γij p̂t (j)
]
Equating these, noting that the first terms on each side must cancel out and rearran-
ging slightly then gives
ept(i)
∗−mct(i)∗E (i) [n̂t] = µt (i)
∗E (i) [n̂t + m̂ct (i)− p̂t (i)]
− E (i)
[
1
γii
α̂t (i) + p̂t (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γij
γii
p̂t (j)
]
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Recognising that ept(i)
∗−mct(i)∗ = µt (i)
∗, we see that the terms in n̂t cancel out and
we arrive, finally, at
p̂t (i) =
µt (i)
∗
1 + µt (i)
∗ Et (i) [m̂ct (i)]−
(
1
1 + µt (i)
∗
)
Et (i)
[
1
γii
α̂t (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γij
γii
p̂t (j)
]
which is equation (4.52) in the main text.
The first-order approximation of firm i’s nominal marginal cost(4.30) around
steady-state is:
m̂ct (i) = ŵt − (1 + η) ât (i) + η (ŷt + p̂t − p̂t (i))
+
η
s (i)∗
(
α̂t (i) + γiip̂t (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γij p̂t (j)
)
(4.75)
Recall that ŵt is the (log deviation in the) nominal wage. We can replace it by ŵt ≡
$̂t + p̂t, where $̂t is the real wage and p̂t is the aggregate price level. Substituting
this expression in for m̂ct (i) gives us
p̂t (i) =
(
µt (i)
∗
1 + µt (i)
∗
)
Et (i)
[
$̂t + p̂t − (1 + η) ât (i) + η (ŷt + p̂t − p̂t (i))
+ η
s(i)∗
(
α̂t (i) + γiip̂t (i) +
∑
j 6=i γij p̂t (j)
) ]
+
(
1
1 + µt (i)
∗
)
Et (i)
[(−1
γii
)
α̂t (i) +
∑
j 6=i
(−γij
γii
)
p̂t (j)
]
Gathering like terms produces
p̂t (i) =
(
µ∗i (1 + η)
1 + µ∗i (1 + ηε
∗
ii)
)
Et (i) [p̂t]
+
(
µ∗i
1 + µ∗i (1 + ηε
∗
ii)
)
Et (i) [$̂t − (1 + η) ât (i) + ηŷt]
+
(
1 + ηε∗ii
1 + µ∗i (1 + ηε
∗
ii)
)
Et (i)
[(−1
γii
)
α̂t (i) +
∑
j 6=i
(−γij
γii
)
p̂t (j)
]
which, noting that
1+ηε∗ii
1+µ∗i (1+ηε∗ii)
= 1− µ∗i (1+η)
1+µ∗i (1+ηε∗ii)
, is equation (4.53) in the main text.
4.A.4 Aggregation under near-uniformity in preferences
There are three aggregations to consider in the firm’s pricing problem, two common
and one firm-specific.
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First, we have that individual firms are interested in firm-specific weighted av-
erages of their competitors’ prices∑
j 6=i
−γij
γii
pt (j)
The assumption of uniformity-in-Γ (4.40a) turns this into∑
j 6=i
−γij
γii
pt (j) =
γ
J
1
J − 1
∑
j 6=i
pt (j)
Assumption (4.40b) then (a) supposes that each firm is sufficiently small that this
expression is the same for everyone∑
j 6=i
−γij
γii
pt (j) =
γ
J
1
J − 1
∑
j 6=i
pt (j) =
γ
J
pt ∀i
and (b) applies a normalisation that when in steady-state, this simple average of log
prices is zero (roughly, although not exactly, that the average steady-state price is
unitary)∑
j 6=i
−γij
γii
p (j)∗ =
γ
J
1
J − 1
∑
j 6=i
p (j)∗ =
γ
J
p∗ = 0 ∀i
Outside of steady-state, firms will therefore wish to estimate (note the hats to indic-
ate deviations from steady-state)∑
j 6=i
−γij
γii
p̂t (j) =
γ
J
p̂t ∀i
Second, the linearised aggregate price level (4.5) is
p̂t =
∑
i
p (i)∗ α̂t (i) +
∑
i
(
α (i)∗ + 2
∑
j 6=i
γijp (j)
∗
)
p̂t (i)
With uniformity-in-Γ (4.40a), this becomes
p̂t =
∑
i
p (i)∗ α̂t (i) +
∑
i
1
J
(ζi + 2γp∗) p̂t (i)
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and with the normalisation that p∗ = 0, we get
p̂t =
∑
i
p (i)∗ α̂t (i) +
∑
i
α (i)∗ p̂t (i)
For the sum over prices, it is clear that since α (i)∗ ∈ (0, 1) and ∑i α (i)∗ = 1,
this is a weighted average all firms’ prices, which we denote ˜̂pt. Next, substitute in
the expression for p (i)∗ – see equation (4.41) in the main text – and noting that
α̂t (i) =
1
J
vαt – see equation (4.25a) – to get
p̂t = ˜̂pt +∑
i
1
γ
(ζi − 1) 1
J
vαt (i)
= ˜̂pt + 1
γ
∑
i
1
J
ζiv
α
t (i)−
1
γ
1
J
∑
i
vαt (i)
The last term clearly goes to zero as J → ∞, since it is a simple average and
E [vαt (i)] = 0. We are therefore left with
p̂t = ˜̂pt + 1
γ
v˜αt (4.76)
which is equation (4.57) in the main text.
Third, aggregate TFP (4.33) linearises as
ẑt =
∫
ât (i) + p̂t (i)− p̂t − 1
s (i)∗
[
α̂t (i) + γiip̂t (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γij p̂t (j)
]
di
Applying the uniformity-in-Γ (4.40a) assumption and using the definition of αt (i),
this becomes
ẑt =
∫
ât (i) + p̂t (i)− p̂t− 1
s (i)∗
[
1
J
vαt (i)−
γ
J
p̂t (i) +
γ
J (J − 1)
∑
j 6=i
p̂t (j)
]
di
Applying uniformity in steady-state expenditure shares (4.40c) and expanding ât (i),
we get
ẑt =
∫
At + v
A
t (i) + p̂t (i)− p̂t − vαt (i) + γp̂t (i)− γ
1
(J − 1)
∑
j 6=i
p̂t (j) di
But then the last two terms cancel out and and we arrive at
ẑt = 
A
t + p̂t − p̂t (4.77)
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Finally, we can linearise the household’s intratemporal first-order condition
(4.22) and the aggregate production function (4.32) to express the real wage as
$̂t =
(
1
σ
+
1
ψ
(1 + η)
)
ŷt − 1
ψ
(1 + η) ẑt
Combined with the earlier linearised expressions for aggregate TFP (4.77) and the
aggregate price level (4.76), we can substitute this into equation (4.56) to give
p̂t (i) = θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
Et (i)
[ ˜̂pt]+ (1− θ(1 + 1
ψ
))
Et (i)
[
p̂t
]
+ Et (i)
[
θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
ŷt − θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
At + θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
1
γ
v˜αt − θvAt (i)
]
or, since Et (i) [v˜
α
t ] = 0,
p̂t (i) = θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
Et (i)
[ ˜̂pt]+ (1− θ(1 + 1
ψ
))
Et (i)
[
p̂t
]
+ Et (i)
[
θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
ŷt − θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
At − θvAt (i)
]
which is equation (4.58) in the main text.
4.A.5 Higher-order expectations
With a linearisation of the household Eular equation, we therefore have the following
system of equations:
ŷt = Et [ŷt+1]− σ
(̂
it − Et [p̂t+1 − p̂t]
)
ît = κyŷt + κpiEt [p̂t+1 − p̂t] + Mt
p̂t =
{ ˜̂pt + 1γ v˜αt for NUTL
p̂t for UTL and DS
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and our three possible price-setting rules:
p̂t (i)
TL = θ∗Et (i) [p̂t] + (1− θ∗)Et (i)
[
p̂t
]
+ θEt (i)
[( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
ŷt −
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
At − vAt (i)
]
p̂t (i)
STL = Et (i)
[
p̂t
]
+ θEt (i)
[( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
ŷt −
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
At − vAt (i)
]
p̂t (i)
DS = Et (i)
[
p̂t
]
+
1
1 + εη
Et (i)
[( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
ŷt −
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
At − vAt (i)
]
Substituting the first three expressions into the individual price equations, recog-
nising that Et (i) [v˜
α
t ] = 0 and noting that firms observe ât (i) directly, we have
p̂t (i)
∗ = λ∗1Et (i)
[
p̂t
]
+ λ∗2Et (i)
[ ˜̂pt]
+ λ∗3Et (i) [p̂t+1] + λ
∗
4Et (i) [ŷt+1]
+ λ∗5Et (i)
[
At
]
+ λ∗6Et (i)
[
Mt
]
+ λ∗7 ât (i)
for ∗ ∈ {NUTL,UTL,DS} and where the λ∗∗ coefficients are given by:
Near-Uniform TransLog
λNUTL1 = 1− θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
λNUTL2 = θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
− θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
σ
1 + σκy
(1− κpi)
λNUTL3 = θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
σ
1 + σκy
(1− κpi) λNUTL4 = θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
1
1 + σκy
λNUTL5 = −θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
λNUTL6 = −θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
σ
1 + σκy
λNUTL7 = −θ
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Uniform TransLog
λUTL1 = 1− θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
σ
1 + σκy
(1− κpi) λUTL2 = 0
λUTL3 = θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
σ
1 + σκy
(1− κpi) λUTL4 = θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
1
1 + σκy
λUTL5 = −θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
λUTL6 = −θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
σ
1 + σκy
λUTL7 = −θ
Dixit-Stiglitz
λDS1 = ξ λ
DS
2 = 0
λDS3 =
1 + η
1 + εη
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
σ
1 + σκy
(1− κpi) λDS4 =
1 + η
1 + εη
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
1
1 + σκy
λDS5 = −
1 + η
1 + εη
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
λDS6 = −
1 + η
1 + εη
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
σ
1 + σκy
λDS7 = −
1 + η
1 + εη
where ξ ≡ 1− 1+η
1+εη
(
1
σ
+η
1+η
+ 1
ψ
)
σ
1+σκy
(1− κpi) is the same as in the previous chapter.
In order to ensure stability in the system, we require that decreasing weight be
applied to higher-order expectations. In other words, we require that
λ1 ∈ (0, 1) ; λ2 ∈ (0, 1) ; and λ1 + λ2 ∈ (0, 1)
The first of these requires that ψ be sufficiently large to ensure that θ
(
1 + 1
ψ
)
< 1.
For any of the parameterisations chosen here, this requirement is satisfied. Given
the definitions of λ1 and λ2, the third will automatically be satisfied so long as the
second is, while the second requires that
0 ≤ θ
(
1 +
1
ψ
)
− θ
( 1
σ
+ η
1 + η
+
1
ψ
)
σ
1 + σκy
(1− κpi) ≤ 1
Taking the simple average of the pricing equation (4.60), we have
p̂t = λ1Et
[
p̂t
]
+ Et
[
λ2 ˜̂pt + λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + λ5At + λ6Mt ]+ λ7At
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Repeatedly substituting this back into itself gives
p̂t =
∞∑
k=0
λk1
(
E
(k)
t
[
λ7
A
t + Et
[
λ2 ˜̂pt + λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + λ5At + λ6Mt ]])
or
p̂t = λ7
A
t +
∞∑
k=0
λk1E
(k+1)
t
[
λ2 ˜̂pt + λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ5 + λ1λ7) At + λ6Mt ]
Putting this into (4.60) in place of p̂t, we have
p̂t (i) = λ1Et (i)
[
λ7
A
t
+
∑∞
k=0 λ
k
1E
(k+1)
t
[
λ2 ˜̂pt + λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ5 + λ1λ7) At + λ6Mt ]
]
+ λ2Et (i)
[ ˜̂pt]
+λ3Et (i) [p̂t+1] +λ4Et (i) [ŷt+1]
+λ5Et (i)
[
At
]
+λ6Et (i)
[
Mt
]
+λ7 ât (i)
or, rearranging,
p̂t (i) = Et (i)
[ ∞∑
k=0
λk1E
(k)
t
[
λ2 ˜̂pt + λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ5 + λ1λ7) At + λ6Mt ]
]
+ λ7 ât (i)
which is equation (4.61) in the main text. Now taking a weighted average of this
(using α (i)∗ as the weights), we obtain˜̂pt = λ7 (At + v˜t)
+ E˜t
[ ∞∑
k=0
λk1E
(k)
t
[
λ2 ˜̂pt + λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ5 + λ1λ7) At + λ6Mt ]
]
Substituting this back into itself gives˜̂pt = λ7 (At + v˜t)
+ E˜t

∞∑
k=0
λk1E
(k)
t

λ2

λ7
(
At + v˜t
)
+E˜t
∑∞k=0 λk1E(k)t
 λ2 ˜̂pt+λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1
+ (λ5 + λ1λ7) 
A
t + λ6
M
t



+λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1
+ (λ5 + λ1λ7) 
A
t + λ6
M
t


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Repeating this substitution eventually leads to
˜̂pt = λ7 (At + v˜At )
+ E˜t
[
φ′E(0:∞)t
[
λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ5 + (λ1 + λ2)λ7) 
A
t + λ6
M
t + λ2λ7v˜
A
t
]]
where E
(0:∞)
t [·] is the hierarchy of all permutations of the two compound expectations
and φ assigns geometrically decreasing weights to each, with λ1 raised to the power
of the number of orders of Et [·] and λ2 raised to the power of the number of orders
of E˜t [·].
For Near-Uniform TransLog preferences, we can plug this into equation (4.76) to
obtain
p̂NUTLt = λ7
(
At + v˜
A
t
)
+
1
γ
v˜αt
+ E˜t
[
φ′E(0:∞)t
[
λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ5 + (λ1 + λ2)λ7) 
A
t + λ6
M
t + λ2λ7v˜
A
t
]]
which is equation (4.63) in the main text.
4.A.6 Firms’ learning
Deriving the Kalman filter
The filter derived here closely follows that developed by Nimark (2011b) as a means
of avoiding the doubling-up of the state vector more typical in the literature, thereby
allowing more accurate simulation results when working with finite computing re-
sources.
Denoting i’s expectation formed with period-t information as Et (i) [·] ≡ E [·|It (i)],
our goal is to find a mean square error minimising19 formula for Et (i) [Xt]. To begin,
we suppose (and verify below) that each firm’s signal vector is given by
qt (i) = C1Xt + C2Xt−1 +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+R3et +R4v˜t−1
19And hence, given that all shocks are mean zero, a variance-minimising estimator.
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and that the innovation (i.e. the unexpected component) in the firm’s signal vector
may be written as:
−→q t|t−1 (i) ≡ qt (i)− Et−1 (i) [qt (i)]
= D
−−−−−→
Xt−1|t−1 (i) + C1G1ut +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+ (R3 + C1G3) et + (R4 + C1G4) v˜t−1
where D ≡ (C1F + C2) and −−−−−→Xt−1|t−1 (i) ≡ Xt−1 − Et−1 (i) [Xt−1] is i’s contemporan-
eous error in estimating Xt. Derivations of the coefficients in these two expressions
are provided below in appendix 4.A.7. Note that there is no term in v˜t here, as firms’
only contemporaneous signal is their productivity shock, which does not rely on it.
For the term in v˜t−1, we note that firms cannot form a prior expectation (strictly,
it is zero) because of the independence of idiosyncratic shocks and the assumption
that we have a continuum of firms.
Since −→q t (i) contains only new information available in period t, it must be
orthogonal to any of i’s estimates based on information from earlier periods. We can
therefore use the result that E [w|y, z] = E [w|y] + E [w|z] when y⊥z, so that
Et (i) [Xt] = E [Xt|It−1 (i)] + E
[
Xt|−→q t (i)
]
= Et−1 (i) [Xt] +Kt
−→q t (i) (4.78)
for some projection matrix, Kt (the Kalman gain). Note that Kt does not require
an agent subscript as the problem is symmetric for all agents. For this to be the
best linear estimator, we require that Kt be such that
−→q t|t−1 (i) is orthogonal to the
corresponding projection error, Xt −Kt−→q t|t−1 (i). That is, we require that
E
[(
Xt −Kt−→q t|t−1 (i)
)−→q t|t−1 (i)′] = 0 (4.79)
Rearranging this gives
Kt = E
[
Xt
−→q t|t−1 (i)′
] (
E
[−→q t|t−1 (i)−→q t|t−1 (i)′])−1 (4.80)
Before evaluating this, note that we can rewrite the law of motion for the hidden
state as
Xt = F
(−−−−−→
Xt−1|t−1 (i) + Et−1 (i) [Xt−1]
)
+G1ut +G2v˜t +G3et +G4v˜t−1
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The first term of equation (4.80) thus expands to:
E
[
Xt
−→q t|t−1 (i)′
]
= E

(
F
(−−−−−→
Xt−1|t−1 (i) + Et−1 (i) [Xt−1]
)
+G1ut +G2v˜t
+G3et +G4v˜t−1
)
×
 D−−−−−→Xt−1|t−1 (i) + C1Gut +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+ (R3 + C1G3) et + (R4 + C1G4) v˜t−1

′

which simplifies to
E
[
Xt
−→q t|t−1 (i)′
]
= FVt−1|t−1D′ +G1ΣuuG′1C
′
1
+G3Σee (R3 + C1G3)
′ +G4Σv˜v˜ (R4 + C1G4)
′
where Vt|t ≡ E
[−−→
Xt|t (i)
−−→
Xt|t (i)
′
]
is the variance-covariance matrix associated with
Et (i) [Xt] and I have exploited the fact that α (i)
∗ → 0 as J →∞ to obtain zero co-
variance between individual idiosyncratic shocks and their aggregated counterparts.
Given the symmetry of the problem across agents, although individual expectations
may differ the variance of each estimate will be common. For the second term, we
have that
E
[−→q t|t−1 (i)−→q t|t−1 (i)′]
= E

 D−−−−−→Xt−1|t−1 (i) + C1Gut +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+ (R3 + C1G3) et + (R4 + C1G4) v˜t−1

×
 D−−−−−→Xt−1|t−1 (i) + C1Gut +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+ (R3 + C1G3) et + (R4 + C1G4) v˜t−1

′

which simplifies to
E
[−→q t|t−1 (i)−→q t|t−1 (i)′] = DVt−1|t−1D′ + C1G1ΣuuG′1C ′1
+R1ΣvvR
′
1 +R2ΣvvR
′
2
+ (R3 + C1G3) Σee (R3 + C1G3)
′
+ (R4 + C1G4) Σv˜v˜ (R4 + C1G4)
′
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where Σvv =
[ σ2
vA
0
0 σ2vα
]
. All together, the Kalman gain is therefore given by
Kt =
(
FVt−1|t−1D′ +G1ΣuuG′1C
′
1
+G3Σee (R3 + C1G3)
′ +G4Σv˜v˜ (R4 + C1G4)
′
)
(4.81)
×

DVt−1|t−1D′ + C1G1ΣuuG′1C
′
1
+R1ΣvvR
′
1 +R2ΣvvR
′
2
+ (R3 + C1G3) Σee (R3 + C1G3)
′
+ (R4 + C1G4) Σv˜v˜ (R4 + C1G4)
′

−1
Evolution of the gain and variance matricies
First, since we can rewrite the state equation as
Xt − Et−1 (i) [Xt] = FXt−1 +G1ut +G2v˜t +G3et +G4v˜t−1 − Et−1 (i) [Xt]
= F (Xt−1 − Et−1 (i) [Xt−1]) +G1ut +G2v˜t +G3et +G4v˜t−1
we have that
Vt|t−1 = FVt−1|t−1F ′ +G1ΣuuG′1 +G2Σv˜v˜G
′
2 +G3ΣeeG
′
3 +G4Σv˜v˜G
′
4 (4.82)
Next, add Xt to each side of equation (4.78) and rearrange to get
Xt − Et (i) [Xt] +Kt−→q t|t−1 (i) = Xt − Et−1 (i) [Xt]
Since the innovation is orthogonal to both the prior error, Xt−Et−1 (i) [Xt], and the
posterior error, Xt − Et (i) [Xt], the variance of the right-hand side must equal the
sum of the variances on the left-hand side, so that
Vt|t = Vt|t−1 −KtV ar
(−→q t|t−1 (i))K ′t
= Vt|t−1 −KtV ar
 D−−−−−→Xt−1|t−1 (i) + C1Gut +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+ (R3 + C1G3) et + (R4 + C1G4) v˜t−1
K ′t
= Vt|t−1 −Kt

DVt−1|t−1D′ + C1G1ΣuuG′1C
′
1
+R1ΣvvR
′
1 +R2ΣvvR
′
2
+ (R3 + C1G3) Σee (R3 + C1G3)
′
+ (R4 + C1G4) Σv˜v˜ (R4 + C1G4)
′
K ′t (4.83)
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Provided that F represents a contraction, then there will exist time-invariant Kalman
gain and Variance matricies, found by iterating equations (4.81), (4.82) and (4.83)
forward until convergence is achieved. The form of these matricies will be:
K =
(
FV D′ +G1ΣuuG′1C
′
1
+G3Σee (R3 + C1G3)
′ +G4Σv˜v˜ (R4 + C1G4)
′
)
×

DVD′ + C1G1ΣuuG′1C
′
1
+R1ΣvvR
′
1 +R2ΣvvR
′
2
+ (R3 + C1G3) Σee (R3 + C1G3)
′
+ (R4 + C1G4) Σv˜v˜ (R4 + C1G4)
′

−1
V = F
V −Kt

DVD′ + C1G1ΣuuG′1C
′
1
+R1ΣvvR
′
1 +R2ΣvvR
′
2
+ (R3 + C1G3) Σee (R3 + C1G3)
′
+ (R4 + C1G4) Σv˜v˜ (R4 + C1G4)
′
K ′
F ′
+G1ΣuuG
′
1 +G2Σv˜v˜G
′
2 +G3ΣeeG
′
3 +G4Σv˜v˜G
′
4
The law of motion for the hierarchy of firms’ expectations
First note that the recursive formulation of Xt
Xt ≡ E(0:∞)t [xt] =
 xtEt [Xt]
E˜t [Xt]

allows us to write
Et [Xt] =
[
0 I 0
]
Xt = TsXt
E˜t [Xt] =
[
0 0 I
]
Xt = TwXt
where Ts and Tw select the elements from Xt with simple- and weighted-average
expectations as their outermost. Next, recalling that the innovation in the firm’s
signal vector is given by
−→q t (i) = D (Xt−1 − Et−1 (i) [Xt−1]) + C1G1ut +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+ (R3 + C1G3) et + (R4 + C1G4) v˜t−1
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we can take the simple average of the Kalman filter (4.78) to obtain
Et [Xt] = TsXt = {FTs +KD (I − Ts)}Xt−1
+KC1G1ut
+K (R3 + C1G3) et
+K (R4 + C1G4) v˜t−1
and the weighted average of the same to obtain
E˜t [Xt] = TwXt = {FTw +KD (I − Tw)}Xt−1
+KC1G1ut
+KR1v˜t
+K (R3 + C1G3) et
+K (R2 +R4 + C1G4) v˜t−1
We can therefore write
Xt = FXt−1 +G1ut +G2v˜t +G3et +G4v˜t−1
where
F =

[
ρA 0 01×∞
0 ρM 01×∞
]
FTs +KD (I − Ts)
FTw +KD (I − Tw)
 G1 =

[
1 0
0 1
]
KC1G1
KC1G1

G2 =

[
0 0
0 0
]
0∞×2
KR1
 G3 =

[
0 0
0 0
]
K (R3 + C1G3)
K (R3 + C1G3)
 G4 =

[
0 0
0 0
]
K (R4 + C1G4)
K (R2 +R4 + C1G4)

4.A.7 Solving the model
Given the law of motion for the hierarchy of firms’ expectations:
Xt = FXt−1 +G1ut +G2v˜t +G3et +G4v˜t−1
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and the following expression for firms’ signal vectors:
qt (i) = C1Xt + C2Xt−1 +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+R3et +R4v˜t−1
we here demonstrate that the aggregate variables of the economy may then be char-
acterised as:
ŷ∗t = γ
∗′
y Xt + δ
∗′
y v˜t
p̂∗t = γ
∗′
p Xt + δ
∗′
p v˜t
for ∗ ∈ {NUTL,UTL,DS}.
Building an expression for ŷt
We start with the expression for output in period t
(1 + σκy) ŷt = Et [ŷt+1]
− σ (1− κpi) p̂t
+ σ (1− κpi)Et [p̂t+1]
− σMt
Substituting in the conjectured solution and recalling that the representative house-
hold and central bank have full information then gives
(1 + σκy) ŷt = γ
∗′
y (FXt +G4v˜t)
− σ (1− κpi)γ∗′p Xt
+ σ (1− κpi)γ∗′p (FXt +G4v˜t)
− σMt
Rearranging then gives
ŷt = γ
∗′
y Xt + δ
∗′
y v˜t
where
γ∗′y =
1
1 + σκy

γ∗′y F
+σ (1− κpi)γ∗′p (F − I)
+
[
0 −σ 01×∞
]

δ∗′y = γ
∗′
y G4 + σ (1− κpi)γ∗′p G4
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or
γ∗′y =
1
1 + σκy
(
σ (1− κpi)γ∗′p (F − I)
+
[
0 −σ 01×∞
] )(I − 1
1 + σκy
F
)−1
Building an expression for p̂t (Uniform TransLog and Dixit-Stiglitz
preferences)
We start with the expression for the aggregate price:
p̂∗t = λ
∗
7 
A
t
+
∞∑
k=0
(λ∗1)
k E
(k+1)
t
[
λ∗3p̂
∗
t+1 + λ
∗
4ŷt+1 + (λ
∗
5 + λ
∗
1λ
∗
7) 
A
t + λ
∗
6 
M
t
]
for ∗ ∈ {UTL,DS}. Substituting in the conjectured solution and noting that firms’
incomplete information implies that Et (i) [v˜t] = 0 ∀i, we have
p̂∗t = λ
∗
7 
A
t
+
∞∑
k=0
(λ∗1)
k E
(k+1)
t
[
λ∗3γ
∗′
p FXt + λ
∗
4γ
∗′
y FXt + (λ
∗
5 + λ
∗
1λ
∗
7) 
A
t + λ
∗
6 
M
t
]
or
p̂∗t =
[
λ∗7 0 01×∞
]
Xt
+
(
λ∗3γ
∗′
p F + λ
∗
4γ
∗′
y F +
[
(λ∗5 + λ
∗
1λ
∗
7) λ
∗
6 01×∞
]) ∞∑
k=0
(λ∗1)
k E
(k+1)
t [Xt]
from which we can read that
p̂∗t = γ
∗′
p Xt
where
p̂∗t =
[
λ∗7 0 01×∞
]
+
(
λ∗3γ
∗′
p F + λ
∗
4γ
∗′
y F
+
[
(λ∗5 + λ
∗
1λ
∗
7) λ
∗
6 01×∞
] ) (I − λ∗1Ts)−1 Ts
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Building an expression for p̂t (Near-Uniform TransLog preferences)
We start with the expression for the aggregate price level in period t
p̂NUTLt = λ7
(
At + v˜
A
t
)
+
1
γ
v˜αt
+ E˜t
[
φ′E(0:∞)t
[
λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ5 + (λ1 + λ2)λ7) 
A
t + λ6
M
t + λ2λ7v˜
A
t
]]
Substituting in the conjectured solution and recalling that Et (i) [v˜t] = 0 ∀i, we have
p̂NUTLt = λ7
(
At + v˜
A
t
)
+
1
γ
v˜αt
+ E˜t
[
φ′E(0:∞)t
[
λ3γ
′
pFXt + λ4γ
′
yFXt + (λ5 + (λ1 + λ2)λ7) 
A
t + λ6
M
t
]]
or
p̂NUTLt =
[
λ7 0 01×∞
]
Xt +
[
λ7
1
γ
]
v˜t
+
( (
λ3γ
′
p + λ4γ
′
y
)
F[
(λ5 + (λ1 + λ2)λ7) λ6 01×∞
] ) E˜t [φ′E(0:∞)t [Xt]]
To simplify this further, it will be necessary to consider the following object
φ′E(0:∞)t [Xt]
Recalling the recursive formulation of E
(0:∞)
t [·], we have that
Xt =
 xtEt [Xt]
E˜t [Xt]

Et [Xt] =
[
0 I 0
]
Xt = TsXt
E˜t [Xt] =
[
0 0 I
]
Xt = TwXt
where Ts and Tw select the elements from Xt with simple- and weighted-average
expectations as their outermost. We can therefore write
φ′E(0:∞)t [Xt] = Xt
+ λ1Et [Xt] + λ2E˜t [Xt]
+ λ21Et
[
Et [Xt]
]
+ λ1λ2E˜t
[
Et [Xt]
]
+ λ1λ2Et
[
E˜t [Xt]
]
+ λ22E˜t
[
E˜t [Xt]
]
+ · · ·
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and then rewrite this as
φ′E(0:∞)t [Xt] = Xt
+ λ1TsXt + λ2T2Xt
+ λ21T
2
sXt + λ1λ2TwTsXt
+ λ1λ2TsTwXt + λ
2
2T
2
wXt
+ · · ·
But this is then simply an infinite (and convergent) sum of binomials
φ′E(0:∞)t [Xt] =
( ∞∑
k=0
[λ1Ts + λ2Tw]
k
)
Xt
which may be written as
φ′E(0:∞)t [Xt] = (I − [λ1Ts + λ2Tw])−1Xt
Moving back to the expression for the aggregate price level, we can therefore
write
p̂NUTLt =
[
λ7 0 01×∞
]
Xt +
[
λ7
1
γ
]
v˜t
+
( (
λ3γ
′
p + λ4γ
′
y
)
F[
(λ5 + (λ1 + λ2)λ7) λ6 01×∞
] )
× (I − [λ1Ts + λ2Tw])−1 TwXt
or, gathering terms,
p̂NUTLt =
(
γNUTLp
)′
Xt +
(
δNUTLp
)′
v˜t
where(
γNUTLp
)′
=
[
λ7 01×∞
]
+
 (λ3 (γNUTLp )′ + λ4 (γNUTLy )′)F[
(λ5 + (λ1 + λ2)λ7) 01×∞
] 
× (I − [λ1Ts + λ2Tw])−1 Tw(
δNUTLp
)′
=
[
λ7
1
γ
]
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The firms’ signal vector
Recall the signal vector observed each period
qt (i) =

ŷt−1 + ey,t
p̂t−1 + ep,t
ŷt−1 (i)
ŵt−1
ât (i)

′
With the conjectured solution, we can immediately write that
ŷt−1 = γ∗′y Xt−1 + δ
∗′
y v˜t−1
p̂t−1 = γ∗′p Xt−1 + δ
∗′
p v˜t−1
ât (i) =
[
1 0 01×∞
]
Xt +
[
1 0
] [vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
which leaves only ŷt−1 (i) and ŵt−1 to work out.
Making use of the previous-period quantity (TransLog and Symmetric
TransLog preferences)
To make use of the quantity sold from the previous period, we note again the two
definitions of expenditure share in the TransLog framework:
Pt−1 (i)Yt−1 (i)
Pt−1Yt−1
= st−1 (i) = αt−1 (i) + γiipt−1 (i) +
∑
j 6=i
γijpt−1 (j)
Linearising and making use of our near-uniformity assumptions and the definition of
αt (i), this becomes
1
J
(p̂t−1 (i) + ŷt−1 (i)− p̂t−1 − ŷt−1) = ŝt−1 (i) = 1
J
vαt−1 (i)−
γ
J
p̂t−1 (i) +
γ
J
p̂t−1
Further rearranging, we may write this as
p̂t−1 (i) + ŷt−1 (i) = ŷt−1 + p̂t−1 + γp̂t−1 + vαt−1 (i)
The left-hand side of this expression is made up entirely of objects observed by
the firm. Since the firm’s price is necessarily a linear function of its period t − 1
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information set, observing ŷt−1 (i) is informationally equivalent to observing p̂t−1 (i)+
ŷt−1 (i). To construct this, we start with the earlier expression for p̂t:
p̂t = λ7
A
t +
∞∑
k=0
λk1E
(k+1)
t
[
λ2 ˜̂pt + λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ5 + λ1λ7) At + λ6Mt ]
Substituting the definition of the aggregate price under Near-Uniform TransLog pref-
erences gives
p̂t = λ7
A
t +
∞∑
k=0
λk1E
(k+1)
t
[
λ2p̂t − 1
γ
v˜αt + λ3p̂t+1 + λ4ŷt+1 + (λ5 + λ1λ7) 
A
t + λ6
M
t
]
Substituting in the conjectured solution then gives
p̂t = λ7
A
t +
∞∑
k=0
λk1E
(k+1)
t
[
λ2γ
′
pXt + λ3γ
′
pFXt + λ4γ
′
yFXt + (λ5 + λ1λ7) 
A
t + λ6
M
t
]
Gathering like terms,
p̂t =
[
λ7 0 01×∞
]
Xt
+
(
λ2γ
′
p + λ3γ
′
pF + λ4γ
′
yF[
(λ5 + λ1λ7) λ6 01×∞
] ) ∞∑
k=0
λk1E
(k+1)
t [Xt]
or
p̂t = γ
′
pXt
where
γ ′p =
[
λ7 0 01×∞
]
+
(
λ2γ
′
p + λ3γ
′
pF + λ4γ
′
yF[
(λ5 + λ1λ7) λ6 01×∞
] ) (I − λ1Ts)−1 Ts
which is to say
p̂t−1 (i) + ŷt−1 (i) = (γy + γp + γγp)
′Xt−1 + (δy + δp)
′ v˜t−1 +
[
0 1
] [vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
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Making use of the previous-period quantity (Dixit-Stiglitz preferences)
Equivalent logic to the above then grants the following for Dixit-Stiglitz preferences:
p̂t−1 (i) + ŷt−1 (i) = (γy + εγp)
′Xt−1 +
[
0 1
] [vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
where ε is the elasticity of demand.
Including the wage in the signal vector
Recall from appendix 4.A.4 that
$̂t =
(
1
σ
+
1
ψ
(1 + η)
)
ŷt − 1
ψ
(1 + η) ẑt
ẑt = 
A
t + p̂t − p̂t
where $̂t ≡ ŵt − p̂t is the real wage. Combining these, we have
ŵt = γ
′
wXt + δ
′
wv˜t
γw = γp +
(
1
σ
+
1
ψ
(1 + η)
)
γy − 1
ψ
(1 + η) (γp − γp)
δw =
(
1
σ
+
1
ψ
(1 + η)
)
δy +
(
1− 1
ψ
(1 + η)
)
δp
The signal vector
We are therefore able to write
qt (i) = C1Xt + C2Xt−1 +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+R3et +R4v˜t−1
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where
C1 =

01×∞
01×∞
01×∞
01×∞
1 0 0 0 01×∞
 C2 =

γ ′y
γ ′p
γ ′y + γ
′
p + γγ
′
p
γ ′w
01×∞
 R1 =

0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0

R2 =

0 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
 R3 =

1 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
 R4 =

δ′y
δ′p
δ′y + δ
′
p
δ′w
0 0

Innovation in the signal vector
Recall that the optimal linear estimator in this setting is the Kalman filter (4.68):
Et (i) [Xt] = FEt−1 (i) [Xt−1] +K {qt (i)− Et−1 (i) [qt (i)]}
First note that firm i’s prior expectation of qt (i) (i.e. that formed in the previous
period) may be written as
Et−1 (i) [qt (i)] = (C1F + C2)Et−1 (i) [Xt−1] +R2Et−1 (i)
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
where we have dropped the terms in ut, v
A
t (i) and v
α
t (i) as they cannot be seen
in advance and have unconditional expectations of zero. The term in v˜t−1 is also
dropped as idiosyncratic shocks are fully independent (so that Et (i) [vt (j)] = 0 ∀j 6=
i) and in the limit, limJ→∞ α (i)
∗ = 0 ∀i. It is also the case that Et−1 (i)
[
vαt−1 (i)
]
= 0
since firms make no observation of household demand at the moment of setting prices.
In principle, we have a complication in that since the firm observes ât (i), it must be
that
Et−1 (i)
[
vAt−1 (i)
]
= vAt−1 (i) + 
A
t−1 − Et−1 (i)
[
At−1
]
However, since nothing in qt (i) depends on Et−1 (i)
[
vAt−1 (i)
]
(the left-hand column
of R2 is all zeros), we may ignore this complication and simply write
Et−1 (i) [qt (i)] = (C1F + C2)Et−1 (i) [Xt−1]
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Consequently, we may write the surprise in (i.e. the unexplained portion of) the
firm’s signal vector as
−→q t (i) ≡ qt (i)− Et−1 (i) [qt (i)]
= (C1F + C2) (Xt−1 − Et−1 (i) [Xt−1]) + C1G1ut +R1
[
vAt (i)
vαt (i)
]
+R2
[
vAt−1 (i)
vαt−1 (i)
]
+ (R3 + C1G3) et + (R4 + C1G4) v˜t−1
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